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DEFENSIVELY INVOKING TREATIES IN AMERICAN
COURTS-JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES UNDER THE
U.N. DRUG TRAFFICKING CONVENTION BY FOREIGN
DEFENDANTS KIDNAPPED ABROAD BY U.S. AGENTS
THOMAs MICHAEL MCDONNELL"
I. INTRODUCTION
Article VI of the United States Constitution makes treaties
"the supreme Law of the Land."1 Through this clause, the Fram-
ers intended, among other things, to grant foreigners the right
to invoke treaties in American courts.! The Framers thereby
hoped to avoid conflicts with a foreigner's home country' The
potential for such conflict rises when our government, rather
than a private party, deprives a foreigner of a right protected by
treaty4 Individuals-citizens and foreigners alike-attempting
* Associate Professor, Pace Umversity School of Law. BA., J.D., Fordham Uny-
versity. I thank Professors Eric E. Bergsten, Donald L. Doernberg, John E. Noyes,
Nicholas Triffin, and Gayl S. Westerman for their comments upon an earlier draft of
this Article.
1. Article VI states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing xi the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (commonly referred to as the "Supremacy Clause").
Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power "extend[s] to all
Cases, mi Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." U.S.
CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. The Judiciary Act of 1789, the first legislation the Senate
considered, gave federal courts jurisdiction over disputes involving treaties. 1 Stat.
73 (1789).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); see also znfra notes 70-74 and
accompanying text.
3. Id. The Framers also hoped to preserve the rule of law and to protect the
rights of the individual. See infra part IIA.2.a.
4. Note, for example, the outrage Mexicans at all levels of society expressed
when the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504
U.S. 655 (1992), reversed a decision ordering the return of a Mexican physician
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to invoke treaties in American courts have, however, often been
blocked by the judicially created non-self-executing treaty doc-
trine, under which the courts refuse to enforce certain treaties
or treaty provisions. Lower federal courts, in particular, have
unjustifiably expanded the doctrine and frequently have applied
the wrong standard.' They have thus often frustrated the
Framers' purpose, violated the plain meamng of the Supremacy
Clause, and failed to protect individuals' human rights.
This Article unravels the non-self-executing treaty doctrine,
examines the invocation of a treaty as a defense to governmental
action, and develops a test for when an individual (rather than a
government) may assert a treaty defensively in state or federal
courts. Lastly, this Article applies this test to state-sponsored
kidnapping and the U.N. Convention Against llicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The parties to
whom Drug Enforcement Adminstration-paid agents had kidnapped from Mexico and
brought to the United States for trial. See infra notes 454, 457 and accompanying
text.
5. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989) (determining
that the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is non-self-executing and
thus not invocable by sanctuary movement members defending against federal prose-
cution for smuggling Central Amencan inngrants claimed to be refugees), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir.
1987) (concluding that the High Seas Convention is non-self-executing); United States
v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 873-84 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979);
Sel Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 218 P.2d 595
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), rev'd on this issue and affd on other grounds, 242 P.2d
617, 620-22 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) (determining that Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N.
Charter, the human rights articles, are non-self-executing and thus not invocable by
a Japanese immigrant challenging race-based restriction on owning land); In re Me-
dina, 19 I. & M. Dec. 734, 734-35, 740-41 (1988) (determining that the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is non-self-
executing and thus not invocable by a Salvadoran fighting deportation to her country
in the middle of an armed conflict); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (concluding that, among other
treaties, the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons m Time of
War and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War are
non-self-executing), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The
Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. PostaL- Win at Any Price?, 74 AAi1. J.
INT'L L. 892 (1980) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Postal).
6. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substanc-
es, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988), reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) (entered into force Nov. 11, 1990) [hereinafter U.N. Drug Traf-
ficking Convention].
DEFENSIVELY INVOKING TREATIES
this treaty, which was sponsored by the United States, barred
one country's law enforcement agents from operating without
permission on another country's soil and rejected a provision
requiring a country to extradite its own citizens.7 This Article
demonstrates that, had the Convention been in effect when the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Alvarez-Machan, the
Court would have been constrained, even under its flawed rea-
soning in interpreting the extradition treaty at issue there, to
have recognized the challenge to the trial court's personal juris-
diction brought by the Memcan physician abducted from
Guadalajara by paid agents of the United States.'
To understand why courts generally should permit individu-
als, and particularly foreigners, to invoke treaties defensively
requires an examination of the status of treaties in American
law and, especially, a study of Article VI, clause 2, of the Consti-
tution. Part II analyzes the text and drafting history of the Su-
premacy Clause, the characteristics of self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties, the United States' approaches to treaty
interpretation, and the manner m which American courts have
interpreted treaties when asserted defensively by individuals.
Part III proposes a three-prong test for invoking treaties defen-
sively Part IV analyzes the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention,
discusses the extraordinary drafting history of the Convention's
extradition and antiforeign law enforcement articles, and shows
how they ought to be interpreted in light of that history and in
accordance with the more general rules of treaty interpretation
discussed in Part II. After analyzing these provisions, Part IV
demonstrates how the general theory of treaty interpretation
and the proposed test combine to accord abducted foreign defen-
dants"° the right to invoke these two articles to challenge the
7. Id. arts. 2, 6; see infra note 318 (excerpting relevant paragraphs of Article 6);
Appendix, infra, at notes 525-32 (providing complete text of Article 2).
8. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
9. See infra part W.C.i.
10. The Convention deals solely with illicit drug trafficking and protects only those
kidnapped in relation to law enforcement efforts involving illicit drugs. Furthermore,
the Convention protects nationals of the state from which the individual is abducted,
not necessarily nationals of other states. This fact does not mean that those outside
the Convention have no protection. Customary international law and human rights
treaties generally prohibit state-sponsored abductions. See RESTATEMENT, (THIRD) OF
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personal jurisdiction of state and federal courts.
II. TREATIES IN AMERICAN COURTS
A. Treaties and the Supremacy Clause
1. Self- or Non-Self-Executing?-A Questin of Domestic Law
In their relations with one another, most countries view trea-
ties as legal obligations, much in the same way that parties to a
private bilateral or multilateral contract regard such an agree-
ment." The domestic courts of nation states, however, view
treaties through a different lens-that of their domestic law, in-
cluding applicable constitutional provisions. The lens may con-
sist of transparent glass, highly refracted glass, or glass so
opaque as to transmit virtually no light whatsoever. Whether an
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 reporter's note 1 (1987) (inferring from Articles 3, 5, and
9 of the Umversal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as Articles 7, 9, and 10 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that state-sponsored abduc-
tions are illegal and noting that the Human Rights Committee established by the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that Uruguayan security agents
violated Article 9(i) by kidnapping a Uruguayan refugee from Argentina).
The United States Senate, however, has rendered the human rights treaties
that the United States has ratified largely non-self-executing. See, e.g., 138 CONG.
REC. S4781, S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (Executive Session on the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Furthermore, American courts have been
inconsistent in giving effect to customary imternational law. Compare The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law.
[Wlhere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.") with
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 971 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
customary international law applies m state-sponsored kidnapping cases only "in a
situation in which the government's conduct was outrageous" and thus violative of
due process) (citing United States v. Toscanmo, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974)); see
also Louis Henkin, International Law As Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555, 1565-66 (1984) (concluding that customary international law has the
same status as self-executing treaties); Monroe Leigh, Is the President Above Custom-
ary International Law?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (1992) (arguing that the executive
branch exceeds its discretion when ordering an extraterritorial arrest without the
consent of the territorial sovereign state). But see Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board
the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary Inter-
national Law, 25 VA. J. INTL L. 143, 151 (1984) (asserting that customary interna-
tional law is inferior to federal statute).
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS pt. 1, ch. 1, introductory
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individual may invoke a treaty in a domestic court thus depends
largely on the domestic law of the country in question. When,
without additional implementing legislation, domestic law per-
mits courts to use a treaty provision as the rule of decision, the
treaty provision is "self-executing." 2 When domestic law re-
quires Implementing legislation to make the provision effective
locally, the treaty provision is "non-self-executing." 3 Whether a
treaty provision is self-executing or non-self-executing is a ques-
tion of domestic, not international, law '4 Each country is re-
quired to carry out its international obligations, but the country
may choose any reasonable method of doing so."
For example, a clause in a bilateral treaty of amity and
friendship may state as follows: "The parties to this treaty guar-
antee that neither party's nationals shall be subject to discrim-
ination in trade or employment." 6 Assume that two countries,
Atlantis and Utopia, enter into a treaty of amity and friendship
containing this clause. Assume further that a mumcipality in
Atlantis denied A, a national of Utopia legally residing in
Atlantis, a license to operate a taxi cab service. A met all of the
mumcipality's requirements for the license but was denied solely
because she was not an Atlantis national. The domestic law of
Atlantis could permit A to assert the treaty of frendship in
Atlantis's courts to obtain an order, requiring the municipality
to issue the license. Alternatively, Atlantis's executive could in-
tervene with the municipality's officials to rescind the denial of
12. Id. § 111 cmt. h.
13. Id.
14. Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A
Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 650 (1986); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § II cmt. h; RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEM[S OF LAW AND POLICY 73-74 (1979).
15. See Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 651 ("States determine how to implement their
international legal obligations on the municipal level."). Despite courts' statements
that intent of the parties determines the self-executing question, "[tihe negotiating
parties are usually not concerned with the question of whether the treaty will
be domestically valid or directly applicable [self-executing]." Id. at 654. Tis is par-
ticularly so with multilateral treaties. Id., FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 580 (1990).
16. See Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340 (1924). In Asakura, the Court inter-
preted a similar treaty provision to bar discrimination against a Japanese national
carrying out the trade of a pawnbroker. Id. at 343.
1996] 1405
WILLIAM AND MARY.LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1401
the license and obtain a license for A. 7 Under either approach,
Atlantis has fulfilled its obligations under the treaty of amity
and fiendship.
The first approach illustrates the operation of a self-executing
treaty provision. The second approach illustrates the operation
of a non-self-executing provision, an approach that requires
implementing legislation to permit the individual to assert the
treaty violation in the state's courts. Usually, the state parhes
do not care which method the other state party or parties adopt
to fulfill their treaty obligations."5 In our country, the available
evidence suggests that the Framers of the Constitution intended
that the United States adopt the first approach, creating a de
facto rebuttable presumption in favor of self-execution.
2. The Framers' Intent in Making Treaties the Law of the
Land
Through the Supremacy Clause, 9 the Framers deliberately
chose to make treaties law rather than merely a moral obliga-
tion."0 They were well aware that England used a quite different
17. Typically, A, the aggrieved national, would have to persuade her government
to intercede on her behalf. Assuming that Utopia agreed to do so, it would use dip-
lomatic channels to persuade Atlantis officials to ensure that the municipal govern-
ment grants A the license. See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Le-
gal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 310, 314-15 (1986) (explaining the
terms "dualist" and "monist). Persons within a monist state can invoke the treaty
and sue in a domestic court of the state to require that they be treated m accor-
dance with the treaty standard. Id. at 314. "In a dualist state, [howeverj interna-
tional treaties are part of a separate legal system from that of the domestic law
(hence a 'dual' system)." Id. "Therefore, a treaty is not part of the domestic law, at
least not directly." Id. Persons m such a state may not go to court to enforce their
rights under the treaty: "The [foreign citizen'sl only recourse is to persuade his own
government to use diplomatic means to encourage [the violating state] to honor its
obligation[s under the treaty]." Id. at 314-15. I have borrowed from Jackson m creat-
ing the above hypothetical; he uses a quite similar one to illustrate the difference
between a monist and a dualist state.
18. As a matter of convention, the states leave to each party state's domestic law
the authority to choose the appropriate means of meeting treaty obligations. See
supra note 14.
19. See supra note 1.
20. George Mason, delegate from Virginia, was one of the three Framers who re-
fused to sign the proposed Constitution. He set forth his objections m a pamphlet
that was later published in the Virginia Journal on November 22, 1787. George
1406
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system and purposely rejected England's approach. Under the
British system, treaties are never self-executing,2 ' and Par-
liament must pass special legislation for a treaty to operate
domestically The Framers, however, wanted treaties to have the
same status as do federal statutes.
a. Treaties Becoming Law of the Land
After the hostilities between the British and the rebellious
former colonists ended in 1781, intense anti-Tory feeling contin-
ued to grip the newly independent American states. As a result,
many state legislatures enacted statutes that permitted: (1)
forgiveness of debts owed to Tones (British citizens),22 (2)
Mason, Objections to the Constitution, VA. J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DE-
BATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 345 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE DE-
BATE]. A federalist writing under the pseudonym of Civis Rusticus replied as'follows:
"The infraction of the present treaty [the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain] shews
the necessity of treaties having the force of laws. " Civis Rusticus, Reply to
Mason's Objections, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 30, 1788, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE,
supra, at 359. Many of the essays, including The Federalist Papers, written either
for or against ratifying the Constitution, were written under pseudonyms.
21. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT'S DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 437 (James McClellan & M.E. Bradford eds.,
1989) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (statement of delegate Mercer indicating that
treaties in England were never final until voted upon by Parliament). The Minority
Report from the Pennsylvania Convention argued that the full Parliament had to
approve treaties for them to have effect locally: "It is the unvaried usage of all free
states, whenever treaties interfere with the positive laws of the land, to make the
intervention of the legislature necessary to give them operation. This became
necessary, and was afforded by the parliament of Great-Britam." The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their
Constituents, PA. PAcKET DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 161 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). As indicated,
although Mercer and the minority report correctly noted the English practice, their
argument did not prevail. See Essays of an Old Whig III, INDEP. GAZETTEER (PHILA.),
Oct. 1787-Feb. 1788, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 27. In
objecting to the Supremacy Clause, the author noted that
even m England the parliament is constantly applied to for their sanction
to every treaty which tends to introduce an innovation or the slightest
alteration in the laws in being, the law there is not altered by the treaty
itself; but by an act of parliament which confirms the treaty, and alters
the law so as to accommodate it to the treaty.
Id. Again, although the author correctly identified English practice, his ultimate
argument failed.
22. See, e.g., Citation Act, 1782 N.Y. Laws ch. 1 (An Act Relative to Debts Due to
Persons Within the Enemy Lines).
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confiscation of Tory property," and (3) recovery in trespass for
the Tores' use and occupation of Americans' land confiscated by
the British during the war.2 4 Such statutes violated Articles IV,
V, and VI of the Treaty of Peace of 1783 with Great Britain.'
Protecting Tores' rights had been one of Great Britan's chief
demands in negotiating the Treaty of Peace26 and in granting to
the United States numerous rights and privileges. 7 In retaliation
against the continued enforcement of the anti-Tory statutes, Great
Britain refused to evacuate several garrisons on the Great Lakes
and allowed its soldiers to capture some 3000 American slaves."
Anti-Tory statutes also shaped the thinking of Alexander
Hamilton, one of the most influential Framers of the Constitution,
who has been credited with calling the Constitutional Con-
vention." Hamilton saw the Supremacy Clause as resolving at
23. See, e.g., Confiscation Act, 1779 N.Y. Laws ch. 25 (An Act for the Forfeiture and
Sale of the Estates of Persons Who Have Adhered to the Enemies of This State
in Respect to all Property Within the Same). Note that some of the anti-Tory statutes
were enacted before the war ended.
24. See, e.g., Trespass Act, 1783 N.Y. Laws ch. 31 (An Act for Granting a More
Effectual Relief in Cases of Certain Trespasses).
25. Article IV of the Definitive Treaty of Peace of 1783, between Great Britain and
the United States, provided as follows: "It is agreed that creditors, on either side, shall
meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value, in sterling money,
of all bona fide debts, heretofore contracted." Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239
(1796) (quoting Article IV of the Treaty). Article V of the Treaty provided: "That all
persons who have any interest in confiscated lands, by DEBTS, should meet with no
lawful impediment in the prosecution of their just rights." Id. at 238-39 (quoting
Article V of the Treaty) (emphasis by capitalization in original). The treaty was ratified
on January 14, 1784, and went into effect on April 9, 1784.
26. On January 14, 1784, the Continental Congress ratified the Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain and called on the states to stop confiscating Tones' properties and to
repeal laws preventing the collection of debts owed to Tories by American citizens, all
of which conduct violated the Treaty. 1 THE DEBATE, supra note 20, at 1069-70. The
states, however, failed to heed the injunction of the Congress.
27. Under- the treaty, Great Britain recogmzed not only the independence of the
United States but also its "claim to the territory west to the Mississippi, north to
Canada, and south to the Flondas." 1 HARRY J. CARMAN ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 215 (3d ed. 1967). Furthermore, Great Britain granted the United
States fishing rights on the banks of Newfoundland, in the inshore waters of the
British dominions in America, and in the unsettled bays and harbors along Canada's
eastern coastline. Id.
28. See infra note 51.
29. RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY,
AND THE CONSTrrUTIoN 194-95 (1985).
DEFENSIVELY INVOKING TREATIES
a single stroke two critical, interrelated problems: first, assuring
a strong central government; second, protecting the rights of
foreigners and thereby encouraging foreign investment, speaking
with one voice in international commerce, and avoiding friction
with other countries." After the war ended, but before the
Constitutional Convention, Hamilton had handled a lawsuit,
Rutgers v. Waddington,"' dealing with a treaty violation. The
state court's reaction to the violation and the popular response to
the court's opinion indelibly impressed upon him the need to
elevate the status of treaties in the new constitution. 2
In Rutgers, Hamilton represented a Tory who had been sued for
trespass under the New York statute. After occupying New
York City in 1778, the British seized some real property in the
City and let two Tones operate a brewery on the premises.34
They paid no rent from 1778 to 1780 but, upon order of the
British Commande-in-Chief, paid rent into a poor person's fund
thereafter until 1783."5 After the war, the American owner 6 of
the property sued under New York's Trespass Act to recover
damages for the use and enjoyment of the property during the
occupation.
Under the treaty, neither side was entitled to recover for
seizures made during hostilities.38 In arguing before the New
30. Id. at 184-85.
31. N.Y. Mayor's Ct., 1784, removed by writ of error, N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1784-1785, cited
in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 289-316 (Julius Goebel, Jr., ed.,
1964) [hereinafter LAW PRACTICE].
32. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 526-27.
33. Id. at 289.
34. Id. The merchants' names were Benjamin Waddington and Evelyn Pierrepont.
35. Id. at 290.
36. Id. at 289. The owner's name was Elizabeth Rutgers. She fled New York City
when it was captured by the British durng the summer of 1776. Id.
37. Id. at 291.
38. Article VI of the Treaty of Peace of 1783 provided as follows:
That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any prosecutions com-
menced against any person or persons, for, or by reason of any part, which
he or they may have taken in the present war: and that no person shall,
on that account, suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, lib-
erty, or property; and that those who may be in confinement on such
charges, at the time of the ratification of the treaty in America, shall be
immediately set at liberty, and the prosecutions so commenced, be
discontinued.
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York Mayor's Court, Hamilton emphasized that the legitimate
interests of foreigners had to be respected. 9 He relied upon the
Treaty, the Articles of Confederation, and the law of nations.40
The court rejected the treaty argument and, in a somewhat
confusing opinion, determined that the legislature could not have
intended the statute to apply when it would violate the law of
nations.41 In a Solomon-like holding, appreciated by neither side,
the court gave judgment to the American owner for the period
from 1778 to 1780, for which the Tory occupants had paid no
rent,42 but gave the occupants 43 judgment for the period from
1780 to 1783, during which they had paid rent under the order of
the British military command."
A test case, Rutgers received wide publicity Although Hamilton
thought that the court had failed to uphold the Tories' rights
under the treaty, anti-Tones nevertheless denounced the opin-
ion.45 Rutgers and its stormy reception persuaded Hamilton that
making treaties legally enforceable was the only means of
protecting the interests of foreigners in state courts.46
Meanwhile, enforcement of the anti-Tory statutes led to
continued British reprisals.4 1 After investigating Britain's com-
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 273 (1796) (quoting Article VI of the Treaty).
Hamilton argued that Article VI protected by implication an individual in the
defendant's position. The phrase "nor any prosecutions commenced against any person
or persons, for, or by reason of any part, which he or they may have taken in the
present war" suggests that a British Army licensee could not be prosecuted for having
occupied real property seized dunng the conflict. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, at
298-99.
39. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 299, 305.
40. Id. at 297, 304-05.
41. Id. at 308-09.
42. Id. at 306-07.
43. Judgment actually ran to Joshua Waddington, their agent, and the named party
in the lawsuit. Id. at 291.
44. The court reasoned that the Tory occupants were not acting under military
orders until 1780 and that the legislature did not intend to have the Trespass Act
apply in such a way as to violate the law of nations, which provided for no
compensation for property seized under military orders. Id. at 308-09.
45. The State Assembly passed a resolution criticizing the decision for "its tendency
subversive of all law and order" to undermine the authority of the legislature. Id. at
312 (quoting NY Assembly Journal, 8th Assembly, ist meeting 33 (Oct. 4-Nov. 29,
1784)).
46. 1 LAW PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 282; MORRIS, supra note 29, at 44-45.
47. MORRIS, supra note 29, at 148.
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plaints that the states had violated the treaty by enacting and
enforcing the anti-Tory laws, John Jay" issued Ins famous
catalog of infractions to the Continental Congress.49 Jay had
conducted a thorough investigation and informed the Congress of
Ins conclusion that the states had violated the treaty first." By
1787, Great Britain had made clear that it would carry out its
treaty obligations only if the American states honored their
commitments to the Tories.5 To help resolve tIns issue, Federal-
ists exhorted the Continental Congress to adopt a constitutional
provision malng treaties superior to state constitutions and stat-
utes and enforceable by individuals in state courts.52 In the end,
48. Jay had been president of the Continental Congress, one of the diplomats who
negotiated the Treaty of Peace, an ambassador to Sparn and Great Britain, and later
the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 1 WILLIAMf JAY, THE LIFE OF JOHN JAY
v-vi (1972).
49. According to Jay, these infractions occurred before British soldiers captured
slaves. MORRIS, supra note 29, at 149.
50. Id. at 148-49. Documents now available reveal, however, that Britain, though
unquestionably incensed about the United States' violations of the treaty, used them
as a pretext to violate the treaty themselves:
[Alt a secret meeting in the British Colomal Office on April 8, 1784-the
day before the treaty went into effect-the British decided to retain [their]
posts [in the Northwest Territories] in order to enlist the aid of friendly
Indians in checking the advance of American settlement and to protect the
lucrative Scottish Canadian fur trade in the Northwest.
CAPmAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 241.
51. On February 28, 1786, the British government told John Adams that the British
would not evacuate their forts in the Northwest Territories until the Americans met
their treaty obligations by permitting British creditors to collect their debts and by
compensating the Tores for confiscations. THE DEBATE, supra note 20, at 1073. The
states' anti-Tory statutes and refusal to honor contracts with British creditors caused
continued friction between the United States and Great Britain. This dispute was not
resolved until the Jay treaty was ratified in 1795. The treaty called for, among other
things, the payment of English creditors as originally provided in the Treaty of Peace
of 1783. FORREST McDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 317 (1982). Great Britain did not
abandon her posts on American soil until 14 years after the Treaty of Peace was
signed. Id.
52. James Madison stated that, for a treaty "[itlo render succeeding laws void, it
must have more than the mere authority of a law [that would only repeal all
antecedent laws]." 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 327 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1975). An
earlier letter to Madison had complained that a lack of uniform compliance among the
states as to treaty obligations with Great Britain left Britain at liberty to capture
American ports and American slaves. Id. at 63. Madison also noted in The Federalist
that, because the state constitutions differed, "it might happen that a treaty or na-
tional law of great and equal importance to the states, would interfere with some and
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the Congress passed a resolution calling upon the states to repeal
laws that were "repugnant to the treaty "" More importantly, the
resolution asserted that treaties are "part of the law of the land,
and [are] not only independent of the will and power of such
[state] Legislatures, but also binding and obligatory on them."'
This resolution was the forerunner of the treaty provision in the
Supremacy Clause, which the Constitutional Convention included
in Article VI a few months later.55
Drawing on his experience in Rutgers, observing the results
of the anti-Tory statutes," and convinced of the utter folly of
thirteen loosely joined independent states, Hamilton concluded
that the new constitution needed a supremacy clause "buttressed
by an independent judiciary"57 Consequently, he devoted much
of his energy to supporting the Supremacy Clause.58 He subse-
not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the states
at the same time that it would have no effect in others." 10 id. at 425 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison)).
53. MORRIS, supra note 29, at 149.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. On March 21, 1787, only a few months before the Constitutional Convention,
Hamilton argued for passage of his bill repealing that part of the Trespass Act that
prohibited pleas of military justification: "He said no state was so much interested in
the due observance of the treaty, as the state of New-York; the British having
possession of its western frontiers. And which they hold under the sanction of our not
having complied with our national engagements." 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAmIL
TON 121 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) [hereinafter PAPERS].
On April 17, 1787, less than a month before the convention, he argued for the
passage of an "Act Repealing Laws Inconsistent with the Treaty of Peace." The act
was passed by the N.Y. Assembly but failed to pass in the Senate. 1 LAW PRACTICE,
supra note 31, at 524 n.196.
57. MORRIS, supra note 29, at 47.
58. Hamilton's proposed constitution, which he apparently gave to Madison at the
close of the Constitutional Convention, contained a clause that closely resembled the
Supremacy Clause: "The laws of the United States and the treaties which have been
made under the articles of confederation and which shall be made under the con-
stitution shall be the supreme law of the land and shall be so construed by the Courts
of the several states. Anything te thze entr- y . thstanding." 4 PAPERS, supra note
56, at 270 (quoting art. VII, § 6 of Alexander Hamilton's proposed constitution)
(language stricken in original). Although Hamilton did not draft the Supremacy Clause,
his writings both before and after the convention, his proposed constitution, his actions
in the New York Legislature to abolish the anti-Tory statutes, and his addresses to
the New York state ratifying convention evince his commitment to the Supremacy
Clause. MCDONALD, supra note 51, at 95-115. Luther Martin, the Maryland delegate
and states' rights advocate, drafted the final version of the Clause. MORRIS, supra note
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quently explained his position at length in four separate issues of
the Federalist Papers.59
For example, in Numbers 22 and 80 of The Federalist, he
discussed two related issues: first, for treaties to have any effect,
courts must have the authority to apply them and individuals
generally must have the right to invoke them; second, to avoid
conflicts with other countries, foreigners must receive access to
our courts and the right to invoke treaties as the rule of deci-
sion.6" Specifically, in Number 22, he wrote:
A circumstance, which crowns the defects of the confederation,
remains yet to be mentioned-the want of a judiciary power.
Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define
their true meaning and operation. The treaties of the United
States to have any force at all, must be considered as part of
the law of the land. Their true import as far as respects in-
dividuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial
determinations.61
On the need to recognize foreigners' rights in courts, Hamilton
wrote in Number 80:
The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers
for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an
injury ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of
preventing it. As the demal or perversion of justice by the
sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with
reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that
the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in
which the citizens of other countries are concerned.62
Hamilton later made clear, in Number 80, that state and federal
courts must acknowledge the rights of foreigners to invoke treaties
29, at 218.
59. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 22, 33, 78 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 80,
supra note 2.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 59; THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 2.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 59.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 2. This particular paper of The Federalist
was published less than three weeks before the critical New York State Convention,
in which Hamilton has been credited with turning around a majority of the delegates
who had been opposed to ratifying the constitution. MCDONALD, supra note 51, at 114-
15.
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to prevent such foreigners from complaining to their home
countries about unjust treatment at the hands of the United
States' federal or state governments."
Hamilton's dismay about the treaty violations was broadly
shared by the Framers' and extended to some anti-Federal-
ists.65 One important anti-Federalist opposed the Constitution as
written, and the treaty power in particular, because the Suprema-
cy Clause implicitly excluded the House of Representatives and
because nothing in the proposal expressly placed constitutional
limits on the treaty power.66 He nevertheless acknowledged that
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 2. In that same essay, Hamilton expanded
on lus concern about avoiding hostilities by providing foreigners with recourse to
independent national tribunals empowered, among other things, to apply treaties and
domestic law as the rule of decision:
But it is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against a
foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to the lex
loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign, as
well as one which violated the stipulations in a treaty or the general laws
of nations.
4 PAPERS, supra note 56, at 668; see also Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 762 (1988) (quoting William Davie, a North Carolina delegate to
the Constitutional Convention: "It was necessary that treaties should operate as laws
on individuals. They ought to be binding upon us the moment they are made. They
involve in their nature not only our own rights, but those of foreigners [and should
be protected by the federal judiciary].") For very good discussions of the Framers'
intent in making treaties the law of the land, see Paust, supra, and Carlos M.
Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUIM. L. REV. 1082,
1097-1110 (1992).
64. Benjamin Franklin proposed adding the language concerning treaties to the first
draft of the Supremacy Clause. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, at 45. In moving
to give Congress a veto power over state legislation, Charles Pinckney, delegate of
South Carolina, noted, among other things, that the states repeatedly violated foreign
treaties. Id. at 86. In seconding the motion, James Madison remarked that the states
"evinced a constant tendency to violate national Treaties." Id. at 87.
65. See, e.g., A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire on the Federal
Constitution (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 21, at
86, 88 (decrying the inability of the confederation to honor the law of nations or
enforce the treaties).
66. Essay XIII of Brutus, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 21, at 377, 428-29 ("For as treaties will be the law of the
land, every person who have rights or privileges secured by treaty, will have aid of
the courts of law, in recovering them."). Storing classifies the essays of Brutus as
"among the most important Anti-Federalist writings." Id. at 358; see also Essays of an
Old Whig III, supra note 21, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 21, at 27-28.
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treaties must have the force of law 67 The two major proposals
that became the focus of the debate in the Constitutional Conven-
tion recogmzed the importance of the treaty power.6" Both the
New Jersey plan, which favored states' rights, and the Virginia
plan, which favored a strong central government, elevated treaties
to the status of law and made them supreme over inconsistent
state statutes.69 In sum, the Framers were anxious to avoid dis-
putes with foreign countries70 that might arise if we denied
foreign citizens either treaty rights or access to our courts.7
Aside from avoiding conflicts with other states, the Framers
desired to establish a uniform foreign trade policy and to encour-
age wealthy foreigners to do business with, and to move to, the
United States." The Framers also wanted to demonstrate to the
world the respect that the new nation held for the rule of law "
67. Essays of an Old Whig III, supra note 21, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 21.
68. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, at 113, 117-18. The New Jersey plan was
largely rejected; the constitution that emerged resembles the Virginia plan in broad
outline. The Supremacy Clause, however, does find part of its root structure in the
New Jersey plan.
69. Id.
70. James Madison, however, criticized the New Jersey plan for not going far
enough to prevent treaty violations: "Will it prevent those violations of the law of
nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in calamities of foreign
wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry
instances." Id. at 139. In his preface to the constitutional debates, Madison noted that
the authority of the Continental Congress to make treaties binding on all the states
had been ignored not only concerning the Treaty of Peace but also concerning treaties
with other countries. Id. at 19-20.
71. In a thoughtful article, one commentator noted that
the Framers were concerned about treaty violations in part because such
violations could offend other states and perhaps lead to calamity and war.
The Framers empowered foreign nationals to utilize our courts to enforce
the nation's treaty commitments in part to cure any such violations before
they gave rise to international friction.
Vdzquez, supra note 63, at 1160 (emphasis in original).
72. At the Virginia Convention, James Madison said: "We well know, sir, that
foreigners cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts, and this has prevented
many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (quoting 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 583 (1888)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
73. In Pennsylvania, James Wilson, a delegate to the Convention, stated: "[We] will
show the world that we make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the char-
acter of the United States; that the judges of the United States will be enabled
to carry it into effect." Id. at 763 (quoting 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, at 490)
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To accomplish these objectives, the Framers made treaties the su-
preme law of the land, enforceable by individuals in state and
federal courts.74
b. The Supreme Court's First Interpretation of a Treaty
Seven years after the ratification of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court in Ware v. Hylton75 had its first opportunity to
construe a treaty-the Treaty of Peace between the United States
and its former colomal master, Great Britain. 6 In finding that
the treaty revived the debts citizens owed to British subjects, the
Court concluded that the treaty overrode inconsistent state law "
The Court thus permitted the Tory creditors to invoke the treaty
in a lawsuit against American debtors, much as Hamilton had
urged in Rutgers.8 Ware effectuated one of the purposes of
making treaties the law of the land-avoiding international
conflict. By enforcing the treaty, the Court prevented British
creditors from demanding that Great Britain take action against
the United States for failing to honor the rights of British citizens.
(alteration in original).
74. The Supremacy Clause solved the most critical issue facing the 13 newly iode-
pendent states-forming a strong central government without necessarily usurping the
sovereignty of the individual member states. Rather than giving Congress- the power
to veto state legislation, which Madison proposed in the Virgnia plan, the Supremacy
Clause instead made federal law and treaties superior to state law, implicitly granting
to the federal courts the authority to determine when state laws contravened federal
statutes and treaties. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
75. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
76. Id.
77. Justice Chase stated:
[T]he treaty of 1783 has superior power to the Legislature of any State,
because no Legislature of any State has any lnd of power over the
Constitution, which was its creator [and] it is the declared duty of the
State Judges to determine any Constitution, or laws of any State, contrary
to that treaty (or any other) made under the authority of the United
States, null and void. National or Federal Judges are bound by duty and
oath to the same conduct.
Id. at 237 (Chase, J., concurring) (all members of the Court filed an opinion); accord
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 360 (1816); see Paust, supra note
63, at 765 nn.35-37 (collecting early American cases finding treaties self-executing).
78. The treaty did not give such a creditor a cause of action expressly, but the
Court, nevertheless, allowed the creditor to invoke the treaty in the trial court. Ware,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 243-44; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Both the states' blatant violations of the treaty and the firm
belief that the rights of foreigners had to be respected to stave off
foreign hostilities and to encourage foreign trade and investment
underlay the Framers' crafting of Article VI, clause 2 of the Con-
stitution. The underlying assumption shared by both detractors
and advocates of Article VI was that Article VI gave individuals
the right to assert treaties in federal and state courts as rules of
decision.
B. Base of the Non-Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine in the United
States
1. Origin of the Doctrine
At first glance, the non-self-executing treaty doctrine appears
to violate the Framers' intent that individuals be able to assert
applicable treaties in state and federal courts. Certainly, a broad
or incorrect interpretation of the doctrine may have that effect.
One needs to examine carefully how the doctrine arose and how
narrowly circumscribed it is to understand its purpose in Amen-
can treaty law The doctrine of non-self-execution did not emerge
here until 1829, forty-two years after the signig of the Constitu-
tion. Narrowly interpreting a treaty between the United States
and Spain, the Supreme Court in Foster & Elam v. Neilson79
instituted the doctrine in this country-
A treaty is m its nature a contract between two nations, not
a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object
to be accomplished; especially so far as its operation is mfra
territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power
of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our
Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is,
consequently, to be regarded in Courts ofjustice as eqivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the
parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty address-
79. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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es itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the Court. 0
Foster held that the treaty was non-self-executing but later
overruled itself upon closer examination of a translation of the
Spanish text. The treaty dealt with the validity of Spanish land
grants made in Florida before it became part of the United States.
The eighth article of the treaty in the English original stated:
[A]ll the grants of lands made before the 24th January, 1818,
by is Catholic majesty, or by his lawful authorities, m the
said territories ceded by is majesty to the United States, shall
be ratified and confirmed to the persons m possession of the
lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be valid
if the territories had remained under the dominion of his
Catholic majesty 8
The emphasized language differed in the Spanish original;
translated, the Spanish text said that such grants "shall remain
ratified and confirmed." 2 Noting that the Spanish version
conformed to international practice and construing both originals
together, the Court reversed itself and found that the treaty
language was self-executing.83
Apparently, the Court initially had read the language "shall be
ratified and confirmed" not to be mandatory' but to be a future,
executory obligation-that is, meaning that the grant "will be
ratified and confirmed" after the treaty was to come into force."
80. Id. at 314.
81. Id. at 274 (quoting the "Florida Purchase Treaty" between the United States and
Spain of February 22, 1819) (emphasis added).
82. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833) (The Spanish version
of this article is: "Todas las concesiones de terrenos quedaran ratificados y
reconocidas a las personas que esten en posesion de ellas.") (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 87-88.
84. The Supreme Court has recognized that "shall" generally means mandatory. See
infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; see also REED DICKERSON, THE FUN-
DAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING § 9.4 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that "shall" indicates an
obligation to act).
85. The Ninth Circuit employed a similar analysis in Islamic Republic v. Boeing Co.,
771 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985). Islamic Republic dealt with the executive agreement
between the United States and Iran over the release of the American hostages and
of the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States. The court concluded that the
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Commentators have criticized Foster's distinction between
executory and executed treaty provisions as unworkable.86 Self-
executing treaties may come into effect at a future date."
Because, after more closely examining the treaty language, the
Court overruled Foster, that case should be read for the narrow
proposition that a treaty or treaty provision that makes itself non-
self-executing is non-self-executing and thus requires implement-
ing legislation to be invoked in court." A more encompassing
aspect of the doctrine concerns whether enforcing the treaty
violates separation-of-powers principles.
2. Separation of Powers, Principles of Contract, and
Non-Self-Executing Treaty Terms
Digging out the foundation of the United States' non-self-
executing treaty doctrine reveals that the doctrine rests largely on
constitutional grounds. Determining whether a treaty is self-
executing or non-self-executing is a question of domestic law 9 In
the United States, the Supremacy Clause forms the base of this
applicable domestic law The Clause's history and plain meaning
suggest that the Framers presumed that most treaties would be
self-executing. By enforcing some treaty terms, however, the
courts might usurp the power of a co-equal branch of government
or otherwise violate the Constitution.90 To avoid such conflicts,
pact was "couched m executory language" and quoted the following terms: "[Tihe
United States agrees to terminate all legal proceedings m United States courts in-
volving claims against Iran , [agrees] to nullify all attachments and judgments
obtained therein, [agrees] to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and
[agrees] to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration." Id.
at 1283 (quoting from the Accords between the United States and the Islamic Republic
of Iran) (emphasis added by the court). Because of the asserted executory character
of these Accords, the court found them non-self-executing. Id. at 1283-84.
86. Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 685; accord Paust, supra note 63, at 770-71.
87. See Oscar Schacter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provi-
sions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REv. 643, 645 (1951).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(4)(a) (1987). This con-
tractual principles component of the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties is discussed
in the next section. Commentators also have phrased the rule of Foster more generally
as follows: "Thus, a treaty which requires no legislation to make it operative within
the national legal order is said to be 'self-executing.'" BURNS H. WESTON. ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 191 (1980).
89. See supra part IIA.i.
90. Although not clear from the wording of the Supremacy Clause, a treaty may not
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the courts have declared such treaty terms non-self-executing.9
These potential constitutional violations typically involve
separation-of-powers conflicts. A treaty term is not self-executing
if it requires action that the Constitution authorizes only Congress
to perform. For example, by purporting to declare war or by re-
quiring the allocation of funds, a treaty would usurp the House's
constitutional role and would be unenforceable.9 2 A treaty term
is not self-executing if it is nonjusticiable 93-that is, if its judicial
enforcement would usurp exclusive, constitutionally granted
executive power over critical foreign policy issues. 4 A treaty term
violate the Constitution. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
91. See Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.) (peace treaty
regarding patents on industrial property), cert. dented, 280 U.S. 571 (1929); Sei Fujii
v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g dented, 218 P.2d 595 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1950), rev'd on this issue and affd on other grounds, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (en
banc); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 reporter's note 5 (citing
Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913)) (giving effect to congressio-
nal view that industrial property treaty was non-self-executing). For a discussion of Set
Fujii, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
92. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that, in the following
areas, among others, the treaty-making power is not "concurrent" with congressional
power: Congress has exclusive authority to declare war, to appropriate money, and to
raise taxes) (quoting Article I, § 9, cl. 7, of the Constitution: "No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."), cert.
dented, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 cmt.
i, at 47-48. For a conflicting view, see Paust, supra note 63, at 775-81, in which the
author argues that Congress does not have exclusive power to allocate funds or to raise
taxes. Consequently, except for declarations of war, Panst would not render treaties
non-self-executing for want of the approval of the House of Representatives. Authorities
have asserted that criminal offenses may not be established by treaty because that
power requires congressional action. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 111 cmt. i, at 48. But see Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 618
(1927) (implying that the United States' criminal jurisdiction could be expanded by
treaty alone).
93. Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that Congress
may violate a treaty and finding nonjusticiable a lawsuit to compel the president to
comply with a treaty in the face of Congress's clear intent to violate the pact), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
94. The political question doctrine rests on the separation of powers. Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Three principal questions underlie the doctrine: "(i) Does the
issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a
coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that
a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations
counsel against judicial intervention?" Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring); see Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (formulating a similar six-prong
test that Justice Powell has summarized and reduced to three).
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A party asserting the political question doctrine must receive an affirmative
response to at least one of the above three questions. By making treaties the "supreme
Law of the Land" and by extending judicial power "to all Cases in Law and Equity,
arising under Treaties," the Constitution textually commits the handling of treaty
questions to the judiciary, leading to a negative response to the first question of Jus-
tice Powell's summary of the Baker test. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Ld. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1; see also supra note 1 (observing that the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave jurisdiction
to federal courts in treaty cases).
The second question involves whether "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" exist to resolve the dispute, Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, and whether
adjudicating the case enmeshes the judiciary m nonjudicial policymaking, id. Answering
this question depends largely on the treaty in question and the court's experience in
construing such treaties or construing statutes having provisions similar to such
treaties. On the one hand, a treaty prohibiting the development of space-based
antiballistic nssiles (ABMs) and a dispute over whether developing space-based ABM
systems violates the treaty, for example, may engage the court in nonjudicial
policymaking. On the other hand, treaties dealing with extradition and similar subjects
come within the courts' experience and core functions. See 1 M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE § 4-3, at 76 (2d ed.
1987).
The third question-the prudential test-inquires whether judicial action shows
abject disrespect towards another branch, whether there is "an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made," Baker, 369 U.S. at 217,
or whether such a decision will cause "embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question," id. In this context, the issue is
whether the need to speak in one voice in foreign affairs renders the question political.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 112 cmt. c. To avoid such a possibility,
the Court has adopted a general rule of deferring to the executive in interpreting
treaties and m handling other international law questions. Id. The Court has, however,
occasionally rejected the executive's interpretation. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S.
325 (1939) (reversing the Executive's determination that an individual was not a
citizen pursuant to a treaty); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S.
5, 18 (1936) (concluding that, absent authorization by statute or treaty, the President
lacked power to surrender a fugitive to France); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102
(1933) (disagreeing with the government's interpretation of a treaty allowing search of
vessels off the U.S. coast); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (finding no
statutory authorization for the Navy's seizure of a Danish vessel).
Political questions in the foreign affairs context are a matter of line drawing.
Nevertheless, the history of Article VI and of case law that has interpreted treaties
suggest that the line should be drawn to make only the exceptional case nonjusticiable.
Because Congress can breach and the executive can denounce a treaty, those branches
have the power to avoid complying with a treaty if considered in the broader interests
of the federal government. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. 996; Diggs, 470 F.2d 461. When
a treaty imposes direct responsibility upon the executive, only a usurpation of the
president's role in foreign affairs or of the president's constitutional power as com-
mander-m-cuef would render the question nonjusticiable. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at
999 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (reversing a presidential order because the president is bound by the
Constitution in time of war); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
1422 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1401
is not self-executing if it is so vague that, by construing the term,
courts would be encroaching upon the exclusive power of the
president and the Senate to make treaties. By applying a vague
term to a specific case, a court could de facto legislate at variance
with what the president and two-thirds of the Senate intended in
making the treaty into law 95 Courts test this last potential
separation-of-powers conflict by closely examining the treaty lan-
guage to determine whether it speaks in words of command and
uses sufficiently precise terms to impose a legal obligation.
Generally, American courts have refused to apply a treaty when
it merely exhorts the states to "use best efforts" or to "promote" a
given objective," reasoning that such language does not connote
a legal obligation but merely a moral obligation or aspiration. In
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,"7 the Supreme Court compared the
language of Articles 33.1 and 34 of the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees. 9' Although not dealing expressly with the
221-22 (1972) (commenting on the limited "legislative power" of the courts in foreign
affairs); Jordan J. Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the
Land?-Foreign Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
719, 727 n.24 (1982) (citing, among other cases, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900) (voiding an executive seizure of an enemy vessel in time of war)); V~zquez,
supra note 63, at 1128-33 (discussing the separation-of-powers issues underlying
justiciability inquiries). But see Malvma Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court
Decision in Alvarez-Macham, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 736 (1992) (arguing that the Alvarez-
Machan decision can be defended on the ground that it posed a political question);
Michelle D. Goum, Note, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Waltzing with the Political
Question Doctrine, 26 CONN. L. REV. 759 (1994) (arguing but deploring that the real
basis for the Court's decision in Alvarez-Machamn was the political question doctrine).
95. Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 672; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W Scor,
JR., CRIMINAL LAW 90 n.2 (2d ed. 1986) (citing James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483
(1948), for the proposition that separation of powers prohibits Congress from "pass[ing]
the law-making job on to the judiciary" by enacting an ambiguous statute).
Additionally, a vague term does not give fair warning to the party against whom the
provision is enforceable. Id. at 91. This policy consideration, however, appears to apply
only to duties imposed on individuals, not duties imposed on the government. These
two policy concerns likewise underlie the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Papachrstou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
96. See, e.g., In re Alien Children Litig., 501 F Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
affd unreported mem., (5th Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952) (en banc).
97. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
98. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
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doctrine of self-executing treaties, the case is instructive in
distinguishing mandatory from hortatory language. Article 33.1
provides: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opimon."" In contrast, Article 34 provides that
contracting states "shall as far as possible facilitate the as-
similation and naturalization of refugees."' The Court stated
of the latter provision:
[Tihe provision is precatory; it does not require the implement-
ing authority actually to grant asylum to all those who are
eligible. Thus, as made binding on the United States
through the Protocol, Article 34 provides for a precatory, or
discretionary, benefit for the entire class of persons who qualify
as 'refugees,' whereas Article 33.1 provides an entitlement for
the subcategory that 'would be threatened' with persecution
upon their return.'
A case involving the Charter of the Orgamzation of American
States (OAS) also illustrates the criteria for mandatory lan-
guage." 2 Article 47 of the Charter provides as follows:
The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance
with their constitutional processes, to ensure the effective
exercise of the right to education, on the following bases:
(a) Elementary education, compulsory for children of school
age, shall also be offered to all others who can benefit from it.
When provided by the State it shall be without charge."
99. Id. at 6276 (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441.
102. In re Alien Children Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Trex. 1980), affd
unreported mem., (5th Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
This case and the above quoted language are discussed in NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT,
supra note 15, at 580-81.
103. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force for the United States, Dec. 13, 1951); Protocol of
Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Feb. 27, 1967, art.
47, 21 U.S.T. 607, 672, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, 340 (entered into force for the United
States, Feb. 27, 1970) (emphasis added).
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The court held that the OAS charter language was not sufficiently
mandatory to establish a rule of law binding in an American
court. The court noted that the emphasized words are "not the
kind of promissory language which confers rights in the absence
of implementing legislation"1 4 but also indicated that, had that
preamble been absent, subsection (a) would have passed muster
under the self-executing treaty doctrine.'0 5
Besides requiring mandatory language, most United States
courts have held that general treaty language does not give rise
to a legal obligation-that the language must be specific for an
individual to invoke the treaty in a domestic court.'° When
interpreting an imprecise treaty term, a court runs the risk of
legislating and thereby encroaching upon the president's and the
Senate's exclusive treaty-making power. State and lower federal
courts have imposed quite rigorous requirements in many cases,
suggesting a veiled attempt at limiting treaty application in
United States courts.
10 7
104. In re Alien Children Litig., 501 F Supp. at 590.
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
835 (1976); American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F Supp. 756, 769-70 & n.7 (N.D.
Cal. 1989) (finding the following Article (Art. 1) of Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons m the Time of War too vague to be enforced: "The High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con-
vention in all circumstances."); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (finding non-self-executing the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons m Time of War (Fourth
Geneva Convention)), cert. dented, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Postal, 589
F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir.) (holding that Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas
established only a general principle, not law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Huynh
Tin Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978) (criticizing generality of the treaty
language); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985)
(holding that the United Nations Protocol is not self-executing and that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is "merely a non-binding resolution"), affd on other
grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 681 (9th Cir. 1989) (de-
termimng summarily that the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is non-
self-executing), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d
486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting summarily in dicta that Article 6 of the Convention
on the High Seas is not self-executing when the Coast Guard attempts to board in
international waters a foreign vessel suspected of drug smuggling). Article 6.1 provides
that "[siups shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases
expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to
DEFENSIVELY INVOKING TREATIES
For example, Se Fujii0 8 is often considered the seminal case
on non-self-execution. In that case, a Japanese national challenged
a California statute that prohibited foreigners from owning land
in Califorma.0 9 The California Court of Appeals concluded that
the statute violated Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter.110
The Supreme Court of California affirmed-on due process
grounds-and expressly rejected the grounds relied upon by the
lower court."'
Article 55 provides that the United Nations "shall promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion," and, in Article 56, the member nations
'!pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55.""' After analyzing the language of the
preamble and Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the Charter, the California
Supreme Court determined that the latter two articles were not
self-executing."' The court reasoned that the two articles were
not "clear [or] definite" enough to "manifest[ an] intention" that
they operate without the aid of implementing legislation"4 and
further noted that "[t]hey state general purposes and objectives of
the United Nations Organization and do not purport to impose
legal obligations on the individual members or to create rights in
private persons.""' The California Supreme Court asserted that
other articles, in contrast to Articles 55 and 56, did contain clear
and definite language,"6 indicating that they stated a legal rule
that could operate domestically "'
its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas." Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (for the United States, Sept. 30, 1962).
108. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 218 P.2d 595
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), reu'd on this issue but affd on other grounds, 242 P.2d 617
(Cal. 1952) (en banc).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 481, 487-88.
111. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 617, 620 (Cal. 1952) (en bane).
112. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56 (emphasis added).
113. Set Fuji!, 242 P.2d at 620.
114. Id. at 621.
115. Id. at 620-21.
116. See zd. at 621 (citing Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (concluding that Articles 104 and 105 are self-executing)).
117. Article 104, for example, provides: "The Organization shall enjoy m the territory
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Sei Fujii provoked considerable scholarly commentary, most of
it critical.'18 Although the language of Articles 55 and 56 of the
U.N. Charter is not as precise as one might wish,'19 United
States courts have had little hesitation in construing much vaguer
terms from the Constitution, such as "due process," "equal
protection of the laws," and "reasonable searches and seizures."
American courts, both state and federal, also routinely interpret
such nebulous terms as "reasonable foreseeability," "good faith,"
and "proximate cause." 2 '
of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the fulfillment of its purposes." U.N. CHARTER art. 104 (emphasis added).
Article 105 provides:
1. The Organization shall enjoy m the territory of each of its Members
such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its
purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of
the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as
are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection
with the Organization.
Id. art. 105 (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., LILLICH & NEWMAN, supra note 14, at 76; Kathryn Burke et al.,
Application of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 291, 303-04 (1983); Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The
Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1951); Comment, U.N. Charter Invalidates Alien
Land Law, 2 STAN. L. REV. 797, 809 (1950). Contra Manley 0. Hudson, Charter Pro-
visions on Human Rights in American Law, 44 AM. J. INTL L. 543, 545 (1950)
(arguing that Articles 55 and 56 are not self-executing). One commentator has implied
that Sei Fujii is the Plessy v. Ferguson of human rights law. R. LILLICH, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 116 (2d ed. 1993).
119. Some human rights groups have argued that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have become recognized as "authoritative" in-
terpretations of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Consequently, they lend sufficient
specificity for Articles 55 and 56 to be enforced in a domestic court. NEWMAN &
WEISSBRODT, supra note 15, at 582 n.14.
120. For example, trying to establish "universal tests" for proximate causation is
"demonstrably erroneous" because determining causation is "a matter of common sense
and moral intuitions." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 158 (1987)
(quoting Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 317
(1912)). Compare United States v. Knowles, 26 F Cas. 800 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No.
15,540) (finding a ship's master not guilty for failing to turn a boat about to attempt
rescue of a crew member who had fallen overboard because but-for causation had not
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt) with Commonwealth v. Howard, 402 A.2d 674
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (finding proximate causation satisfied when a defendant-mother
of five-year-old child failed to intervene when the mother's boyfriend physically abused
the child, resulting in death).
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Other provisions of the U.N. Charter have been held self-
executing in only a handful of cases, the most noteworthy being
Saipan v. Unted States Department of Interor 121 In that case,
citizens of Micronesia, a trust territory administered by the
United States, sued to challenge the granting of a lease to
Continental Airlines for the construction of a hotel on public land
next to Micro Beach, an important historical, cultural, and recre-
ational site.'22 Article VI of the Trusteeship Agreement for the
Pacific Islands" provides that the United States shall "promote
the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants,
and to this end shall regulate the use of natural resources" and re-
quires the United States to take steps to "protect the inhabitants
against the loss of their lands and resources."" u Noting that the
Trusteeship Agreement was the plaintiff-islanders' "basic
constitutional document," the Ninth Circuit determined that the
article was self-executing and that the plaintiffs could invoke it in
their action."
In deciding whether a treaty term is sufficiently precise, courts
also consider whether its terms are cast negatively Negative
treaty provisions-namely, obligations not to act-are more likely
121. 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); see also Keeney
v. United States, 218 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (concluding that U.N. personnel
rules forbidding disclosure of confidential information accorded defendant, a U.N.
employee, a privilege against testifying about an employment matter).
122. Saipan, 502 F.2d at 93.
123. 61 Stat. 3301, 3301-02 (1947).
124. Id. at 3302.
125. Saipan, 502 F.2d at 98. The court required the following factors to be
considered:
[Tihe purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence
of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implemen-
tation, the viability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and
the immediate and long-range social consequences of self- or non-self exe-
cution.
Id. at 97 (citation omitted); cf Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985).
Frolova required an examination of similar factors:
(1) [T]he language and purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the cir-
cumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations
imposed by the agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative
enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right
of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute.
Id., see Vdzquez, supra note 63, at 1120 n.140 (criticizing the Frolova formulation as
one that ludes the real issues comprising the doctrine of self-executing treaties).
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to be judged self-executing than are affirmative provisions. 2 '
This rule of construction probably rests, in part, on the fact that
negatively drafted provisions are often more precise than are
affirmative ones 1 7 and, in part, on the fact that the negative
nature of such a treaty term implicitly elinunatesi" the need for
implementing legislation.'29
Aside from the constitutional and separation-of-powers
considerations, the doctrine of non-self-execution draws on
contractual principles. A treaty term is not self-executing if it
expressly makes itself non-self-executing. In Cardenas v.
Smith,"' for example, the mutual legal assistance treaty includ-
ed such a term: "[T]lus Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the
part of any person to take any action in the United States to
suppress or exclude any evidence. )131 The contractual princi-
ples category"' contemplates the narrow express exception
126. Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702 (1878); Baldford v. State,
20 Tex. App. 627, 640-41 (1881); Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 674 n.228 (citing Ware
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244-45 (1796)). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 111 reporter's note 5 (1987), states: "Obligations not to act, or to act only
subject to limitations, are generally self-executing." Id.
127. Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 674-75.
128. The Supreme Court considered Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, a "very able"
opinion, United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 reporter's note 5. The court m Hawes explained why
negative treaty provisions are self-executing:
[When a treaty provides] that certain acts shall not be done, or that certain
limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded or exceeded by the
contracting parties, the compact does not need to be supplemented by leg-
islative or executive action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline to
override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed restrictions, for the
palpable and all sufficient reason, that to do so would be not only to
violate the public faith, but to transgress the "supreme law of the land."
Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) at 702-03 (emphasis added) (also quoted in RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111 reporter's note 5).
129. In addition, negative treaty provisions presumably would not require any
allocation of funds. Such provisions are less likely to run afoul of the Constitution and
the separation-of-powers doctrine. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
130. 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
131. Id. at 918.
132. See Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); supra notes 79-88
and accompanying text. The Court, in essence, held that the parties to the treaty had
delegated to the executive branch the task of fulfilling a promise, an executory
obligation over which the treaty parties did not assume immediate international
responsibility. See supra part II.B.1.
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provision, as exemplified in Cardenas, and two other situations:
(1) a domestic implementation clause, a fairly common clause that
calls upon the treaty parties to enact domestic legislation to imple-
ment the treaty, and (2) a reservation by the Senate that expressly
renders the treaty or some of its terms non-self-executing. 3'
To understand domestic implementation clauses requires an
analysis of the nature of treaties and the recognition of a imscon-
ception about the intent of the parties. Some American courts
have discussed whether the treaty parties intended to make a
treaty self-executing or whether they intended for individuals to
invoke the treaty in United States courts."M This notion of
intent, however, is largely a fiction.'35 Most parties to an in-
ternational convention are indifferent as to how individual states
carry out their international obligations, as long as they do so.3 6
133. If the Senate attaches a reservation to the treaty making it non-self-executing,
then the treaty is non-self-executing. This question is one of domestic law, and the
Senate may, in ratifying the treaty, determine whether it is self-executing. Blindly
attaching such reservations to treaties, however, may have the unwanted effect of
encouraging other state-parties not to take their treaty obligations seriously. See
NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 15, at 591 (criticizing reservations depriving
human rights covenants of their character as being self-executing); M. Cherif Bassioun,
Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169, 1173 (1993) ("The
Senate's practice of de facto rewriting treaties through reservations, declarations,
understandings, and provisos leaves the international credibility of the United States
shaken. "); Lon F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning
"Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 516-17
(1991) (concluding that "non-self-executing declarations" may undermine treaties
domestically and internationally). Aside from the Senate, the president also may play
a role in determining whether a treaty is self-executing. Because the courts give
deference to the executive in treaty interpretation, the president's statements about the
treaty being self-executing or non-self-executing may influence a court's ultimate
determination of the question. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § iII
cmt. h (1987).
134. See, e.g., More v. Intelcom Support Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding that, because an international agreement governing employment rights
of Filipmo workers on United States bases did not show that parties intended to
confer a private right of action, plaintiff workers may not sue for Christmas bonus
notwithstanding treaty provisions stating that "[elmployees shall receive as a minimum,
in addition to their basic wages,. [sic] (c) Christmas bonus: [elquivalent to one-
half month's pay") (omission in original).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(4) cmt. h (observing that the
intent of a party other than the United States is irrelevant to the issue of self-
execution in the United States); see supra note 15.
136. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 15, at 580.
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Furthermore, most states cannot ratify a self-executing treaty
because, like Great Britain, their constitutional systems forbid
it. 3 7 When these states are party to a treaty with the United
States, they cannot have intended that the treaty be "self-execut-
ing."138 Since nation-state parties generally do not consider how
each state will fulfill its obligations domestically, saying whether
the parties intended'39 or did not intend to provide individuals
with rights under the treaty provision misses the mark.
A domestic implementation clause should be examined in this
context. Generally, such a clause merely enforces the rule of
customary international law that each state is "bound to take
every measure necessary to give full effect to the treaty (pacta
sunt servanda)." A domestic implementation clause usually
indicates that the state parties desire that all parties individually
take whatever steps necessary to bring the treaty into force in
their own country Such clauses are often directed at countries
like Great Britain, which cannot enter into self-executing treaties.
Consequently, countries like the United States, which can enter
into such treaties, may not need to take any measures to make
the treaty effective in domestic courts.' In addition, a domestic
137. A fairly small number of states have adopted the doctrine of self-executing trea-
ties, including Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey,
and other European Community countries. Richard B. Lillich, International Human
Rights Law in U.S. Courts, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoLy 1, 4 n.14 (1993) (citation
omitted).
138. Richard B. Lillich, Invokng International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts,
54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 373 (1985) (noting that, because few countries have adopted
the doctrine of self-executing treaties and most have "little interest in the mechanics
by which other countries fulfill their international obligations under a treaty," trying
to determine the "intent of the parties' to most multilateral treaties [has] only
marginally greater chances of success than medieval attempts to capture the umcorn").
Aside from the constitutional prohibitions on certain states, "intent analysis" for self-
execution purposes does not mean analysis of the parties' actual intent as revealed in
the travaux preparatoires (preparatory work or drafting history). The intent is largely
manifested objectively, that is, gleaned from the language of the treaty itself. See
Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 655.
139. Of course, the parties may include express language purporting to make a treaty
self-executing in the parties' domestic courts. Such language, however, is not a condi-
tion precedent to making a treaty term self-executing, and a state's courts would still
have to refer to domestic law to determine whether such a clause is self-executing. See
supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
140. Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 660.
141. A general implementation clause typically contains language such as the
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implementation clause may be limited to some articles of the
treaty but not to others." In the absence of more specific
language, therefore, a court should not draw the conclusion that
domestic implementation clauses render a treaty or treaty provi-
sion non-self-executing.
C. Supreme Court Precedent on Treaty Interpretatin and on
Treaty-Based Junsdictional Challenges
1. The United States'Approach to Treaty Interpretation
Traditionally, United States courts have construed treaties
liberally to effectuate their underlying purpose and to honor the
plain meaning of the treaty language: "It is a general principle of
construction with respect to treaties that they shall be liberally
construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties
to secure equality and reciprocity between them." United
States courts frequently have resorted to the drafting history'
to glean the purpose 45 and meaning4 of a treaty term.47
following: Each state party undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution,
the measures necessary to give effect to the provisions of this treaty. See id. Some
courts have found implementation clauses to be dispositive on the question of a
treaty's non-self-execution. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("A treaty that provides that party states will take
measures through their own laws to enforce its proscriptions evidences its intent not
to be self-executing."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v: Postal, 589
F.2d 862 (5th Cir.) (finding that Articles 17 though 29 of the High Seas Convention
rendered Convention non-self-executing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). Such a view,
however, misperceives (1) the manner in which states are obligated to carry out inter-
national law and (2) the character of self-executing treaties. See supra notes 134-42
and accompanying text.
142. See IwasLwa, supra note 14, at 660. Accordingly, a treaty may have both non-
self-executing provisions and self-executing provisions. See Warren v. United States,
340 U.S. 523, 526 n.2 (1951); Sel Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952) (en
banc); supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
143. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); see Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187
(1961); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928);
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902).
144. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Kolourat, 366
U.S. 187; Nielsen, 279 U.S. 47; Jordan, 278 U.S. 123; Tucker, 183 U.S. at 437.
145. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984)
(construing the Warsaw Convention limiting airlines' liability); Kolovrat, 366 U.S. 187
(construing the Treaty of Commerce between United States and Serbia); Ford v. United
States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) (interpreting anti-hovering treaty between Great Britain
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They appear to regard the drafting history of treaties as analogous
to the legislative history of statutes 14  and have rejected a
literal-minded approach to treaty interpretation.
Justice Scalia, however, has attempted to persuade the
Supreme Court to adopt a plain meaning, textualist approach.'49
and the United States prohibiting boarding of vessels to search for then-illegal alcohol
except when the vessel was within one hour's travel distance of a party's coastline);
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) (interpreting the extradition provisions
of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 between Great Britain and the United
States).
146. Given the president's predominant foreign affairs role, courts, when interpreting
a treaty, give great weight to the president's construction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 326 (1987). The courts, nevertheless, have "final authority" con-
cermng treaty interpretation and may reject the interpretation of the executive branch.
Id. Compare Kolourat, 366 U.S. at 194 (stating that courts give executive interpretation
"great weight") with Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 348 (1939) (declining to follow the
Attorney General's opinion).
147. Purpose analysis operates on both the macro and nncro levels. The overriding
purpose of the treaty helps inform interpretation as does the specific purpose of a
particular treaty provision. See HARRY W. JONES ET AL., LEGAL METHOD 345 (1982).
148. Reporter's note 1 of § 325 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
observes the ease with which our courts have resorted to negotiation history: 'United
States courts, accustomed to analyzing legislative materials, have not been hesitant to
resort to travaux priparatozres." See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985);
Trans World Airlines, 466 U.S. 243.
149. In United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989), the Court interpreted a bilateral
tax treaty with Canada. The majority quoted language consistently used in prior
decisions utilizing drafting history: "The clear import of treaty language controls unless
'application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a
result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.- Id. at 365-66
(quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982); Maximo
v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)). The Court proceeded to apply plain meaning
analysis and then to examine extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent, ruling that both
the plain meaning and the extrinsic evidence demonstrated that treaty parties intended
to permit the IRS Commissioner to direct a United States bank to turn over to
Canadian tax authorities bank records of a Canadian national. Id. at 366-70.
Concurring, Justice Scalia sharply criticized the majority for resorting to extrinsic
evidence, including the preratification legislative history materials when, according to
him, the text of the treaty was clear.
The critical question, however, is whether [the intent of the parties]
is more reliably and predictably achieved by a rule of construction which
credits, when it is clear, the contracting sovereigns' carefully framed and
solemnly ratified expression of those intentions and expectations, or rather
one which sets judges in various jurisdictions at large to ignore that clear
expression and discern a 'genuine' contrary intent elsewhere.
Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia would have given "authoritative effect"
to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent only had the treaty provision been
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The difficulty with this approach15 ° is that it often puts formal-
ism ahead of the parties' actual intentions in making the treaty
or statute. 5' Even a textualist, like Justice Scalia, will examine
legislative or drafting history if the relevant provision is ambigu-
ous as applied to the facts. 5 Deterinimng whether the language
is ambiguous as applied, however, is a subjective undertakng that
is difficult to carry out without first examimng the purpose, leg-
islative or drafting history, and context of the relevant provision
and the treaty (or larger statute) of which it is a part. 5
ambiguous. Id. at 373 (Scalia, J., concurring). He believed, however, that the use of
preratification legislative history materials was improper because "[t]he question before
us in a treaty case is what the two or more sovereigns agreed to, rather than what
a single one of them or the legislature of a single one of them, thought it agreed to."
Id. at 374 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Detlev F. Vagts, Senate Materials and
Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 Ahl. J. INT*L L.
546 (1989).
150. Interpreting a treaty on the basis of drafting history can likewise be abused,
sometimes resulting in judge-made law contrary to the authentic intentions and
expectations of the parties. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitians Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155
(1993) (discussed infra note 154); see also G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of
the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty
Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INVL L. 1, 8 (1951) ("It is evident that this method [of
interpreting to further objects, principles and purposes of the treaty], taken beyond a
certain point, would involve tribunals in legislative instead of judicial or interpretative
functions. ").
151. See, e.g., Cammetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 486, 491 (1917) (employing
the plain meaning of the words "any other immoral purpose" of the Mann Act, which
was aimed at combatting prostitution, to include males who engage in extramarital
sexual relations with any woman, whether or not she was a prostitute whom the male
transported across state lines). This plain meaning interpretation permitted the
government to abuse its power. See, e.g., CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN
AND THE SECRETS 120-21 (1991) (noting that the Hearst chain of newspapers stopped
covering the Senate's Teapot Dome hearings after the Bureau of Investigation, the
predecessor to the FBI, threatened to prosecute William Randolph Hearst under the
Mann Act for taking his mistress across state lines).
152. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines Co., Ltd., 116 S. Ct. 629, 632 (1996) (Scalia, J.) (refusing to apply the plain
meaning rule to the term "damages" of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention governing
international air transportation, reasoning that the general meaning of the term was
overly broad). In construing this term, Justice Scalia relied instead upon the travaux
prdparatoires, the postratification conduct of the parties, and the context provided by
another related article within the Convention. Id. at 633-35.
153. Judge Anzilotti of the Permanent Court of International Justice analyzed the
problems with the plain meaning rule as follows:
But I do not see how it is possible to say that an article of a convention
is clear until the subject and aim of the convention have been ascer-
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Justice Scalia has recently joined at least one opinion that
rejected the clear plain-meaning interpretation, instead relying
heavily on the delegates' debates in negotiating the treaty 54
tamed. Only when it is known what the Contracting Parties intended
to do and the aim they had in view is it possible to say either that the
natural meaning of terms used in a particular article corresponds with the
real intention of the Parties, or that the natural meaning of the terms
used falls short of or goes further than such intention.
WILLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 165-67 (1962)
(quoting Interpretation of the 1919 Convention Concerning Employment of Women
During the Night, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 50 (Anzilotti, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the article stating that a "[wioman without distinction of age shall not be
employed during the night in any public or private[] undertaking" applied only to
women performing manual labor and not to women working as supervisors or
managers)); see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 527, 528 (1947) ("words are inexact symbols"); Harry W. Jones, The
Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25
WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 16 (1939); Charles B. Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous
Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509, 519 (1940). But see WESTON ET AL., supra note 88, at
142-43 (quoting Comments of Sir Eric Beckett on the Report of M.H. Lauterpacht (of
the Second Commission of the Institute of International Law) on the Interpretation of
Treaties, 1950 Annuaire de L'Institut de Droit International 437-39 (endorsing the plain
meaning approach and noting that "the task of the court is to interpret the treaty and
not to ascertain the intention of the parties")).
154. Sale, 509 U.S. 155. Haitians challenged Presidents Bush and Clinton's policy of
interdicting Haitian refugees on the high seas, failing to provide them an asylum
hearing, and returning them to Haiti, then a country with one of the worst human
rights records in the hemisphere. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1994, at 149, 150
(1994) (noting, among other things, that in 1993 "torture and ill treatment of detainees
was widespread"); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1992, at 132 (1992). The
U.N. Protocol on Refugees provides as follows: No state "shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where is
life or freedom would be threatened on account of Is race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion." United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276
(emphasis added). The majority opinion, which Justice Scalia joined, strained to avoid
the plain meaning of "return" and "refouler." The majority concluded that "return" does
not mean "return" and relied primarily upon two delegates' comments during the
negotiations to contradict both the plain language of the treaty and its underlying
purpose, namely, to protect refugees from persecution. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 184-87.
The authoritative French Dictionary, the French equivalent to Webster's, defines
"refouler" as: "1 faire reculer (des personnes) [Ex.] Refouler des envahisseurs." MICRO
ROBERT DICTIONNAIRE DU FRANCAIS PRIMORDIAL 912 (1977). Translated, this means:
(1) to make (persons) go back [Ex.] To send the invaders back." A French-English
dictionary defines "refouler" as follows: "to drive back, repulse; immigrant to turn back.
COLLINS ROBERT--CONCISE FRENCH-ENGLISH-ENGLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY 318 (1981).
Substituting "turn back" for "return" gives a stronger reading in favor of the refugees:
"No state shall turn back in any manner whatsoever."
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That interpretation, unfortunately, also flew in the face of the
treaty's purpose.' He and the Rehnquist Court as a whole have
been criticized for taking a result-oriented approach to treaty
interpretation.'56
Thus far, the Court apparently has not accepted Justice Scalia's
textualist argument.157 While recogmzing that canons of inter-
pretation establish fine rather than bright lines,'58 American
155. Sale, 509 U.S. at 189 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 953 (1994). This commentator observed that the Court somersaults through the
treaty canons, excoriating the Court for its strained approach in defiance of the plain
meaning in Sale. Id. at 987-92.
157. By joining in the majority's opinion in Sale, Justice Scalia apparently demon-
strated his unwillingness to accept the textualist argument in every case in which the
plain meaning is clear. See also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 116 S. Ct.
629, 634-35 (1996) (Scalia, J.) (relying upon extrinsic aids to interpret a treaty term).
158. Karl Llewellyn observed that, when interpreting statutes, courts freely and
flexibly use directly opposing canons of construction, such as construing one statute
according to its plain meaning and another according to is purpose. KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35 (1960). Llewellyn
arranged opposing canons of construction in two columns, labelling one column "thrust"
and the other "parry"--e.g., Thrust: "A statute cannot go beyond its text." Parry: "To
effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text." Id. at 522. His ob-
servations apply equally to interpreting treaties. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392 (1985); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Air France, relied upon the plain mean-
mg rule in interpreting the word "accident" from Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
which limits airlines' liability. Air France, 470 U.S. at 394, 400. Rejecting plaintiffs
complaint concerning an ear injury, Justice O'Connor concluded that "accident" means
an "unusual or unexpected occurrence." Id. at 396. She emphasized that "[t]he analysis
must begin, however, with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used." Id. at 396-97.
A year earlier, however, in Trans World Airlines, while interpreting a different
article of the same treaty, Justice O'Connor, again writing for the majority, stressed
that the purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to limit a carrier's liability for lost
cargo and to "set a stable, predictable, and internationally uniform limit." Trans World
Airlines, 466 U.S. at 256. In determining the purpose, Justice O'Connor relied upon
state practice and the treaty's drafting history. Id. at 252-53. The treaty linked the
extent of air carriers' liability for lost cargo to the value of gold. Id. at 247. Avoiding
the treaty's plain meaning, the Court approved the lower maximum liability formula
not linked to the current price of gold. Id. at 251. The dissent stressed the plain
meaning of the treaty term, criticizing the Court for "rewrit[ing]" the Convention. Id.
at 261-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As with any written document, there 'is a strong
presumption that the literal meaning is the true one, especially as against a
construction that is not interpretation but perversion. '") (alteration in original)
(quoting The Five Per Cent. Discount Cases, 243 U.S. 97, 106 (1917)); see also
Frankfurter, supra note 153, at 544 ("In the end, language and external aids, each
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courts should resume the tradition of construing treaties liberally,
particularly when dealing with the rights of the individual:
"Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and,
when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights
which may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them,
the latter is to be preferred."'59 To resume this tradition requires
not only examining and attempting to give effect to the plain
meaning but also, among other things,160 the drafting histo-
ry,.6 the purpose of the treaty as whole and the treaty provision
accorded the authority deserved in the circumstances, must be weighed in the balance
of judicial judgment.").
159. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
160. Although a treaty prevails over a prior congressional enactment, Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957), and a prior congressional enactment prevails over a preexisting
treaty, Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888), the Court has taken pains to
construe an apparently conflicting treaty and statute as being consistent with one
another, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) ("A treaty will not be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on
the part of Congress has been clearly expressed."); see United States v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 695 F Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). For similar reasons, the Court
should apply the same rule of construction to statutes that conflict with customary
international law and should construe treaties so as not to conflict with custom: "[Ain
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains. " Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
161. The international law of treaty interpretation follows a more restrictive approach
than that typically followed by United States courts. The Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties, which codifies this approach, adopts a hierarchy emphasizing the
plain meaning rule and, secondarily, purpose and contextual analysis: "A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23, 1969, art.
31.1, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]; see LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 475-78 (3d ed. 1993) (reproducing Jimdnez de Ardchaga, Interna-
tional Law in the Past Third of a Century, [19781 RECEVIL DES COURS 1, 42-48 (noting
the hierarchal approach of the Vienna Convention to treaty interpretation)). The
Vienna Convention permits the use of extrinsic materials (drafting history) only when
the treaty language is "ambiguous or obscure" or when the plain meaning in-
terpretation would lead to a "manifestly absurd" or 'unreasonable" result. Vienna Con-
vention, supra, art. 32. The practice of international tribunals, however, does not ap-
pear to be as restrictive as the rules themselves would suggest. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 325 reporter's note 1 (observing the fairly widespread
use of travaux preparatoires by international tribunals).
The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Although stating that the Convention is declaratory of customary international law, the
State Department Office of Legal Adviser suggests a broader rule for drafting history
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at issue, the context in which the treaty was made, and any
postformation conduct of the parties.'62 The Court has observed
a similar principle in statutory construction: "In expounding a
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of
a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy" 63 In applying a nonrestrictive approach to
treaty interpretation, American courts are better able to effectuate
the authentic intentions" 4 of the parties and to recognize rights
than does the plain meaning of the Convention Articles 31 and 32: "As a matter of
judicial and executive practice, negotiating history, like the legislative history of a
statute, is frequently relied upon in U.S. domestic law and in international law to
interpret treaties." CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING To
INTERNATIONAL LAw 147 (1981) (citing Department of State File Nos. P80 0124-1938,
P80 0115-1502).
162. This approach to treaty interpretation draws from the traditional United States
approach and that of the draft convention on treaties prepared by the Harvard
Research in International Law. The draf'es Article 19 provides as follows:
(a) A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the general purpose which
it is intended to serve. The historical background of the treaty, travaux
preparatoires, the circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was
entered into, the change in these circumstances sought to be effected, the
subsequent conduct of the parties in applying the provisions of the treaty,
and the conditions prevailing at the time the interpretation is being made,
are to be considered in connection with the general purpose which the
treaty is intended to serve.
29 Alf. J. INT'L L. 937 (Supp. 1935) (quoting Article 19).
163. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.) (quoting with
approval United States v. Heirs of Boisdor6, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1850). This
approach resembles the international-law doctrine of maximum effectiveness:
other things being equal, so to speak, texts are to be presumed to have
been intended to have a definite force and effect, and should be interpreted
so as to have such force and effect rather than so as not to have it, and
so as to have the fullest value and effect consistent with their wording (so
long as the meaning be not strained) and with the other parts of the text.
Fitzmaurice, supra note 150, at 8 (single emphasis in original, double emphasis added);
see also infra note 430. Another helpful test considers what the parties to the treaty
would have regarded as the correct decision if they had addressed the issue ex ante.
See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 161, at 1124.
164. In treaties of a constitutional nature, such as the U.N. Charter, a teleological
approach going beyond the intent of the parties to further goals of international order
may be appropriate:
[T]he interpretation of the San Francisco instruments will always have
to present a teleological character if they are to meet the requirements of
world peace, cooperation between men, individual freedom and social prog-
ress. The Charter is a means and not an end. To comply with its aims,
one must seek the methods of interpretation most likely to serve the
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due the individual.
2. Treaty-Based Challenges to Tral Courts' Personal
Jurisdiction
Two lines of Supreme Court cases deal with self-executing
treaties that deprive a domestic court of personal jurisdiction. The
first line involves extradition treaties and the specialty doc-
trine-the doctrine that prohibits the requesting country from
prosecuting a fugitive for offenses besides those that the asylum
country'65 has designated in its extradition order.'66 The second
line involves the Prohibition-era anti-hovering treaties that gave
limited rights to the United States Coast Guard to seize on the
high seas foreign ships engaged in smuggling alcoholic beverages
into the United States.16 7
The Court established the specialty doctrine in United States v.
Rauscher 168 The United States had asked Great Britain to
extradite a ship's officer who allegedly murdered a crew member
aboard an American vessel. Upon being extradited, however, the
officer was not charged with murder but with assault and in-
fliction of cruel and unusual pumshment upon a crew member.
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty between the United States and
natural evolution of the needs of mankind.
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 161, at 479 (quoting Advisory Opinion Concerning Compe-
tence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
1950 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Azevedo, J., dissenting)); see also td. at 479 (quoting the decision of
the European Court of Human Rights m the Deumeland Case, 86 I.L.R. 376, 408
(1986), for the proposition that the European Convention on Human Rights should be
construed "in the light of modern day conditions obtaining in the democratic societies
of the Contracting States and not solely according to what nght be presumed to have
been in the minds of the drafters of the Convention"); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL.,
THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: PRINCIPLES OF
CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967); cf Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (applying the rubric of evolving standards of decency to hold that
the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of murderers under the age of sixteen). But
see Gerald Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our
"Interpretation" of It? 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 358 (1971).
165. The "requesting state" is the country seeking extradition. The "requested state"
or "asylum state" is the country holding the fugitive, the country from whom
extradition is sought.
166. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 354-64.
167. See infra notes 200-28 and accompanying text.
168. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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Great Britain made murder, but not this lesser crime, an
extraditable offense." 9 The Court ruled that the United States
had violated the treaty by trying the officer on a charge different
from that upon which Great Britain had granted extradition. The
Court implicitly concluded that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction, reversed the conviction, and ordered that the
defendant be given the opportunity to return to the asylum
state.7 The Court reasoned that the detailed procedures estab-
lished by the treaty, the language of the preamble restricting
extradition to "certain cases," the probable policies underlying that
restriction, and the treaty language itself demonstrated that the
purpose of the provision was to limit extradition to the seven
enumerated offenses.' 7'
Nothing in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, however, suggests
that the parties intended to grant individual fugitives any rights,
limits the crimes on which the requesting country may charge the
fugitive, or hints about a remedy in the event of a treaty viola-
tion.' The treaty' commands what the parties should
do-for example, surrender persons accused of murder or assault
to commit murder-but is silent concerning what the parties may
not do. It does not expressly prohibit trying an extradited person
for other than the extraditable offenses. 74 The drafters could
have inserted an express provision in the treaty- "The competent
authorities of the requesting state may charge, try, and sentence
the fugitive only for crimes for which she is extradited." 5
169. The treaty provides:
[The [parties] shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, deliver
up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime of [11 murder;
or [21 assault with intent to commit murder, or [31 piracy; or [41 arson; or
[51 robbery; or [61 forgery, or the [71 utterance of forged paper, committed
within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found,
within the territories of the other.
Id. at 410-11 (quoting the Webster-Ashburton Treaty between the United States and
Great Britain) (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 422-23.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 169 (quoting the relevant treaty language).
173. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422-23.
174. The dissent stressed this point. Id. at 434 (Waite, C.J., dissenting).
175. Cf Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64, 66 (1899) (finding that extradition treaty
between United States and Canada included explicit language recognizing right of
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Like most extradition treaties, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
was made primarily to benefit the two parties, not the fugitives to
be extradited.' 6 The Court in Rauscher nevertheless inferred
that the government had violated the defendant's rights by
charging him with a nonextraditable crime, " concluding that
the object and purpose of the treaty provided rights residing in the
individual extradited"8 as well as in the states-parties. 1'9
Rauscher was thus a direct beneficiary of the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty, but not necessarily an intended beneficiary' 0 Fur-
specialty).
176. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 319.
177. More contemporary court opinions have divided on whether the asylum state
must protest the prosecution's filing additional charges for the doctrine of specialty to
apply. A full discussion of the question of protests as necessary for standing and the
related question of waivers are beyond the scope of this Article. See Michael B.
Bernacchi, Note, Standing for the Doctrine of Specialty in Extradition Treaties: A More
Liberal Exposition of Private Rights, 25 LOY. LA.. L. REV. 1377, 1386 nn.72-73 (1992)
(collecting the leading cases requiring asylum state protest-United States v. Kaufman,
874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir.) (finding that only asylum state may complain of treaty
violation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895 (1989); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that right of specialty is held by the asylum state), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986), vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994); United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490 (2d
Cir. 1962) (ruling that the asylum state, not the fugitive, possesses right of specialty)-
and allowing defendant the right to raise objection-United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d
715, 721 (11th Cir.) (holding that defendant may raise whatever objections asylum
state may raise), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d
146, 151 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1987) (ruling that defendant has right to raise treaty viola-
tions); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (allowing a fugitive to
assert extradition treaty violations), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986)); supra note 280;
see also United States v. Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that, as
supreme law of the land, specialty provision may be asserted by fugitive), aftd on
other grounds, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
178. The Court expressly rejected a lower court's holding in another case that only
the state parties can invoke the treaty in the event of a violation. The lower court
held:
[W]hile abuse of extradition proceedings, and want of good faith in resort-
ing to them, doubtless constitute a good cause of complaint between the
two governments, such complaints do not form a proper subject of
investigation in the courts, however much those tribunals might regret that
they should have been permitted to arise.
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424-25 (1886) (quoting Judge Benedict's rea-
somng in another extradition case interpreting the Webster-Ashburton Treaty)
(alteration in original).
179. Id. at 422.
180. Id. at 431. A defendant may not be tried for other charges "until a reasonable
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thermore, the Court expressly rejected the argument that a
defendant's only remedy was to seek the intervention of "the
Executive Departments of the respective governments."''
Recognizing the rights of individual prisoners to invoke the
treaty, according to the Court, "relieve[d]" the "tension" between
the executive branch and our state courts.' Such federal
interference in state court proceedings causes resentment, which
is elinnated by providing the individual defendant the right to
assert the treaty in all cases."8 The Court also believed that the
rule of specialty encouraged asylum states to surrender defen-
dants.' If asylum states learned that extradited persons are
routinely tried for crimes other than those for which they were
extradited, then the requested state might, in the future, be more
reluctant to deliver requested fugitives.' Indeed, shortly before
the Court decided'Rauscher, Great Britain refused to deliver a
fugitive, asserting those precise grounds. 8 '
Rauscher reflects the long-standing recognition that extradition
treaties are self-executing.8 7 It exemplifies the kind of case that
does not pose separation-of-powers concerns. Extradition has a
time and opportunity have been given him, after his release or trial upon such
[charges upon which he has been extradited], to return to the country from whose
asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings." Id. at 430. The Court
relied upon treatises and a line of state and federal cases. Id. at 431.
181. Id. at 426. Rauscher repudiated the lower court's position and held that
individuals as well as state parties have the right to invoke the treaty. Id., see supra
note 17.
182. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430.
183. Id.
184. The Court in Rauscher also noted that two acts of Congress apparently
supported its position. Id. at 423. The first, codifying extradition practice, authorized
the Secretary of State to deliver up to a foreign government a fugitive "to be tried for
the crime of which such person shall be so accused, and such person shall be delivered
up accordingly." Id. (quoting United States Rev. Stat. § 5272). The second statute, also
dealing with extradition, allowed the President to take fugitives delivered up to the
United States and to provide for their safekeeping "until the final conclusion of his
trial for the crimes or offences specified in the warrant of extradition." Id. (quoting
United States Rev. Stat. § 5275). Neither of these statutes, however, prohibits the trial
of the fugitives surrendered to the United States for other crimes. The Court indicated
that it used the statutes solely to bolster its holding m construing the treaty itself.
Id.
185. Id. at 419.
186. Id. at 415-16.
187. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 74-76.
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lengthy history of being regulated by the judiciary, 1' and de-
termining the rights of those accused of a crime is exclusively
within the judicial power. 9 Since the early years of the Repub-
lic, 9° courts have interpreted extradition treaties and have
applied them to individuals. The courts thus have considerable
experience in determining whether an accused is properly before
them and properly charged. 9'
Rauscher is further illuminated by Ker v. Illinois.'92 In Ker,
the United States hired a messenger to go to Peru to deliver
extradition papers requesting Ker's extradition.9 ' Upon arrival,
the messenger did not present the extradition papers to the proper
authorities but instead forcibly abducted Ker and returned him to
the United States.' Ker was subsequently indicted, tried, and
convicted of larceny and embezzlement."' Ker challenged the
lower court's personal jurisdiction, asserting the illegality of his
capture and removal from Peru. 9 In rejecting Ker's arguments,
the Supreme Court reasoned that having physical custody of the
defendant sufficed to establish personal jurisdiction, regardless of
the manner in which that custody was obtained.'97 The Court
distinguished Rauscher, noting that the government had violated
a treaty' in that case, whereas the Ker abduction, though ille-
188. Id. at 71-101.
189. See United States v. Robins, 27 F Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175)
(concluding that extradition treaties are self-executing and holding that Article III of
the Constitution extended the courts' judicial power to extradition treaties despite the
absence of congressional legislation on extradition). Congress did not enact legislation
governing extradition until 1848. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 72.
190. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, at 71-72.
191. See id.
192. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Ker was decided the same day as Rauscher The same
Justice wrote the majority opinion in both cases. Ker is usually linked with Fnsbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) ("The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine"). In Frisbie, the defendant was
kidnapped in Illinois and brought to Michigan, where he was likewise arrested, tried,
and convicted. Id. at 520. The result was the same as in Ker; the illegality of the
kidnapping did not defeat the trial court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.
at 522.
193. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 438-39.
196. Id. at 439.
197. Id. at 440.
198. Id. at 443. Ker also has been distinguished on the ground that Ker involved a
19961 DEFENSIVELY INVOKING TREATIES 1443
gal in Peru, did not violate any treaty with that country '99
Aside from the specialty cases, individuals have used the
Prohibition-era anti-hovering treaties to challenge a trial court's
personal jurisdiction. In Cook v. United States,"0 Justice
Brandeis, writing for the Court, relied upon the history leading up
to such a treaty to infer a remedy in favor of a private individu-
al.2'o Before the treaty, the United States Coast Guard had been
boarding and seizing foreign vessels, cargoes, and crews outside
the then-recogmzed international three-mile limit.2 The vessels
had been carrying liquor to smuggle into the United States during
Prohibition."' The Court noted that Great Britain had protested
United States interdictions strenuously, asserting that the United
States was violating international law and that continuing this
policy would create "a very serious situation."2"4
In response to the British protests, the two countries began to
negotiate a treaty to resolve their differences." 5 Britain rejected
United States proposals for a mutual twelve-mile limit.0 6 After
further negotiations, the United States accepted, with slight vara-
tions, Britan's counterproposal: the limit would equal one hour's
traveling distance measured by the maximum speed of the seized
vessel.2 7 In Cook, the vessel was boarded 11.5 miles from the
private Idnappmg-the United States had not authorized the party's abduction,
whereas, for example, the United States, through the DEA, did authorize the abduction
of Alvarez-Macham. See United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 682 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. Nor did the abduction violate the Constitution or any
United States statute. Id. at 444.
200. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
201. Id. at 112-22.
202. Id. at 113.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 115.
205. Id. at 115-16.
206. Id. at 116.
207. Article II(1) and (2) of that treaty provides as follows:
(1) His Britanmc Majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the
boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of
territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, its territories or
possessions in order that enquiries may be addressed to those on board
and an examination be made of the ship's papers for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether the vessel or those on board are endeavoring to import or
have imported alcoholic beverages into the United States, its territories or
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American coast. °8 The vessel was capable of traveling ten miles
per hour."9 Hence, the seizure took place outside the agreed
upon distance. The ship's master was subsequently fined
$14,286.18 for violating United States statutes prohibiting the
importation of liquor."0 He appealed.2 n
The issue on appeal was whether the district court had
jurisdiction over the vessel and the ship's master despite the fact
that the vessel was taken in violation of the treaty 212 The treaty
language provided for compensation but said nothing expressly
about a defense to a fine. Nevertheless, the Court inferred such a
term from the treaty language, concluding that the ship's master
had the right to assert the treaty and that the government's
possessions in violation of the laws there in force. When such enquiries
and examination show a reasonable ground for suspicion, a search of the
vessel may be instituted.
(2) If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel has committed or
is committing or attempting to commit an offense against the laws of the
United States, its territories or possessions prohibiting the importation of
alcoholic beverages, the vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the
United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in accordance
with such laws.
Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for Prevention of Smuggling
of Intoxicating Liquors, May 22, 1924, U.S.-Great Britain, 43 Stat. 1761-62 (1924)
[hereinafter Anti-Hovering Treaty]. Article IV of the treaty, which dealt with claims
for compensation, provided as follows:
Any claim by a British vessel for compensation on the grounds that it has
suffered loss or injury through the improper or unreasonable exercise of the
rights conferred by Article II of this Treaty or on the ground that it has
not been given the benefit of Article III [permitting passage of liquor
through the U.S. destined for a foreign port or for use on board] shall be
referred for the joint consideration of two persons, one of whom shall be
nominated by each of the High Contracting Parties.
Effect shall be given to the recommendations contained in any such
joint report. If no joint report can be agreed upon, the clam shall be
referred to the Claims Commission established under the provisions of the
Agreement for the Settlement of Outstanding Pecuniary Claims signed at
Washington the 18th of August, 1910, but the claim shall not, before
submission to the tribunal, require to be included in a schedule of claims
confirmed in the manner therein provided.
Id. at 1762.
208. Cook, 288 U.S. at 107.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 108.
211. Id. at 108-09.
212. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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violation of the treaty deprived the trial court of personal
jurisdiction:
The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely
because made by one upon whom the Government had not
conferred authority to seize, at the place where the seizure was
made. The objection is that the Government itself lacked power
to seize since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limita-
tion upon its own authority Our Government, lacking
power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject
the vessel to our laws. To hold that adjudication may follow a
wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect
of the Treaty 
213
This interpretation helped the United States meet its treaty
obligations with Great Britain. The treaty itself arose because
Britain sharply protested the United States' interdicting British
vessels on the high seas. Had the Court upheld the trial court's
jurisdiction, British protests presumably would have escalated
because, not only would the United States have disregarded the
international three-mile limit, but it also would have violated an
agreement between the parties to resolve this specific problem.
Furthermore, the Court's interpretation is in accord with one of
the Supremacy Clause's purposes-avoiding friction with other
governments. By making treaties the supreme law of the land and
thereby giving individuals, including foreigners, the right to raise
treaty rights in American courts, the Framers hoped to reduce
potential conflict with the foreigners' home countries.214 The
Court in Cook expressly foresaw this potential conflict215 and
prevented it from developing.
Cook posed no separation-of-powers concerns because it dealt
solely with a prosecution brought by the executive branch. The
master who had been fined was a direct beneficiary of the treaty
terms and probably an intended beneficiary, but the Court did not
explore whether the parties to the treaty intended to grant
persons in that class the right to challenge a court's jurisdiction.
213. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22 (citing, in comparison, United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407 (1886)).
214. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
215. Cook, 288 U.S. at 115.
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The Court relied upon Ford v. United States216 to find the treaty
self-executing."'
In Ford, the defendants-ship officers-sought to oust the
court's jurisdiction, arguing that the government violated the
same anti-hovering treaty in seizing the vessel and prosecuting
them." 8 The defendants claimed that the vessel was seized in
international waters well beyond the one-hour traveling dis-
tance.2"9 The treaty language, however, did not expressly give an
individual apprehended in violation of the treaty a right to
challenge the personal jurisdiction of a United States District
Court or of any other court.22° The vessel alone was given a
remedy, that being only an arbitral claim for "the improper or
unreasonable exercise of the rights conferred by Article II of this
Treaty or on the ground that it has not been given the benefit of
Article III. "22
The government relied upon Ker v. Illinois.222 The Supreme
Court, however, distinguished Ker, concluding that the anti-hov-
ering treaty provided a defense to individuals wrongfully seized
and arrested:22
The Solicitor General answers, on the authority of Ker v.
Illinois, that an illegal seizure would not have ousted the
jurisdiction of the court to try the defendants. But the Ker case
does not apply here. It related to a trial m a state court, and
this Court found that the illegal seizure of the defendant
therein violated neither the Federal Constitution, nor a federal
law, nor a treaty of the United States, and so that the validity
of their trial after alleged seizure was not a matter of federal
cognizance. Here a treaty of the United States is directly
involved, and the question is quite different.2
216. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
217. Cook, 288 U.S. at 119 (citing Ford, 273 U.S. 593, and a letter from the
Secretary of State to the House Committee on foreign affairs to the same effect).
218. Ford, 273 U.S. at 600.
219. Id. at 605-06.
220. See id. at 599.
221. Id. at 609 (quoting Article IV of the treaty).
222. 119 U.S. 436 (1886); see supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
223. See Ford, 273 U.S. at 606.
224. Id. at 605-06 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Court implied that the officers could assert the treaty as a
defense to the district court's criminal jurisdiction.225 The officers
were direct beneficiaries of the treaty provision prohibiting seizure
of British ships. They were not, however, necessarily intended
beneficiaries.22
Rauscher, Ford, and Cook teach that defendants may trump the
Ker-Frisbze doctrine and oust the trial court of personal jursdic-
tion when agents of the United States have illegally seized such
defendants from abroad in violation of a treaty 22 7 In addition,
Rauscher implicitly held that a direct beneficiary of a treaty may
invoke that treaty as a defense and that there need not be any
showing that the defendant was an intended beneficiary or that
the treaty itself expressly granted individuals in the defendant's
class any rights.228 The Ford facts and holding give rise to a
similar inference.
225. See id. at 606.
226. The Court held, however, that the government did not violate the treaty in
arresting the defendants, for the trial court, as the proper finder of fact on this issue,
determined that the vessel was within the one-hour travel distance from the California
coast. Id. at 605. The Court also ruled that the treaty did not, by implication, give
individuals on the ship immunity from criminal proceedings. Id. at 610-11.
227. Although concluding that the DEA kidnapping did not violate the extradition
treaty with Mexico, the Court in Alvarez-Macham did acknowledge that, had the
kidnapping in fact violated the treaty, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine would not have applied.
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992); see also Jacques
Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and Jurisdiction over Criminal
Defendants Abducted Abroad Extraterritorzlly: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined,
30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 513, 525-29 (1992). Many lower federal courts, however,
have gone out cf their way to avoid recognizing defenses based on treaty. In United
States v. Toscamno, 500 F.2d 267, 269-70, 278-80 (2d Cir. 1974), the court rejected an
application of the Ker-Fnsbie rule and concluded that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction, ruling that the state-sponsored kidnapping, coupled with torture, beatings,
and ill treatment (1) shocked the conscience and violated due process and (2) violated
international treaty. The international-law prong of that decision, however, has not
been followed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 433 reporter's note
3 (1987) (citing United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1100 (1985); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States
ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975);
United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974)).
228. See Rauscher v. United States, 119 U.S. 407, 432-33 (1886).
1448 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1401
III. PROPOSED TEST FOR ASSERTING A TREATY DEFENSIVELY
A. Affirmative Versus Defensive Treaty Invocation
Authorities have differed on the appropriate standards for
implying a private cause of action for damages under a treaty
One approach is to do so when the treaty passes the test for
implying a right of action under a federal statute.229 The Court,
however, has made such an implication increasingly difficult. The
plaintiff must now show not only that Congress intended especial-
ly to benefit the class of persons of which she belongs but also
that Congress intended to create such a cause of action.o
Another commentator has suggested that treaties are more alin
to constitutional provisions and that, consequently, the less
restrictive criteria for implying rights of action from the Constitu-
229. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm,
73 MINN. L. REv. 349, 401-02 (1988) (arguing that human rights treaties pass the Cort
test for implication of causes of action).
230. The Court has followed an increasingly narrow path in inplying rights of action.
Under Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), the Court implied a private right of action "whenever the statute
in question appeared to fall short of attaimng congressional goals." Brett Witter, Note,
Lamb v. Phillip Moms, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir 1990): The Sixth Circuit Gets
Sheepish on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 533, 548
n.121 (1992). In 1975, however, the Court restricted the bases upon which a cause of
action could be implied from a federal statute, establishing the following criteria:
[1][Ius the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted[?]" [2] [Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? [31 [Is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plamtiff? [4][I]s the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law9
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Over the next seven years, the Court again made
the test more difficult, emphasizing the second Cort factor, which required plaintiffs
to show that Congress had intended to grant individuals in plaintiffs' class a private
cause of action. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
374 (1982); Califorma v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293-97 (1981); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979). The Supreme Court has since further restricted the test. See Karahalios v.
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527 (1989); Henry P
Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 233, 246 n.91 (1991) ("The four factors have been reduced to the question of
legislative intent. ").
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tion should apply" Some argue, however, that a private right
of action should be rejected altogether, unless the treaty expressly
grants such a right. 2
Asserting a treaty-based cause of action for damages, however,
fundamentally differs from invoking a treaty as a defense to a
governmental action. The difference rests on the interaction
between the Supremacy Clause, the Take Care Clause, the nature
of defenses, and the judiciary's role under Article III of the
Constitution. The Supremacy Clause makes treaties the law of the
land, as are federal statutes and constitutional provisions. Under
the Take Care Clause," 3 the Constitution requires the executive
to enforce the law, which includes legally ratified treaties. If the
treaty is self-executing, the executive is obligated to enforce the
treaty domestically as well as internationally Besides making
treaties law, the Supremacy Clause makes them superior to
231. V dzquez, supra note 63; see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16, 18-19 (1980),
(upholding a Bivens-type remedy as available under the Eighth Amendment when
federal prison officials deliberately interfered with a prisoner's medical needs and
rejecting the government's argument that Congress had preempted an implied damage
action through the 1974 amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230-35 (1979) (implying a cause of action for damages under
the Fifth Amendment in favor of a staff member who alleged that her employer, a
Congress member, had engaged in gender-based discrimination); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971)
(holding that, when the "case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress," an individual whose home and person were
searched by federal agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment had stated a cause
of action for damages). But see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 420 (1988)
(holding that wrongful termination of Social Security benefits did not result in an
implied right of action to recover damages for a violation of due process); Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386 (1983) (holding that federal personnel matters demanded
Court deference to congressional expertise, in that a remedial scheme provided by
Congress allowed "meaningful remedies for employees who may have been unfairly
disciplined for making critical comments," while acknowledging that'the congressional
remedy was not as effective as the Bivens remedy).
232. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. dented, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing a cause of action under the Alien Tort
Statute on the ground that customary international law bars torture and is
synonymous with "the law of nations"); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F Supp. 1531 (N.D.
Cal. 1987).
233. Section 3 of Article II of the Constitution provides in relevant part that the
President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1401
inconsistent state laws and previously enacted inconsistent federal
statutes. Under Marbury v. Madison, 4 one of the most signifi-
cant functions of the judiciary is to "say what the law is, " s
including, except for political questions, defimng the executive's
obligations owed to individuals under the Constitution, treaties,
and federal statutes.36
If, for example, a treaty deprived a court of personal jurisdic-
tion, the Supremacy Clause would make this treaty rule superior
to previously enacted inconsistent federal statutes and previously
decided inconsistent federal case law Assume that enforcing the
treaty rule does not rise to the level of a political question. Then,
under the Take Care Clause, the executive is obliged to comply
with the treaty rule. If the executive nevertheless violates the
rule, and if that violation deprives the court of personal jurisdic-
tion, then the court should dismiss. If, however, the trial court
demes the motion to dismiss and ultimately issues a judgment of
conviction, then the judgment is procedurally defective." A
treaty depriving a court of personal jurisdiction for state-spon-
sored lidnapping may not necessarily, however, either expressly
or impliedly grant the kidnap victim a cause of action for false
234. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
235. Id. at 177. In an earlier part of the opinion, the Court also noted that the
'province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire
how the executive or executive officers, perform" discretionary duties. Id. at 170.
236. See id. at 170-71.
237. "The lone exception to the general rule is that the defendant can successfully
challenge the court's jurisdiction over his person if he is before the court m violation
of an international treaty." Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Machain Abduction,
Standing, Denals of Justice, and Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 551, 557 n.25 (1993) (quoting United States v. Vreeken, 603 F Supp. 715, 717
(D. Utah 1984), affd, 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. dented, 479 U.S. 1067
(1987)). Some commentators indicate that a judgment obtained without personal juris-
diction is void; others believe that such a judgment should be considered voidable. Cf
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 180, 190 (2d ed. 1993) (citing Wyman
v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1937) (holding that fraud affecting personal
jurisdiction amounts to lack of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938), and
Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 F 700, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that fraudulently
inducing a defendant into the jurisdiction to be served was msufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction), for the proposition that fraudulently obtaining personal ju-
risdiction in a civil matter deprives the court of jurisdiction but citing Commercial
Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909), for the proposition that, in such
cases, 'jurisdiction exists, but the court should decline to exercise it").
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imprisonment. The defendant/kidnap victim is, however, entitled
to invoke the treaty to help the court properly determine what the
law applicable to his case is, namely, that it demes the court
personal jurisdiction.
Professor Vzquez explains why the threshold for defensively
asserting a treaty is lower than that for affirmatively seeking to
imply a treaty-based private right of action.
A right of action is not necessary to invoke a treaty as a
defense. For example, it is clear that the Framers intended
that a treaty would nullify any inconsistent state law, and that
a treaty supersedes an earlier federal statute. Thus, a defen-
dant being prosecuted or sued under a state or prior federal
law that is inconsistent with a treaty is entitled to invoke the
treaty in court to nullify the state or federal law without hav-
ing to show that the treaty confers a private right of action.
Moreover, the Due Process Clause ordinarily requires that a
government deprivation of property or liberty be preceded by
a hearing. Thus, even if the beneficiary of a treaty-based
primary right were deemed not to possess a right of action, he
would nevertheless be free to resist a deprivation of liberty or
property that violates the treaty and to invoke the treaty as a
defense to a government coercive proceeding. The Supremacy
Clause, by nullifying official action, and the Due Process
Clause, by requiring a hearing at which the action can be
challenged (either offensively or defensively), furnish the legal
sanction that a strict sanctiomst would consider an essential
attribute of a law and a legal right. 8
The substantive standards for invoking a treaty as a defense
are therefore different from and less demanding than those
concerned with implying a private cause of action for damages
from a treaty This comparison necessarily begs the questions:
how much lower are the standards and what standards ought to
be applied to the defensive invocation of treaties? Standing
doctrine was not in existence at the tine the Constitution was
signed and ratified, 9 but whether a defendant may invoke a
238. Vdzquez, supra note 63, at 1143-44 (footnotes omitted).
239. Cf. Michael S. Gilmore, Standing Law in Idaho: A Constitutional Wrong Turn,
31 IDAHO L. REV. 509, 539-41 (1995) (noting that the standing doctrine originated m
1923 in Frothmgham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), even though the Court did not
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treaty appears to be a standing question. In American law, a
consensus has not formed con6ermng what the standing rules are
or should be; the Court has been criticized for mampulating the
standing rules to advance an ideological agenda."4 There does
appear to be general agreement, however, that the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution
demands that the party show that the government has caused him
an "injury in fact."24' Aside from injury in fact, the Court also
has imposed a prudential requirement on plaintiffs that attempt
to invoke the power of the courts so that the judiciary may "avoid
deciding questions of broad social import where no individual
rights would be vindicated and limit access to the federal
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular
claim."
242
For the reasons mentioned above, defensive invocation of a
treaty or statute should necessarily lessen the prudential require-
ments. 243 When the government has already invoked the power
yet use the term "standing").
240. See, e.g., Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at the
Forefront of Judicial Abdication, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1548 (1993); John C. Yang,
Standing in the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1356 (1991); David
A. Domansky, Note, Abusing Standing: Furthering the Conservative Agenda, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 387 (1988).
241. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973). Some commentators,
however, have suggested that the Court has defined injury in fact restrictively, making
it impossible for any plaintiff to challenge certain unconstitutional governmental action.
See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People"- John Locke, Collective Constitutional
Rights, and Standing To Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 92-93
(1985).
242. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 79 (5th ed. 1994) (quoting Glad-
stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979)).
243. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WEcHsLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 184 (2d ed. 1973) ("When a defendant m an enforcement proceeding
resists the imposition of state force upon him, he clearly has standing m every sense
to assert in his defense any claimed constitutional rights of his own."). Compare
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (holding that physicians lacked standing
in a civil action to challenge a Connecticut birth control statute because they invoked
their patients' rights'instead of their own) with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
481 (1965) (recognizing that physicians convicted as accessories for violating the same
Connecticut birth control statute had standing to raise the constitutional rights of their
patients). In Griswold, the Court stated:
In [Tileston] we thought that the requirements of standing should be strict,
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of the court, the litigant's suitability to invoke the claim is not
really in issue, and the possibility of champerty and of litigants
using the courts to further ideological questions that are beyond
the power of the judiciary is decreased considerably The pruden-
tial requirement springs to a great extent from separation-of-
powers concerns.' In defensive-treaty-invocation cases, howev-
er, separation of powers usually does not pose a problem."
Professor VIzquez notes that treaties impose obligations on
governments much in the same way that statutes impose
obligations on admstrative agencies: "IL]ike statutes imposing
duties on admnistrative agencies, treaties by their nature impose
duties on the state. Standing doctrine, which identifies who may
enforce statutes that impose duties on government agencies,
addresses precisely the same question as this branch of the 'self-
execution' question. ,,?A He argues that these standing rules
lest the standards of "case or controversy" in Article IH of the Constitution
become blurred. Here those doubts are removed by reason of a criminal
conviction for serving married couples in violation of an aiding-and-abetting
statute. Certainly the accessory should have standing to assert that the of-
fense which he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally
be, a crime.
Id., see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Baird, the Court ruled that a
birth control advocate could assert the rights of unmarried singles and therefore had
standing to challenge his conviction for distribution of anti-spernicidal foam under a
birth control law restricting the sale of contraceptives. Id. at 446. The Court noted
that the statute criminalized distribution, not use; therefore, unmarried singles could
not have challenged the statute on their own. Id. But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 133-35 (1978) (defimng Fourth Amendment rights narrowly to limit the ability of
criminal defendants to assert such rights); infra note 276 (discussing Rakas and its
progeny). In the context of a criminal prosecution, the defendant must show that she
has suffered an mjury in fact to raise a treaty or other international law claim. See
United States v. Berrgan, 283 F Supp. 336, 341 (D. Md. 1968) (finding that Vietnam
War protesters, who were accused of damaging draft records, lacked standing to invoke
the Nuremberg Principles because they had not been subjected to illegal orders), affd,
417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970); see also United States
v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that an allegation that the US was
conducting the war in Vietnam in violation of several treaties was not a defense in
a case in which the defendant was prosecuted for failure to report for induction into
the armed services), cert. dented, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
244. "M[The law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of
separation of powers." WRIGHT, supra note 242, at 78 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).
245. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; infra part IV.C.1.
246. Vizquez, supra note 63, at 1135.
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should apply to affirmative causes of action under a treaty 1 7
The text and history of the Supremacy Clause, the Take Care
Clause, and Supreme Court precedent suggest that a generous
standard applies for defensive invocation of a treaty 248 The
Court has developed such a standard for challenging adimstra-
tive regulations, the zone-of-interest test, and it should apply to
defensive invocation of a treaty 9
The Court developed the zone-of-interest test in cases interpret-
ing the Adnnistrative Procedure Act (APA), which grants
standing to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the
meamng of a relevant statute.""0 In Associatin of Data Process-
zng Serwce Organizatins v. Camp,25' the Court had to decide
which classes of persons were so "aggrieved."252 A group of data
processors sued the Comptroller of the Currency for permitting a
bank to handle data processing for banks and other business-
es.25  Section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962'
forbade banks from "engag[ing] in any activity other than the
performance of bank services for banks."255 Arguing that the
247. Id. at 1137.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 277-83.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 250-61.
250. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
251. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
252. Id. at 153-56.
253. Id. at 151.
254. Pub. L. No. 87-856, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1864) (amended 1982).
255. Id. § 4. Data Processing has received scholarly criticism, particularly for making
injury in fact the cornerstone for standing. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstem, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 185
(1992). But see Carl Tobias, Standing To Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 425 (noting
the inadequacy of the injury-m-fact test but observing that Data Processing's "arguably
within the zone' requirement functioned pragmatically as a feasible, liberal threshold
test"). Courts also have criticized the test. See, e.g., American Friends Serv. Comm. v.
Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting the difficulty of applying the test).
In Webster, the court also criticized a trend in lower federal courts to restrict the test:
First, a test that focuses on whether Congress intended to protect or
benefit certain interests may be stricter than the Supreme Court's
statement that the complainant's interest need only be "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute in
question." Second, it may run counter to the Court's purpose for developing
the "zone" test-to enlarge the class of people with standing-to deny
standing to parties who have both suffered concrete injury caused by
agency action and satisfied other prudential concerns, solely because a
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data processors lacked standing, the Comptroller correctly noted
that Congress never intended section 4 to benefit data processors
or other nonbank competitors." Rejecting the Comptroller's
position and the so-called legally-protected-interest test, the
Court refused to read the APA's "generous review provisions"
narrowly " Furthermore, the Court held that the Act should
be construed "not grudgingly but as serving a broadly remedial
purpose."258
In Data Processing, the Court established the zone-of-interest
test. 9 The test required the plaintiff to demonstrate not only
that he was adversely affected or aggrieved but also that "the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant [was] arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."26" The Court
search for snippets of congressional language about their particular interest
reveals nothing determinative.
Id. (citing Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153); see also Copper & Brass Fabricators
Council, Inc. v. Department of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (criticizing the D.C. Circuit's decisions that restricted the
zone-of-interest test to require an indication of legislative intent, "however slight" to
benefit the class of which the plaintiff is a member). Then-Judge Ginsburg quoted with
approval Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80-81
(1978):
Where a party champions his own rights (as distinguished from those of
a third party), 9nd where the injury alleged is a concrete and particular-
ized one which will be prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the
basic practical and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are
generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are met.
Copper & Brass Fabricators Council, 679 F.2d at 955 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80-81).
256. Cf Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155 (noting that § 4 granted standing to a data
processing company).
257. Id. at 156 (citing Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)).
258. Id. Congress may, however, affirmatively deny standing to a particular class. See
Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 348 (1984) (holding that milk
handlers, but not ultimate consumers, had standing to challenge the Secretary of
Agriculture's decision that set the price of reconstituted milk on the ground that the
statutory scheme evidenced congressional intent to deny consumers standing to
challenge the Secretary's rulings).
259. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
260. Id. (emphasis added). One commentator has noted that Data Processing had a
two-fold purpose: "First, it sought to liberalize access to the federal courts. Second, the
Court attempted to give content to the Administrative Procedure Act's grant of stand-
mg to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.'"
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 74 (1984).
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concluded that, though not intended beneficiaries, the data
processors arguably were within the zone of interests established
by section 4.21
The Court reached a similar result in Arnold Tours, Inc. v.
Camp,26 2 permitting travel agents to sue the Comptroller for
allowing banks, under their incidental powers granted by 12
U.S.C. § 24, to provide travel services to their customers: "The
Court found it of no moment that Congress never specifically fo-
cused on the interests of travel agents in enacting § 4 of the Bank
Service Corporation Act."261 In Data Processing, the Court was
concerned that the data processors' association be "a reliable
private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest
in the present case."2" In another case, the Court wanted to
preclude suits by those who would be "more likely to frustrate
than to further statutory objectives."2"
In 1987, the Supreme Court applied Data Processing to Clarke
v. Securities Industry Associatin, 6 in which a stockbrokers'
261. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155-57.
262. 400 U.S. 45 (1970).
263. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 n.10 (1987) (citing Arnold,
400 U.S. at 46 n.3); see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 618-20
(1971) (relying upon Data Processing and reasoning that, when an association of invest-
ment companies sued the Comptroller of the Currency for violating the Glass-Steagall
Banking Act of 1933 by authorizing banks to operate mutual investment funds, the
competition that the Comptroller had authorized caused the plaintiffs an injury in fact
and that Congress "had arguably legislated against the competition that the petitioners
[the investment companies association] sought to challenge, and from which flowed
their injury"). Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that, by enacting the banking
legislation, Congress never intended to protect investment companies. Id at 640
(Harlan, J., dissenting). He criticized the above quoted language, noting that neither
the express wording of the Glass-Steagall Act nor its legislative istory "evince[d] any
congressional concern for the interests" of the investment companies. Id. (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan noted that, if anything, the Act was adopted despite its
anti-competitive effects. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). His dissent indicates that the
Court squarely faced the question of intended versus direct beneficiary but rejected the
intended bendflciary doctrine-the legally-protected-interest test-m favor of the zone-of-
interest test implicitly granting standing to direct beneficianes. See d. at 639-42
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
264. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397 n.12 (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154).
265. See id.
266. Id. at 394-403. At the same time the Court applied the zone-of-interest test to
conclude that the direct but unintended beneficiary had standing, it suggested in dicta
that the zone-of-interest test was "most usefully understood as a gloss" on § 702 of the
APA, and "not a test of universal application." Id. at 400 n.16; WRIGHT, supra note
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association sued the Comptroller of the Currency under the APA
for allegedly permitting a bank to set up a discount brokerage
"branch" out of state.26 7 The McFadden Act prohibits banks from
having out-of-state branches.268 These banks may, however,
establish out-of-state offices at which no "deposits are received, or
checks paid, or money lent."2" 9 In Clarke, there was little ques-
tion that the plaintiff would suffer an injury in fact as a result of
the agency's actions; presumably, at least some of the plaintiff's
members would have to compete with the bank's out-of-state
offices, which would sell stocks at a considerable discount. 7 ' The
Comptroller argued, however, that the stockbrokers association
was not under the protection of the McFadden Act27' because
Congress passed the McFadden Act not to protect securities
dealers "but to establish competitive equality between state and
national banks."2 2
Rejecting the Comptroller's argument; the Court in Clarke
stressed that the zone-of-interest test is "not meant to be especial-
ly demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff."27 The
Court's purpose in designng the zone-of-mterest test was to allow
parties to circumvent the requirement of showing that Congress
242, at 79 n.58. For the reasons stated above, however, the zone-of-interest test is
appropriate for defensive invocation of treaties. In any event, regressing to the legally-
protected-interest test has been criticized as contrary to Supreme Court precedent and
unduly restrictive of plaintiffs' rights. See Doernberg, supra note 241, at 53 n.10.
267. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 392-93.
268. McFadden Act, ch. 191, §§ 7-8, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228-29 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 81 (1994)).
269. 12 U.S.C. § 36(i) (1994).
270. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403.
271. Id. at 391-92.
272. Id. at 393.
273. Id. at 399-400 (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971))
(emphasis added). But see Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers
Union, 498 U.S. 517, 524-25 (1991) (removing the term "arguably" from the test and
inquiring whether Congress "intended to protect jobs with the Postal Service" by
enacting comprehensive legislation, including the postal monopoly); Marla E. Mansfield,
The "New" Old Law of Judicial Access: Toward a Mirror-Image Nondelegation Theory,
45 ADAIIN. L. REV. 65, 98-100 (1993) (discussing Air Courier). Interpreting the test
restrictively defeats its purpose of expanding standing and would, if applied to a treaty
case, unduly restrict a foreign litigant from invoking a treaty in our courts as
envisioned by the Framers. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
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intended to benefit the party asserting standing, a requirement
that courts had applied in other contexts." 4 At the same time,
the Court did not wish to grant standing to every possible
aggrieved party In essence, the Court had adopted a direct
beneficiary test that permitted the implementation of the Act's
broad remedial purposes while simultaneously refusing to grant
standing to all citizens275 solely by virtue of their citizenship." 6
274. See Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527,
532-33 (1989); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975); supra note 230.
275. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179
(1974). The generalized grievance cases, however, have been criticized for depriving
every possible plaintiff of the right to litigate certain constitutional issues. See
Doernberg, supra note 241, at 97-98.
276. The Court, however, has adopted a more restrictive test governing the
defendants' standing to raise Fourth Amendment violations. See, e.g., Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980) (holding that the defendant lacked standing to
challenge the search of a companion's purse containing defendant's illicit drugs); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) (concluding that defendant, a third
party, lacked standing to invoke the exclusionary rule when an elaborate governmental
scheme to burgle a banker's apartment and to take and photocopy documents from the
banker's briefcase enabled government agents to obtain documents incriminating the
defendant); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978). In Rakas, the Court denied car
passengers standing to challenge a car search because they were neither the owners
of the car nor the admitted owners of the seized shotgun and shells found in the car.
Id. at 148. Rakas overruled the part of the test established in Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960), that had recognized the standing of defendants who were
"legitimately on [the] premises" at the time of the search, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141-42.
The Court in Rakas asserted that it made no change in standing doctrine. Id. at
139-40 (citing, among other cases, Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970)). Despite the Court's words, one commentator has noted
that, at least in the Fourth Amendment standing cases, the Court has reverted sub
silentio to the legally-protected-interest test repudiated by Data Processing. See
Doernberg, supra note 241, at 88 n.226. Commentators have sharply criticized Rakas
and its progeny for misusing standing rules to emasculate the Fourth Amendment. See,
e.g., John M. Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph
of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 151 (1979); Owen M. Fiss,
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 177-78 (1979) (criticizing the
Court for establishing a vague test and for "stretchfing] too far" towards eliminating
the Jones standard); Ira Mickenberg, Fourth Amendment Standing After Rakas v.
Illinois: From Property to Privacy and Back, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 197, 224 (1980-
1981) ("Rakas and Rawlings allow for the discretionary use of property law in any
manner necessary to deny a motion to suppress."). But see Christopher Slobogm,
Capacity To Contest a Search and Seizure: The Passing of Old Rules and Some
Suggestions for New Ones, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 387 (1981) (criticizing the vagueness
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The "generous review provisions" of the APA, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, may be compared to the history and plain
meamng of the Supremacy Clause, in which the Framers made
treaties the "law of the land," generally enforceable by individuals
in state and federal courts. 7 The Framers authorized foreigners
to assert treaties in our courts to help the United States meet its
treaty obligations and thus avoid conflict with other countries."'
Such a role is analogous to the "private attorney general" role that
the Court envisioned under the APA for the direct beneficiaries of
statutes. The plain meaning and drafting lustory of the Suprema-
cy Clause likewise reveal the Framers' desire that the Supremacy
Clause should not be construed "grudgingly," but broadly279
Supreme Court precedent also suggests that a defendant who
is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated" by the treaty prowson ° may invoke the treaty as a
of the Rakas test but noting that the Court still affords substantial Fourth
Amendment protection).
In any event, Rakas should not apply to treaty violation cases. In Rauscher, Ker,
and Fnsbwe, the Court distinguished government violations of domestic law from
government violations of treaties, concluding that the latter required vindication of
individual rights while the former did not. See supra notes 168-228 and accompanying
text. The distinction probably rests, in part, on one of the purposes of the Supremacy
Clause-that of avoiding conflict with other countries and the courts' role in helping
to avoid such conflict. Because treaty violation cases involve the potential for such
international conflict, they warrant different treatment than do criminal cases in which
the local constable has violated the rights of the, accused.
277. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
280. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396 (1986) (quoting
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). Cases
employing customary international law, as opposed to treaty law, to protect state
sovereignty appear only to require that the party defending against the international-
law violation show injury in fact. See, e.g., The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362
(1824) (concluding that United States agents lacked authority to seize a French vessel
in Spanish territory without Spain's consent and, without inquiring whether the vessel
owner was a direct beneficiary or an intended beneficiary of the custom, awarding the
owner damages for the wrongful seizure). United States agents who trespass upon the
territory of another country violate an established rule of customary international law:
"It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one
state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the
latter's consent." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432 cmt. b (1987).
Even those cases rejecting the applicability of customary international law appear to
rest their holdings upon grounds other than the status of the defendant. See, e.g.,
1996] 1459
1460 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1401
defense to jurisdiction.28' In Rauscher and Ford, for example,
when our governmental agents allegedly acted unlawfully m
seizing persons or property from abroad, the Court concentrated
on the alleged illegality of the agents' conduct, not upon the status
of the victim invoking international law to challenge the govern-
mental proceeding.282 One may infer from the facts of these
cases, however, that, although they were not intended benefi-
ciares of the treaty provisions, the fugitive in Rauscher and the
ship officers in Ford arguably were within the zone of interests
protected or regulated by the extradition and anti-hovering
treaties, respectively 283
B. Separation of Powers and Contractual Principles
Besides standing, the question of self-execution is complicated
by the doctrine of separation of powers. If a treaty requires the
United States to perform acts solely within Congress's enumerated
powers, the treaty is non-self-executing.' But no such separa-
tion-of-powers conflict arises when a defendant asserts the treaty
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
essentially that customary international law is only an exception to the Ker-Fnsbie
doctrine when "the government's conduct [is] outrageous") (citing United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Toscanmo, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir. 1974)). Some of these cases require a protest by the defendant's government in
order for the defendant to have standing to invoke the international-law violation, see,
e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F Supp. 909 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953 (1988), but
these cases generally do not otherwise suggest that more is required than showing
that the defendant is the direct victim of the international-law violation, see supra note
10 (discussing customary international law). A full discussion of whether a government
protest is required for standing is beyond the scope of this Article; however, the text
and drafting history of the Supremacy Clause indicate that protest is not required. See
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992) (implying that no foreign
government protest is required); Vdzquez, supra note 63, at 1160 (suggesting that no
protest is required for standing under treaties). But see United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.) (requiring a protest in order to assert a treaty
defensively), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); Mitchell J. Matorin, Note, Unchaining
the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE
L.J. 907, 923-34 (1992) (asserting that standing under an extradition treaty rests on
an "adequate" protest from the asylum state).
281. See supra notes 168-229 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 168-229 and accompanying text (discussing Rauscher, Ford, and
other cases).
283. See supra notes 168-229 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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as a defense to a federal prosecution.28 The executive has direct
authority over United States prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies." 6 When a treaty imposes a negative obligation on the
United States concerning the conduct of federal law enforcement
agents, the executive does not need congressional action to carry
out the treaty obligation. 7 Such a treaty, therefore, should be
considered prima facie self-executing.
In summary, a court should find a treaty provision self-
executing except when the treaty provision violates separation-of-
powers principles or expressly makes itself or other treaty terms
inapplicable in domestic courts.2' Given the plain language of
the Supremacy Clause and the Framers' intent,"9 American
courts should construe the doctrine of non-self-execution narrowly,
adopting the theme that the doctrine is a limited exception to the
general rule of self-executing treaties. The proposed test to de-
ternnne whether a treaty term is self-executing and invocable as
a defense rests on the Framers' presumption that treaties are self-
executing. To rebut this presumption, the government would have
to obtain an affirmative response to questions one or two below or
a negative response to question three:
1. Would the court's enforcement of the treaty provision invade
the power of another branch of government? For example: (a)
Would enforcing the treaty trespass on one of the House's
exclusive, enumerated powers?2" (b) Would enforcing the
treaty pose a political question?"si or (c) Is the treaty pro-
vision so vaguely worded that, by attempting to interpret it, a
court risks severe encroachment upon the exclusive treaty-
285. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
286. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, state courts are obligated to follow a legally
ratified treaty even if state law or a prosecution under state law conflicts with the
treaty. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that a valid treaty
prevails over an inconsistent state statute); cf. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407, 430-31 (1886) ("[I]f the state court should fail to give due effect to the rights of
the party under the treaty, a remedy is found in the judicial branch of the Federal
government, which has been fully recogmzed.&").
287. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 133 (discussing Senate reservations).
289. See supra notes 20-74 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 92.
291. In an enforcement proceeding, the government will rarely, if ever, be able to
show how the treaty is nonjusticxable. See supra note 94.
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making power of the President and the Senate?"i
2. Does the treaty by its own terms prohibit it from operating
in United States domestic courts? For example: (a) Did the
parties include a broad, unqualified domestic implementation
clause clearly indicating that the treaty as a whole or the
treaty provision in question will not operate locally without
domestic legislation?29 (b) Did the Senate attach a reserva-
tion to the treaty clearly making the treaty as a whole or the
treaty provision in question non-self-executing?2" or (c) Does
the treaty contain a Cardenas-type provision that expressly
renders the treaty as a whole or the treaty term m question
non-self-executing?29 5
3. Does the defendant have standing? Did the government's
violation of the treaty cause the defendant to suffer an injury
m fact, and is the defendant within the zone of interests
arguably protected or regulated by the treaty92"
The U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention will be examined under the
test set forth above. 97 This Article will examine the treaty's text,
292. This prong incorporates the requirement of precise and mandatory language. See
supra notes 95-129 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 234-83 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 6. Assuming that individuals may assert Articles 2 and 6 in
United States courts as a bar to personal jurisdiction, a court would need to fashion
an appropriate remedy. The usual remedy for want of personal jurisdiction is dismiss-
al. See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S.
64 (1899); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). When property- or persons
are wrongfully seized, the remedy is return. See Cosgrove, 174 U.S. at 68-69. Under
the Supremacy Clause, not only are treaties the "supreme Law of the Land," but also
the remedies fashioned as a matter of general and customary international law in
construing treaties. See Vdzquez, supra note 63, at 1161. Under international law, the
typical remedy for wrongful seizure is to put the parties back to status quo ante. See
id. at 1157. State practice in state-sponsored abduction cases reflects the remedy of
dismissal and return to the asylum state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 432 (1987); see In re Jolis, 7 Ann. Dig. 191-92 (Tribunal Correctionnel
d'Adresnes 1933) (Fr.) (ordering the return to Belgium of a Belgian national kidnapped
by French police on Belgian soil after Belgium protested); Charles Rousseau, Chronique
des Faits Internationaux, 69 REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 761,
834 (1965), translated in JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 48-49 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing an official apology given by Italian police to
1462
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purpose, and negotiating history to determine whether the above
criteria are met. Lastly, this Article will examnne manifest public
policy considerations that may further support a court's ultimate
determination of personal jurisdiction over defendants invoking
the Convention.
IV APPLYING THE TEST TO THE U.N. DRUG TRAFFICKING
CONVENTION
A. Introductin to the Conventin
For many years, the United States chose to act either alone or
bilaterally on the enforcement level in attempting to curb the
import of drugs into the United States."' Because the drug
the Swiss government for a kidnapping by an Italian police officer of an Italian
national from Swiss territory). But see Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction:
A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 746, 749 (1992)
(noting the argument that abduction may not violate international law when a state
abducts an individual in anticipatory self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
but observing that no such grounds existed for Alvarez-Macham's kidnapping); Paust,
supra note 237, at 567 (suggesting that return may not be necessary in extraordinary
cases but noting that Alvarez-Macham did not fit in that category).
The United States has recogmzed the remedy of return. During the Vietnam War,
for example, Ronald Anderson, an American citizen and conscientious objector, fled to
Canada to escape the draft. Alerted that Anderson was going to come back, United
States Customs agents were waiting for him as he was about to cross the border. The
agents, however, were impatient and encroached approximately 50 yards into Canada
and arrested Anderson while he was still on Canadian soil. After a Canadian protest,
the United States returned Anderson to Canada. SWEENEY ET AL., supra, at 133 (citing
79 REVUE G2N9RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 462 (1975)). The United States
granted this remedy to one of its own nationals for a minimal intrusion into Canadian
territory. United States courts should have no difficulty in granting a similar remedy
to a foreign national in the case of a state-sponsored kidnapping within the heartland
of the host stat6. Cf. The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925) (holding unlawful
the seizure of a schooner carrying whiskey 19 miles off the United States coast,
dismissing libels against the schooner and its cargo, and implicitly ordering vessel and
cargo returned).
298. ALFRED W. MCCOY, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN 485-87 (1991). From the inception
of international drug control, however, the United States has been involved in
establishing regimes to stop the illicit drug trade. Starting with the International
Opium Convention at The Hague of 1912, Convention Internationale de l'Opium
[Convention for the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs], Jan. 23,
1912, 38 Stat. 1912, 8 L.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter International Opium Convention], and
continuing through the rest of the century, the United States played a leading
international role. See Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on Psychotropic Substances,
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trade, however, operates globally with drug cartels resembling
multinational corporations, many governments, including the
United States, now recognize that suppressing it requires multi-
lateral cooperation. The U.N. Convention Against Illicit Drugs
represents the most ambitious attempt to enlist the countries of
the world in this effort. Adopted by consensus by 106 nations in
December 1988,299 the Convention is one of the most comprehen-
sive criminal-law treaties ever created. As a member of the United
States delegation stated: "The Convention is one of the most
detailed and far-reaching instruments ever adopted in the field of
international criminal law, °0 and if widely adopted and effec-
tively implemented, will be a major force in harmomzing national
laws and enforcement actions around the world."' The United
States was one of the Convention's chief sponsors.0 2
Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; Protocol Limiting and Regulating the
Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of International and Wholesale Trade
in and Use of Opium, June 23, 1953, T.IA.S. No. 5273, 456 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol
Bringing Under International Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the Convention of
July 13, 1931, Nov. 19, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1671, 44 U.N.T.S. 277; Proclamation by the
President, Declaring the Entry into Force of Amendments Set Forth in the Annex to
the Protocol of December 11, 1946, Respecting Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1948, 62 Stat.
1796, T.I.A.S. No. 1859; Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols
on Narcotic Drugs, Dec. 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, 12 U.N.T.S. 179; Convention for
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, July 13,
1931, 48 Stat. 1545, 139 L.N.T.S. 301.
299. David P Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 DENV. J. INTL
L. & POLY 387, 387 (1990).
300. The Convention depends on the cooperation of individual states, not on the
direct operation of an international regime. Professor Bassiouni has criticized the
signatory states' reluctance to establish an international regime in winch the laws
would be established on the international level rather than under an agreement to
enact laws on the nation-state level. Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm. on the Ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1989)
[hereinafter Senate Ratification Hearings] (statement of M. Cherif Bassioum, Professor
of Law); see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Effective National and International Action Against
Organized Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities, 4 EMORY INTL L. REV. 9, 33-39
(1990).
301. Stewart, supra note 299, at 388; see D.W Sproule & Paul St-Denis, The UIN
Drug Trafficking Convention: An Ambitious Step, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 263 (1989)
(explaining provisions of the Convention and evaluating its effectiveness as a weapon
against drug trafficking).
302. Stewart, supra note 299, at 388.
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The Convention requires state parties to share information on
drug offenders and cartels,"' to outlaw money laundering and
a host of drug offenses,3 to regulate sale and distribution of
precursor chemicals,"'5 to extradite certain individuals suspected
of violating drug laws,0 6 to confiscate the assets of drug offend-
ers, 30 7 and to abolish bank secrecy for drug investigative purpos-
es.308 In addition to requiring state parties to enact domestic
antidrug legislation, the Convention contains a mutual legal assis-
tance treaty0 9 (MLAT) and an extradition treaty .0
The Convention also amends all existing extradition treaties I '
that the parties have with each other. 12 First, the Convention
makes drug and money laundering offenses "extraditable offences"
for purposes of any extradition treaties between any of the par-
ties.313 Second, the Convention declares that the drug offenses
listed in Article 3 shall not be considered "fiscal offences" or "polit-
ical offences" or "regarded as politically motivated."14 Drug
offenses thus do not'-qualify for the generally recognized political






309. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 7. Article 7 of the
Convention provides "the widest measure of mutual legal assistance" to other state
parties in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings" concerning the
enumerated drug offenses. Id. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are the tool
whereby one state helps to provide another state with evidence of a crime that is
admissible m the court of the requesting state. Article 7.2 of the MLAT within the
Convention includes taking statements, serving process, executing, searches and sei-
zures, examining objects and sites, providing relevant documents, and identifying and
tracing proceeds, property, and instrumentalities of crime. Id. art. 7.2.
310. Id. art. 6.
311. Although most of the bilateral extradition treaties entered into by the United
States include drug crimes as extraditable offenses, few of our treaties make money
laundering an extraditable offense. Senate Ratification Hearings, supra note 300, at 127
(statement of Richard L. Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States).
Consequently, the Convention, on this basis alone, will have a significant impact on
extradition law.
312. Most extradition treaties areb.ilateral accords. Some regional and multilateral
extradition treaties, however, are in force. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 94, ch. I, § 4,
at 25-30.
313. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, arts. 6.1-.2.
314. Id. art. 3.10.
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offense exception to extradition.315 Third, the Convention re-
qires that state parties either extradite individual suspects or try
them domestically, assuming that the requested state has juris-
diction to do so. 1' Fourth, the Convention itself is intended to
serve as an extradition treaty between any of the parties who do
not have a bilateral treaty 3 "
315. But see Sproule & St-Dems, supra note 301, at 272-75 (noting that the exclusion
of the political offense exception is essentially hortatory and does not apply to politi-
cally motivated requests). On the political offense exception generally, see Barbara A.
Banoff & Christopher H. Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders"- The Political Offense
Exception to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INVL L. & POL. 169
(1984) (providing recommendations as to how the exception should be applied).
316. U.N. Drug Trafficlng Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.9.
317. Id. art. 6.3; see also id. art. 6.4 (requiring the extradition of drug offenders by
parties who do not demand extradition treaties in order to extradite a suspect).
By reservation, the United States does not recognize the Convention as authoriz-
ing the extradition of citizens to countries with whom we do not have an extradition
treaty. Apparently, Senator Helms was concerned that the United States would be
compelled to extradite individuals to certain outlaw states, which he claimed could
compromise legitimate drug enforcement efforts. See EXEC. REP. NO. 15, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 52, app. at 178 (1989) [hereinafter ExEcuTWE REPORT]. The reservation
provides as follows:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators Present concurring therein), That the
Senate advise and consent to the ratification of The United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, done at Vienna on December 20, 1988, subject to the following
understandings:
(1) Nothing in this Treaty requires or authorizes legislation or other action
by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States.
(2) The United States shall not consider this convention as the legal basis
for extradition of citizens to any country with which the United States has
no bilateral extradition treaty in force.
(3) Pursuant to the rights of the United States under Article 7 of this
treaty to deny requests which prejudice its essential interests, the United
States shall deny a request for assistance when the designated authority,
after consultation with all appropriate intelligence, anti-narcotic, and foreign
policy agencies, has specific information that a senior government official
who will have access to information to be provided under this treaty is
engaged in or facilitates the production or distribution of illegal drugs.
135 CONG. REC. S16,616 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989).
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B. The Drafting History of Articles 2 and 6 and the U.N. Drug
Trafficking Convention
The history of the Convention's extradition provision (Article 6)
is particularly revealing. Coupled with the antiforeign law enforce-
ment provision (Article 2), the history indicates that the parties
implicitly intended to bar state-sponsored kidnapping. The United
States proposed a provision requiring each state to extradite its
own nationals. The proposal was overwhelmingly rejected:
The United States had hoped to include a broad obligation to
extradite one's own nationals in this article. Unfortunately
there was overwhelming opposition from countries which, for
either political or legal reasons, would not accept any provision
on the extradition of their nationals, even a hortatory provi-
sion. Thus, [article 6] contains no provision on the extradition
of nationals." 8
318. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 50 (commenting on Article 6 of the
Convention); see also id. app. at 132 (testimony of Richard L. Thornburgh, Attorney
General of the United States). Paragraph 5 of the original draft of the extradition
Article provided: "A request for extradition with respect to any of the offenses to which
this article applies shall not be refused: (a) On the ground that the person sought is
a national of the requested Party, unless such refusal is required by the constitution
of the requested Party." 1 United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, at 5, art. 4, para.
5, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/16 (1994) [hereinafter 1 Official Records] (emphasis added).
The United States proposed that the language following "unless" be deleted. Working
Document on the Draft Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Division of Narcotic Drugs, at 55, para. 412, U.N. Doc.
DND/DCIT/WP.1 (1987) [hereinafter Working Document]. The United States argued that
"permit[ting] traffickers to avoid extradition on the basis of nationality, would undercut
the spirit and the intent of the Convention." Id. Not only did the parties reject the
United States' proposal, they also overwhelmingly rejected the original draft as overly
broad. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 50; see also Sproule & St-Dems, supra
note 301, at 279-80 (discussing the limitations on extradition). Instead, the following
paragraphs were adopted:
Paragraph 5. Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for by
the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, includ-
ing the grounds upon which the requested Party may refuse extradition.
Paragraph 10. If extradition, sought for purposes of enforcing a sentence,
is refused because the person sought is a national of the requested Party,
the requested Party shall, if its law so permits and in conformity with the
requirements of such law, upon application of the requesting Party,
consider the enforcement of the sentence which has been inposed under
the law of the requesting Party, or the remainder thereof.
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The vast majority of the countries opposing such a requirement
noted that their domestic law prohibits extradition of their
nationals, indicating an intent to shield such nationals from
extradition."' In the words of the Norwegian delegate speaking
for the Scandinavian countries, "[blelieving that the protectin of
the rights of the person sought was one of the most significant
principles in international law, [the Scandinavian countries]
considered that a State should never be obliged to extradite its
nationals."320 Only a few states asserted state sovereignty as the
basis for refusing to extradite their own nationals.3 ' The over-
U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 6 (emphasis added); see also 2
United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, at 107, paras. 26-30, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.82/16/Add.1 (1991) [hereinafter 2 Official Records] (relating the comments of
the United States delegate, who believed that extradition is the most "effective and
powerful" weapon against drug trafficking); Working Document, supra, at 55-56, paras.
404-11, 413-14 (1987) (suggesting that the parties mvolved-Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Den-
mark, Belgium, Hungary, Switzerland, Romama, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Poland,
Portugal, and Japan-sought either to weaken the effect of the original draft or to
delete it outright). The drafting history suggests that the United States' proposal to
strengthen the original draft was not seriously considered. The United States' position,
however, is understandable because states that refuse to extradite their nationals often
do not prosecute them for the crime(s) in question. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The
Evolution of United States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive Crimi-
nals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 813, 815 (1993). State-sponsored kidnapping is,
however, not the solution. We and other members of the international community must
persuade these countries to prosecute the criminals and must provide mutual legal
assistance to facilitate the prosecutions. Accordingly, the Convention generally requires
requested states to prosecute the offender, including a national, found in their
jurisdiction if they do not surrender her. See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra
note 6, art. 6.9.
319. See 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 105-10, paras. 7-87; see also zd. at
117, para. 22 (noting that "the majority of States could not extradite their own
nationals"); 1 id. at 36, para. 64.
320. 2 id. at 105, para. 7 (emphasis added). The Norwegian delegate stressed,
however, that the Nordic countries did punish their own nationals for offenses commit-
ted abroad and were prepared to continue to do so. Id. at 105 para. 9. Other countries
expressly indicating that extraditing nationals would violate their constitutions or
domestic law included Afghamstan, Brazil, Cameroon, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya,
Mexico, Morocco, Senegal, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen. Id. at 105-11, paras. 7-102.
Other countries expressing their opposition in the debates include Algeria, Austria,
China, Jamaica, Japan, and Israel. Id. The United States expressly supported the
proposal to extradite nationals. Id. at 107, paras. 26-30. Argentina and Mauitarius
appeared to stake out a compromise position. Id. at 109, paras. 67, 69.
321. See 1 id. at 36, para. 63 (stating that some states felt that "the discretion of
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whelnnng opposition to a weaker mandatory extradition require-
ment than that which the United States had proposed suggests
that the parties to the Convention intended to safeguard the
rights of their nationals from the law enforcement agencies of
other countries.
Later in the negotiations of the treaty, Mexico, which had been
a minor player, demanded that an article be added to the Conven-
tion that would effectively prohibit foreign law enforcement agents
from operating on another country's territory without that
country's consent. 2 In the words of one delegate, Mexico's
proposal came as a "qbombshell." " The United States strongly
opposed the addition, apparently believing that the proposal would
sabotage the entire convention by permitting the parties to escape
their obligations under the treaty " The Report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee noted that the negotiating history
of this controversial article "differ[ed] significantly from that of all
others in the Convention."25 Mexico's limitation read:
Nothing in this Convention empowers, in any way whatsoever,
the authorities of one of the States Parties to undertake, to
attempt to undertake or to exercise pressure m order to be
allowed, in the territorial jurisdiction of any of the other States
Parties, the exercise and performance of functions whose
jurisdiction or competence are exclusively reserved to the
authorities of each of those other States Parties by their
respective national laws and regulations.326
sovereign States to refuse extradition should not be restricted").
322. See EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 22-24. The general outline of every
other article of the Convention was known and essentially accepted early in the
negotiations. Id. at 22. Article 2, however, was not proposed until July 1988, id., only
six months before the Convention's conclusion, after four years of preparation, including
two years in negotiation, uc at 2.
323. Telephone Interview with a Delegate to the Convention Who Requested
Anonymity (July 22, 1994).
324. The United States "strongly opposed" Mexico's proposal, EXECUTIVE REPORT,
supra note 317, at 22, which "[iln broad outline would have characterized the
Convention very narrowly as an 'instrument of international cooperation', the
implementation of which would be limited by 'the most strict respect for' the internal
legal system of each Party," id., see infra note 483 and accompanying text (reproducing
paragraphs 1 through 4 of Mexico's proposed article).
325. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 22.
326. 1 Official Records, supra note 318, at 76. This is paragraph 2 of the original
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Mexico apparently proposed the article after a spate of American
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations on Mexican
soil, including the kidnapping of Mexicans by United States
agents. 7
Although the United States strongly opposed Mexico's proposal,
forty-two countries quickly supported a slightly modified ver-
sion.2 8 Canada and Mexico co-sponsored this modification.329
Mexican proposal. See infra note 483 and accompanying text (containing the full text
of the proposal).
327. The proposal was made after the Camarena and Urquidez cases, both of which
caused concern in Mexico about the role of United States DEA agents m that country.
Telephone Interview with Miguel Ruiz Cabafias, Minister of Border Affairs of the
Mexican Embassy (July 21, 1994) [hereinafter Cabahas Interview]. Mr. Cabanas was
attached to the Mexican delegation during the negotiations on the Convention Against
Illicit Drugs. Id. In 1985, Enrique Camarena, an undercover DEA agent, was tortured
and killed by suspected drug dealers in Guadalajara, Mexico. See Jay Matthews, U.S.
Obtains Recording of Drug Agent's Torture, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1986, at A3. In 1986,
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was apprehended in Mexico by Mexican police officers,
turned over to the DEA, and taken to the United States for trial. United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 505
U.S. 1201 (1992). He was never formally extradited. See id. A federal grand jury
indicted him on charges relating to the death of Camarena. Id. Subsequently, Mexico
lodged "a formal complaint regarding the kidnapping of Verdugo," alleging that the
police officers were "surreptitiously hired by the DEA" to abduct him. Id. (quoting
letters from the Mexican Embassy to the U.S. Department of State). These two cases
caused a heated debate in Mexico. Many Mexicans were surprised to learn that DEA
agents were operating in their country. Cabaflas Interview, supra.
328. See Amendment Submitted by Afghanistan et al., United Nations Conference
for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. EICONF.82/C.1/L.1/Rev.2/Add.1 (1988) [hereinafter
Sponsors]. The Canadian-Mexican proposed article simplified the language of the orgi-
nal Mexican proposal while continuing the theme that each party's sovereignty and
territory should be respected. The Canadian-Mexican proposal provided as follows:
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
1. This Convention constitutes an instrument of inter-national co-operation,
aimed at ensuring maximum effectiveness in the struggle of the States
Parties against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances. Its provisions are directed at all aspects of the problem with
strict respect for the provisions of the internal system of each State Party.
2. Nothing in this Convention derogates from the principles of the
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States or that of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of States.
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The Canadian representative emphasized that the magnitude of
this criminal-law treaty required assurances that every state
would respect the territory of every other state: "Not surprisingly,
when States were asked to assume obligations in new fields they
were, and legitimately so, concerned that those did not infringe on
umversally recognized legal principles such as the sovereign
equality and territorial integrity of States.""'
3. Nothing in this Convention empowers the authorities of one of the
States Parties to undertake, in the territorial jurisdiction of any of the
other States Parties, the exercise and performance of functions whose
jurisdiction or competence are exclusively reserved for the authorities of
those other States Parties by their national laws and regulations.
Amendment Submitted by Canada and Mexco, United Nations Conference for the
Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, U.N. Doc. EICONF.82/C.I/L.1 (1988) [hereinafter Canadian & Mexican
Amendment].
329. See Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328. Aside from Canada and
Mexico, there were a considerable number of countries from the Western hemisphere
among the 42 states that co-sponsored the article: Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Sponsors, supra note 328.
The Canadian-Mexican proposal did weaken the original Mexican proposal to some
extent; the original proposal prohibited one state from "exercis[ing] pressure in order
to be allowed" to operate in the territory of the weaker state. See infra note 483 and
accompanying text (emphasis added). The Canadian-Memcan proposal deleted the
emphasized phrase from Memco's original. See supra note 328. Presumably, the
Convention permits the exercise of such pressure to induce cooperation but does
require cooperation by the requested state in the form of affirmative permission to
conduct any type of police operation on its soil or within its waters. For example, the
DEA operation conducted to kidnap Alvarez-Macham was carned out without official
cooperation from Mexico. See United States v. Caro-Qumtero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D.
Cal. 1990), affd, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
Consequently, the kidnapping would have violated Article 2 had the Convention been
in effect at the time. If, however, the United States had pressured Mexico into giving
up Alvarez-Macham or in permitting U.S. agents to apprehend him, then the United
States would not have violated the Article.
330. 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 155, para. 87. The proposal, however,
did not allow the parties to use their domestic law to avoid their obligations under
the treaty and added that the "provision merely reiterated accepted and well-recoginzed
international law concerning the territorial integrity of States, nothing more." Id. at
155, paras. 88-89 (relating the comments of the Canadian delegate). Despite the
delegate's disclaimer, "merely reiterating" such recognized international law would have
been unnecessary and superfluous because of its generally accepted character. By
insisting, over considerable opposition, that the language appear as an article, as
opposed to a preamble as the United States wished, and that it contain far more
specificity than Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, the controversial Article 2 of the Drug
Trafficking Convention assumes greater dimension.
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Given its breadth, the Convention needed an antiforeign law
enforcement article to make clear, at the outset, the absolute
respect for each country's territory 3 ' Because this Convention
was "significantly broader in scope particularly with regard to
its criminal law provisions"33' than the 1961 Single Conven-
tion,313 the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 3 4 and
the 1972 Protocol, 35 such an article was required.336
The Canadian representative explained that the ban on law
enforcement from trespassing upon another state's territory did
not prevent one country from permitting another to operate in
such a manner.337 The purpose of the article was, instead, to
prevent parties from "unilaterally extend[ing their] jurisdiction
beyond their borders."33 5 Over the strong objections of the United
States, the proposed article and its subsequent drafts garnered
wide support from other countnes.33' As it became obvious that
the United States' objections would fail,340 the United States
331. See id. at 155, paras. 90-92.
332. Id. at 155 para. 91.
333. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 298.
334. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra note 298.
335. Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 298.
336. See 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 155, paras. 87-92. The Canadian
representative recognized that the proposed Convention contained other safeguards. Id.
Nonetheless, he emphasized that stating general principles at the beginning of the
Convention avoided misunderstandings and helped to reassure the state parties about
assuming their other obligations under the Convention. Id. at 155, para. 92. The
Canadian representative stated:
In response the sponsors would emphasize that none of the principles
contained in article 1 bis [the Canadian and Mexican proposal] went
beyond those contained in the other articles of the draft convention. It was
useful, however, to emphasize such general principles [prohibiting one state
from exercising law enforcement functions in another statel, at the
beginning of the convention so that there could be no misundeistanding.
Moreover, the sponsors were confident that with the clarification provided
by article 1 bts [the proposed article], delegations and Governments would
feel reassured and less hesitant to assume the obligations contained in the
other articles of the convention.
Id.
337. See id. at 155, para. 90. '[The proposed article] was not intended to prevent
joint co-operation in areas normally reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of one
Party." Id.
338. Id.
339. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 23.
340. Id. Despite United States opposition, the Review Group sent the proposal on
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made its own proposal, which changed some language but left
Mexico's paragraph 2 (now Article 2.3) virtually intact:" 1
3. Nothing m this Convention empowers the authorities of one
of the States Parties to undertake, m the territorial jurisdiction
of any of the other States Parties, the exercise and perfor-
mance of functions whose jurisdiction or competence are
exclusively reserved for the authorities of those other States
Parties by their national laws and regulations.342 A State
Party to the present Convention shall not undertake m the
territory of another State Party the independent exercise of
jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively
reserved for the authorities of that other State Party by its
national law and regulations.'
The amended third paragraph uses mandatory language--" [a]
State Party shall not undertake" 3 -- that denotes and
connotes legal obligation. 5 The earlier version used the abso-
lute negative--"[n]othing in this Convention empowers" 46 -but
the deletion of that prefatory phrase and the use of the phrase
"shall not undertake" alone appeared to make the obligation
equally strong.347 The Mexican and Canadian representatives
to the Plempotentiary conference. At that conference, a Canadian-Mexican proposal was
substituted for Mexico's original. Id. Although finding the substitute proposal "less
objectionable," the United States delegation still opposed it, characterizing the joint
Canadian-Mexican proposal as "superfluous, premature and inappropriate." Id. Debate
in the conference revealed that a number of Western countries supported the proposal
or some other form of scope article. This debate convinced the United States delegation
that 'the Convention would "for political reasons" need to contain a scope article. Id.
The United States also had argued that part of the proposal should be in the
preamble, as being part of the background and general principles behind the treaty,
but gave up on this point. Id.
341. Id. After informal consultation with other delegations, including Mexico, the
United States proposed a scope article. Id.
342. Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328.
343. 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 171, para. 8 (the United States' proposal
is shaded; the Canadian-Mexican portion of the proposal is not). The United States'
proposed second paragraph phrased the parties' obligations affirmatively rather than
negatively: "States Parties shall carry out their obligations under the present
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and
territorial integrity of States. "Id.
344. Id.
345. The phrase "shall not" creates a negative obligation: "To create a duty not to
act (i.e., a prohibition), say 'shall not.' DICKERSON, supra note 84, at 214.
346. Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328, at para. 3 (emphasis added).
347. Webster's defines "undertake" as, among other things, "to engage in," WEBSTER'S
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discerned no substantive difference between their joint proposal
and the language proposed by the United States. 8 The amend-
ed Umted States proposal was slightly modified and subsequently
became Article 2 of the Convention. 49
The United States Senate Report confirms the parties' intent m
crafting Article 2, paragraph 3:
The third paragraph restates the corresponding provision of
the original Mexican proposal, which reflected concern that the
Conventin not be interpreted to allow law enforcement officials
of one Party to operate on the territory of another Party in drug
cases absent agreement between the two Parties concerned.
Paragraph 3 does no more than state in more specific terms
one aspect of the duty to respect territorial integrity and not to
intervene in domestic affairs contained in paragraph 2.350
The negotiation history as a whole thus indicates that the
parties to the Convention sought to prevent foreign law enforce-
ment from encroaching upon their soil and waters to interdict the
illicit drug trade. Coupling Article 2's history with that of Article
6 indicates, at a minimum, that the parties intended to prohibit
one state's law enforcement agents from trespassing upon another
state and kidnapping that state's nationals.
C. Applying the Proposed Test to Artzcles 2 and 6
Under the proposed test, defendants may invoke Articles 2 and
6 of the Convention to challenge a trial court's jurisdiction when
government agents have brought the defendants before the court
by kidnapping them abroad."5' Each prong of the test will be
applied in turn. Although the test must necessarily focus on the
basis for rebutting the presumption of self-executing treaties, that
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2491 (1986), and "empower" as "to give
authority to," id. at 744.
348. See 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 176, paras. 2-6.
349. For the final version, reflecting slight changes in the U.S. proposal, see
EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 317, at 22.
350. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). The Report to the Senate noted that the preceding
paragraph (Article 2.2) restated "the concepts of sovereign equality, territorial integrity
and non-intervention in domestic affairs, as they are enshrined in Article 2 of the UN
Charter." Id.
351. See supra part III (discussing the proposed test).
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presumption is the starting point of the analysis.
1. Separatin of Powers: Would the Courts' Enforcement of the
Treaty Provisin Invade the Power of Another Branch of
Government?
This prong involves three principal kinds of separation-of-
powers concerns: (1) whether the treaty language at issue is
sufficiently mandatory and precise, (2) whether enforcing the
treaty provision in question would trespass upon one of Congress's
exclusive, enumerated powers, and (3) whether enforcing the
treaty would pose a political question.
First, Articles 2 and 6.5 appear to pass the mandatory and
precise test.352 Both Articles are cast in mandatory terms. Article
2.3 directs that the parties "shall not undertake [law enforcement
functions] in the territory of another Party 353 Article 6.5 states
that extradition "shall be subject to" the laws and treaties of the
state prohibiting extradition of its nationals.354 The emphasized
language closely resembles the language that the Supreme Court
indicated was mandatory and presumably self-executing in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 5" discussed earlier. 56
Articles 2 and 6.5 likewise are sufficiently precise. Article 2.3
compels the state parties not to "undertake in the territory of
another Party" any law enforcement actions.357 The word "under-
352. Extradition treaties generally are considered self-executing and usually do not
pose separation-of-powers issues. See 1 BASSMOUNI, supra note 94, at 39-40. Some of
the subparagraphs of Article 6, however, do contain hortatory language and thus are
not self-executing. See, e.g., U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.7
("[tihe Parties shall endeavor to expedite extradition procedures") (emphasis added).
Article 6.5, however, uses mandatory language and does not contemplate the enactment
of implementing legislation: "Extradition shall be subject to the conditions provided for
by the law of the requested Party or by applicable extradition treaties, including the
grounds upon which the requested Party may refuse extradition." Id. art. 6.5. It is,
therefore, self-executing.
353. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3 (emphasis added).
354. Id. art. 6.5 (emphasis added).
355. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
356. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (suggesting that Article 33 of
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
176, was mandatory, "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened. " (emphasis added)).
357. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3. That Article 2 is
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take" is synonymous with "engage" and conveys the definite idea
that certain conduct is prohibited on another country's soil." 8
The next two phrases in the Article appear to be terms of art that,
when combined, mean the performance of law enforcement func-
tions:59 "[Tihe exercise of jurisdiction and performance of
functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that
other Party by its domestic law "360 Supreme Court precedent
and United States practice support the special meamng given to
these phrases.36' Article 6.5 conditions extradition on the laws
and treaties of the requested state and expressly permits every
party to deny extradition on the grounds provided in their laws or
treaties.362 If any doubt about the meamng of either article
remains, resort may be made to the drafting history, which
indicates that Article 2.3 bars foreign law enforcement agents
from acting within a country without its consent and that the par-
ties amended Article 6.5 to protect nationals from extradition.3"
Enforcing Articles 2.3 and 6.5 would not encroach upon
Congress's exclusive enumerated powers. Article 2.3 is phrased
negatively, telling the executive and its law enforcement agents
what they may not do,3" and Article 6.5 deals solely with
extradition.36 Neither article requires any allocation of funds,
calls for a declaration of war, nor involves any of Congress's other
enumerated powers. Consequently, the government would be
unable to show a separation-of-powers conflict regarding this part
of the prong.
The last part of this prong involves political questions: would
enforcing the Convention and ousting the trial court of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant kidnapped in violation of the
Convention pose a political question?366 Since Article III and the
phrased negatively also supports a finding that it is sufficiently precise. See supra
notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 347.
359. See znfra notes 396-420 and accompanying text.
360. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3.
361. See infra notes 416-20 and accompanying text.
362. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.5.
363. See supra part IV.B.
364. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art 2.3.
365. Id. art. 6.5.
366. See supra note 94 (discussing political questions in this context).
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Supremacy Clause empower the judiciary to interpret treaties, a
court's interpreting the Convention does not usurp a power
constitutionally committed to another branch and thus does not
meet the first criterion for invoking the political question doc-
trine."' Given the judiciary's experience in adjudicating the
rights of criminal defendants, 8' in determining the existence of
personal jurisdiction, and in construing extradition treaties, 69
ruling on abducted defendants' treaty rights is well within the
judiciary's competence and thus does not meet the second criterion
for involing the political question doctrine. 70 Although a court's
decision regarding whether it has personal jurisdiction over an
extradited fugitive may have policy undertones-particularly if the
fugitive is extradited as part of the so-called drug war-reviewing
this type of question is a core function of the judiciary 71 Conse-
quently, courts have not held such decisions to be political
questionsY.12 Because a state-sponsored kidnapping closely
resembles a specialty rule violation, the same reasoning applies
to adjudicating the personal jurisdiction of an abducted defendant.
A defendant involkng the Drug Trafficlkng Convention would be
asking a court to interpret the Convention's extradition article
together with the antiforeign law enforcement article, an analyt-
ical process similar to a routine interpretation of an extradition
treaty
The last criterion of the political question doctrine, the so-called
"prudential" criterion, primarily addresses whether there is "an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made."373 In the context of exercising personal jurisdic-
tion in contravention of the Convention, that issue is whether the
367. See supra note 94.
368. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 187 (1962) (arguing
for a fairly broad political question doctrine but noting that administration of the
criminal law is "well within [the Court's] experience").
369. Federal courts have interpreted extradition treaties since 1799. United States
v. Robbins, 27 F Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). Since at least 1886, federal
courts have determined whether they have personal jurisdiction over extradited
fugitives. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
370. See supra note 94.
371. See BICKEL supra note 368, at 187; Gouin, supra note 94, at 781.
372. See BICKEL, supra note 368, at 187; Gouin, supra note 94, at 781.
373. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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need to speak with one voice in foreign affairs makes this question
nonjusticiable. 74 Although such a concern might apply when the
president and his senior advisors make a foreign policy initiative,
it does not exist when lower federal officials engage in autono-
mous foreign adventuring.171 Whether these prudential concerns
may be applied to foreclose a defense in a criminal case is
doubtful.37 One might reasonably argue that, when the Presi-
dent personally orders the capture of a head of state abroad, as in
the General Nonega case, prudential concerns might preclude the
court's review of the issue. Even such an unusual case 77 deals
with the core function of the judiciary- "A court cannot deprive one
of his liberty without ensuring an opportunity to have his con-
stitutional claim determined."37 Because the Supremacy Clause
elevates treaties to the same status as federal statutes and the
374. See BATOR ET AL., supra note 243, at 233; supra note 94.
375. See Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-
Macham, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 946 (1993); Vdzquez, supra note 63, at 113. Contra
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980) (granting habeas corpus to
a Manel-Cuban refugee on grounds that his indefinite detention violated customary
international law), affd on other grounds sub nom. Rodnguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702
(1987) ("A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones prolonged arbitrary detention. "); but see Garcia-Mir
v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.) (holding that a Mariel-Cuban refugee's challenge
that his indefinite detention by order of the Attorney General violated customary inter-
national law posed a political question), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
376. BATOR ET AL., supra note 243, at 241; see Goum, supra note 94, at 781.
377. Never before had the United States forcibly brought a foreign head of state to
this country to face criminal charges. United States v. Nonega, 746 F Supp. 1506,
1511 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
378. Gouin, supra note 94, at 811 n.353 (quoting Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz,
Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 215, 235 (1985) (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)); see
Champlin & Schwarz, supra, at 234 n.81 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (5-4 decision)). Justice Jackson stated:
My duties as a justice as I see them do not require me to make a military
judgment as to whether General DeWitt's evacuation and detention
program [to detain, among others, American citizens of Japanese ancestry]
was a reasonable military necessity. I do not suggest that the courts
should have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task.
But I do not think [the courts] may be asked to execute a military
expedient that has no place in law under the Constitution. I would reverse
the judgment and discharge the prisoner.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Constitution, 79 a court likewise should not deprive a defendant
of her liberty without ensuring an opportunity to have her treaty
claim determined."'
Because the Constitution expressly authorizes the judiciary to
interpret treaties, because the courts have considerable experience
in interpreting extradition treaties similar to the Convention
provisions, and because an abducted defendant would invoke the
treaty only as a defense to a criminal prosecution, the political
question doctrine would not apply Justice Powell noted that only
an abject usurpation of executive power renders a treaty question
nonjusticiable: "Such a case would arise if we were asked to
decide, for example, whether a treaty required the president to
order troops into a foreign country"38' A court's exannnation of
whether United States agents have kidnapped a single person in
violation of a treaty is a far cry from determining whether a
President must order troops into a foreign country 382 Conse-
quently, the political question doctrine has little applicability to
an abduction case under the Convention.383
379. Vfzquez, supra note 63, at 1134; see also supra part II.A.2.a (discussing the
Framers' intent regarding the supremacy of treaties).
380. In Norega, the district court determined that the defendant lacked standing
to invoke alleged treaty violations because Panama did not protest his capture and
arrest. Noriega, 746 F Supp. at 1533. Whether the state of the abducted national
must protest for the national to have standing to invoke the Convention against illicit
drugs is beyond the scope of this Article. The evidence of the Framers' intent indicates
that such a protest is unnecessary. See supra note 280.
381. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
382. Cf. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing, on political
question grounds, a suit by 110 members of Congress that challenged President
Reagan's alleged violation of the War Powers Resolution in carrying out military action
in the Persian Gulf). But see Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political
Question Doctrine, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 107, 112-13 (Louis
Henkin et al. eds., 1990) (criticizing Lowry as an abdication of judicial review).
383. Contra Halberstam, supra note 94, at 736. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567 (1993), the Court suggested, in a two-paragraph alternative
holding, that it was a political question to enforce the Protocol on Refugess in order
to stop the President's program of interdicting Haitians on the igh seas and forcibly
repatriating them without affording them an opportunity to petition for political
asylum.
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2. Principles of Contract: Does the Treaty by Its Own Terms
Prohibit It From Operating in United States Domestic Courts?
This prong involves contract principles that deal mainly but not
exclusively with domestic implementation clauses, Senate
reservations, and Cardenas-type provisions that expressly render
a treaty in whole or in part non-self-executing." Because the
Senate did not attach a reservation to the Convention that made
any of its provisions non-self-executing and because the Conven-
tion contains no Cardenas-type provisions, these exceptions to self-
execution do not apply The remaimng question is whether the
Convention contains a broad, unqualified domestic implementa-
tion clause making Articles 2 and 6, or the Convention as a whole,
non-self-executing without a congressional enactment.
A treaty may have some provisions that are non-self-executing
and others that are self-executing. 5 Similarly, a treaty may
have domestic implementation clauses that require domestic legis-
lation to carry out some treaty provisions, but not others.386
Some terms of the Drug Trafficking Convention are expressly non-
self-executing; they call upon each state party to enact certain
laws outlawing use and sale of illicit drugs. 87 Other terms are
self-executing. The parties intended those to have immediate ef-
fect. 88 The relevant provisions of the extradition article. 9 and
some within the Mutual Legal Assistance article,"'0 for example,
384. For a fuller exposition of these issues, see supra notes 130-42 and ac-
companying text.
385. See supra note 142.
386. See Iwasawa, supra note 14, at 658-60.
387. See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 3. Article 3 of the
Convention requires that each party adopt laws crmninalizing the production,
cultivation, sale, purchase, and possession of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances. Id.
388. See id. arts. 2.3, 6.2, 7; see also infra notes 392-95 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the effect- of self-executing terms).
389. Article 6.2 amends every extradition treaty between any of the parties to add,
if not already listed, the drug offenses described in Article 3: "Each of the offenses to
which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in
any extradition treaty existing between Parties." U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention,
supra note 6, art. 6 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Article 6.3 permits the Convention
to serve as an extradition treaty between any parties that have not concluded an
extradition treaty. Id. art. 6.3; see supra note 259 (quoting Article 6.5 in full); see also
supra note 317 (discussing the Senate reservation concerning the extradition treaty).
390. For example, Article 7, paragraph 18, provides specific procedures for obtaining
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fall into this category of self-executing terms, as does Article
2.32" Nothing m its language or history suggests an intent to
the testimony of witnesses:
A witness, expert or other person who consents to give evidence in a
proceeding or to assist in an investigation, prosecution or judicial
proceeding in the territory of the requesting Party, shall not be prosecuted,
detained, puished or subjected to any other restriction of ins personal
liberty in that territory in respect of acts, omissions or convictions prior to
his departure from the territory of the requested Party. Such safe conduct
shall cease when the witness, expert or other person having had, for a
period of fifteen consecutive days, or for any period agreed upon by the
Parties, from the date on which he has been officially informed that his
presence is no longer required by the judicial authorities, an opportunity
of leaving, has nevertheless remained voluntarily in the territory or, having
left it, has returned of his own free will.
U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 4.
391. The government could argue that, had the parties intended to give individuals
rights under Article 2, the parties could have easily done so expressly. Article 18
demonstrates that, when the parties wished to provide individual rights, they knew
how to do so. See z& art. 18. The parties easily could have added an additional
paragraph to Article 2 stating: "No state party shall interrogate, detain, apprehend,
punish or prosecute any individual in violation of this Article." Such an argument,
however, misperceives the nature of treaties in American law. Possessing an express
cause of action within the treaty is not a condition precedent for mvokmg a treaty in
court and is not the way treaties are written. See supra parts II.A.2.a-.B.2.
Furthermore, Article 18 is a standard clause in a MLAT treaty. Article 2 is a
foundational article, added late in the negotiating process to ensure that states do not
trespass on the soil of other states. The importance of the Article is underscored by
the controversy it engendered but also by the significant support it quickly garnered.
See supra part IV.B.
Mexico, the original sponsor of Article 2, was particularly concerned about United
States Drug Enforcement Agents violating their territory and abusing the authority
granted to them. See supra notes 322-50 and accompanying text. Such abuses fall
directly on Mexican nationals and others under Mexico's protection whom the DEA
suspects of being in some way involved in illicit drug trafficking or possession. See
supra note 350 and accompanying text. One state's surreptitious entry into another
state to kidnap a national from that state not only affronts the dignity of that state
but also grievously injures that state's kldnapped national. In fact, the drafting history
and text of Article 6.5 indicate that the parties intended to protect the requested
states' nationals. See supra notes 318-21 and accompanying text. The problem of
having the DEA act outside its authority and exercise law enforcement functions on
Mexican soil prompted Mexico to offer the article. See supra note 350 and accompany-
ing text. The Camarena case and the alleged kidnapping of Verdugo-Urquidez occurred
before Mexico proposed the article. See supra note 350. Reading Article 2 and Article
6 together suggests that the parties implicitly intended to protect their nationals from
state-sponsored kidnappmg. See supra notes 322-50. Consequently, just like the
defendants in the extradition specialty cases and the ship master and the defendants
in the Liquor Treaty cases, lkdnap victims should be entitled to assert the treaty as
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reqire each state to enact enabling legislation to make Article 2.3
effective. On the contrary, Article 2.3 was intended to be a
condition precedent to having the parties carry out their other
obligations under the treaty 92 Severing the self-executing
articles from the non-self-executing articles of the Convention is
relatively easy because the non-self-executing articles have their
own domestic implementation clauses. " ' Other articles have no
such clauses." 4 Notably, neither Article 2 nor Article 6 has such
an implementation clause, nor does any such clause in the treaty
expressly or implicitly cover these articles.395
3. Standing: Do United States Agents Violate the U.N Drug
Trafficking Convention and Cause a Foreign National Injury in
Fact When They Abduct a Foreign National from Her Country?
Is Such a Foreign National Arguably Within the Zone of
Interests Protected or Regulated by the Treaty?
Abducting a foreign national in violation of the Convention
easily satisfies the injury-m-fact requirement. "9 ' To determine
whether such an individual is arguably within the zone of
interests protected or regulated by the Convention requires
a defense. See supra notes 168-228 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 322-38.
393. For example, Article 3 begins as follows: "Each Party shall adopt such
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law,
when committed intentionally:. " U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6,
art. 3. Article 4, dealing with junsdiction, and Article 5, dealing with confiscation, also
contain such an implementing clause at the beginning. Id. arts. 4-5.
394. These include, for example, Article 6 on extradition, Article 7 on mutual legal
assistance, Article 9 on other forms of cooperation, and Article 10 on international
cooperation and assistance. Id. arts. 6-7, 9-10.
395. See id. arts. 2, 6. In any event, the domestic implementation clauses that are
contained in and refer to other Convention articles are neither broad nor unqualified
and thus do not deprive the articles to which they refer of their self-executing
character. For example, the domestic implementation clause contained in Article 3,
quoted supra note 393, should not render Article 3 non-self-executing. The language
of the clause indicates that it is aimed at states that do not recognize the doctrine of
self-executing treaties. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. Note the words
"may be necessary," suggesting that Article 3 comes into force immediately if such
implementing legislation is not necessary. See supra note 393; see also supra notes
130-42 and accompanying text (discussing this principle in more detail).
396. Cf BATOR ET AL., supra note 243, at 184-91 (discussing standing under the
Constitution).
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applying the plain meaning, drafting history, and purposes of the
relevant articles and the Convention as a whole to a state-
sponsored ldnapping. The plain meaning of Article 6.5 is that
states have the right to "refuse extradition" on the grounds
permitted by the requested state's domestic law or treaties. 97
Reading Article 6.5 together with Article 6.10 indicates that one
such common ground is that the fugitive sought is a national of
the requested state."8 The Convention thus reaffirms the right
of states to refuse extradition of their nationals if that right is.
provided by their respective domestic law or treaties. 9 The
plain meaning of Articles 2.2 and 2.3 prohibits any unauthorized
foreign law enforcement operation on a party's territory400 Arti-
cle 2.2 repeats each nation's obligation under the U.N. Charter40 '
concerning the inviolability of each nation's territorial integri-
ty402 Whereas Article 2.2 states the general obligation to respect
another country's territory, Article 2.3 specifically prohibits a state
from exercising law enforcement powers in another state.403
397. See supra note 318 (quoting Articles 6.5 and 6.10 in full).
398. See supra note 318.
399. Treaties should be read in pan matera if they deal with the same subject. See
generally EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 231 (1940) ("Statutes
in pan matena [are] those which relate to the same matter or subject. They
are to be construed together as if they constituted one act.").
400. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2.2-.3.
401. Article 2(4) provides as follows: "All Members shall refrain in their internation-
al relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article 2(7) provides as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id. art. 2, para. 7. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has been construed to prohibit
state-sponsored ldnapping in a foreign state. See supra note 330; see also CHARTER
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, supra note 103, arts. 3, 18.
402. This paragraph appears to restate customary international law that prohibits
territorial invasions. This prohibition has been construed to bar state-sponsored
kidnapping. See supra note 297.
Article 2 reads: "The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and
territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
other States." U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.2.
403. Id. art. 2.3.
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Parsing Article 2.3 yields the following:
W"A Party shall not undertake m the territory of another
Party"'4° Parties are expressly prohibited from engaging in
certain conduct in the territory of another state party;
*"the exercise of jurisdiction" '41 States may not use their
state power on another party's soil. Given that the treaty deals
exclusively with criminal law, the exercise of jurisdiction pre-
sumably means the exercise of law enforcement power;
*"and performance of functions wich are exclusively reserved
for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic law "41
The Convention deals solely with criminal law "[Plerformance
of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities
of that other Party by its domestic law" thus refers to law
enforcement functions.
Law enforcement functions are "exclusively reserved"417 for the
authorities of each state as a matter of custom and sometimes as





408. See id. The Justice Department has implicitly recogmzed the territorial
sovereignty of foreign states over law enforcement within their territory. The
Department of Justice Instructions to U.S. Marshals for Processing Requests for Serving
American Judicial Documents Abroad prohibits U.S. Marshals from "travel[ing] to
foreign countries to deliver subpoenas m either criminal or civil cases." SWEENEY ET
AL., supra note 297, at 134-35 (quoting 16 I.L.M. 1331, 1338 (1978)) (requiring that
U.S. Marshals receive the "express approval" of and "guidance by" the Director of the
United States Marshals Service before serving subpoenas abroad).
Other countries have expressly forbidden foreign law enforcement agents from
operating without consent. Article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code provides: "Whoever,
without being so authorized, engages on Swiss territory on behalf of a foreign state
in acts [the exercise of which] appertains to the [Swiss] public authorities shall be
punished by imprisonment." Id. at 134 (quoting 78 REVUE GENERAL DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 851 (1974) (editors' translation)).
Note also that Mexico's domestic law impliedly prohibits foreigners from engaging
in law enforcement functions m Mexico. Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution
provides: "No one shall be disturbed m Ins person, family, domicile, documents or
possessions except by virtue of a written order by the competent authority stating the
legal grounds and justification for the action taken." Brief for the United Mexican
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance.at 15 n.8, United States v. Alvarez-
Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91-712) (quoting Article 16 of the Memcan Political
Constitution). Article 14 of the Ley de Extradicion Internacional (International
Extradition Law) is equally clear: "No Mexican shall be extradited to a foreign state
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"domestic law" to statutes, requiring the violated state to reserve
expressly all law enforcement functions for its own authori-
ties."9 By using the general term "domestic law,' 10 however,
the drafters of the Convention presumably intended to encompass
all categories of law, which include (in addition to statutes)
constitutions, custom, 411 court opinions, treaties, administrative
regulations, adminstrative agency decisions, and executive
orders.412
Consideration of the plain meaning of paragraphs 2 and 3
together demonstrates that the parties intended to require law
enforcement to respect the territory of other states and, in
particular, to prohibit any law enforcement functions within
another state's territory without that state's consent.413 State-
sponsored kidnapping is a major crime in the asylum state and
violates national sovereignty, customary international law, and
except in exceptional cases in the discretion of the Executive." Id. at 14 n.6 (informal
translation); see also SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 297, at 135-36 (reprinting a trans-
lation of an Austrian Supreme Court case from 1961 that appeared in 38 Int'l L. Rep.
133 (1969) (voiding the judgment against a German citizen tried on criminal charges
in absentia because the German defendant had been served by mail in Germany in
violation of German sovereignty and an international treaty)). But see SEC v. Briggs,
234 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (finding that service by a British Columbia Deputy
Sheriff on the defendant, a U.S. citizen, did not violate Canadian sovereignty); contra
ITC v. Compagme de Saint Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(holding that the mail service of a subpoena duces tecum in France on a French
national was improper because it violated general principles of international law). For
a discussion of Compagnie de Sant, see SWEENEY ET AL., supra note 297, at 137-38.
409. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.3.
410. As noted in the previous section, in the final draft, "domestic law" was
substituted for "national laws and regulations." See infra notes 530-32 and accompany-
ing text. The original phrasing could have been interpreted as referring only to
statutes and constitutions ("national laws"), as well as national administrative
regulations, although "national" appears to modify both "laws" and "regulations." If the
parties had intended to limit the term "domestic law" to national legislation, they
could have kept the original wording or crafted more specific language to accomplish
that result.
411. Black's Law Dictionary defines "custom and usage" as: "A usage or practice of
the people, which, by common adoption and acquiescence, and by long and unvarying
habit, has become compulsory, and has acquired the force of a law with respect to the
place or subject-matter to which it relates." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (6th ed.
1990) (citation omitted); see also 1 WILLMIAM BLACKSTONE, COMENTARIES *68-70
(recognizing the importance of custom as law).
412. See WILLIAM P STATSTY, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 14-15 (3d ed. 1986).
413. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2.2, 2.3.
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treaties. Furthermore, this type of kidnapping is an illegal arrest
and, as such, falls within the proscribed law enforcement
functions.414 Consequently, the plain meaning of the Convention
bars state-sponsored kidnapping.415
Aside from a strict plain meaning analysis, Supreme Court
precedent and United States practice indicate that such an
interpretation of Article 2's language is correct. From the early
years of the Republic, the United States has both expressly and
implicitly recognized that state sovereignty is inviolable and that
law enforcement is an "exercise of jurisdiction and performance of
functions exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other
[country] by its domestic law ",' When legal proceedings were
brought against a French vessel of war, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, observed that the
"jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute."414 A dozen years later, when United
414. Drug law enforcement operations include but are not limited to interviewing
potential witnesses, obtaining and cultivating informants, placing agents undercover,
executing searches of persons or places, maintaining surveillance of suspects, engaging
in aerial surveillance and spraying of fields in which source crops are cultivated,
searching and destroying cocaine growing and processing sites, arranging controlled
drug purchases ("stings"), and arresting suspects. See JAMES N. GILBERT, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 365-77 (3d ed. 1993). State-sponsored kidnapping violates Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter as well as Article 18 of the OAS Charter. United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 432(2) (1987).
415. Analyzing the plain meaning of Article 6 indicates that the Convention
expressly preserves the rights of requested states to refuse to extradite their own
nationals if their domestic law or treaties so provide. See U.N. Drug Trafficking
Convention, supra note 6, art. 6. Reading Articles 2 and 6 together from a strictly
plain meaning perspective thus indicates that the Convention bars state-sponsored
kidnapping and mpliedly protects from such kidnapping nationals of those states
whose treaties or domestic law prohibits extraditing their own nationals. In other
words, Article 2 alone does not necessarily make kidnapping victims intended
beneficiaries of its provisions, but Article 6 implicitly makes the nationals of requested
states such beneficiaries. See id. arts. 2, 6.
416. Id. art. 2.3.
417. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). In
that case, Napoleon had added an American merchant vessel to his navy, having
wrongfully seized it on the ugh seas. The vessel subsequently entered an American
port, and the former owners brought a libel against it. The issue was whether the
vessel was immune from suit, being part of the territory of France. Ruling affir-
matively, the Court, in a preliminary part of the opinion, discussed the nature of a
state's jursdiction over its own soil and waters:
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States tax agents seized a French ship from Florida (then Spanish
territory) without Spanish consent, Justice Story, writing for the
Court, concluded that the agents lacked the "power to arrest"
within the exclusive territory of a foreign nation: "It would be
monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers were authorized to
enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing
vessels which had offended against our laws."418 Similarly, when
[A nation's jurisdiction over its territory] is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, denvmg validity from an ex-
ternal source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of
the restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.
Id. Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, human rights conventions, and the Decla-
ration on Human Rights, however, do limit a nation's sovereignty to a limited extent
not relevant to the discussion here. See LILLICH & NEWMAN, supra note 14, at 148-49
(quoting Hauser, United Nations Law on Racial Discrimination, 1970 AM. SOC'Y IN'L
L. PROC. 114, 114-18) (describing the doctrine of sovereignty as a "real problem").
418. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824). In that case, the Apollon
was carrying a cargo bound for Charleston, South Carolina. Nearing Charleston, the
captain learned that Congress had passed an act imposing punitive tariffs on cargoes
carried by French ships. Id. at 364. The United States levied these tariffs in retalia-
tion for France's imposition of restrictions on vessels carrying the United States flag.
Id. at 375. Consequently, he changed course and landed in Florida, then a Spanish
territory, and paid the applicable Spanish duties. Id. at 364. Without any authorization
from Spanish authorities, United States tax agents later entered this Spanish territory,
seized the ship, and brought it to Georgia for disposition. Id. at 365. The ostensible
grounds for the seizure were the alleged attempt of the Apollon to evade the United
States tariff. Id- While under Spansh control, Florida was apparently a stagmg point
for extensive smuggling of goods into the United States. Id. at 374. The Court
determined that the seizure was unlawful and ordered the return of the ship and the
payment of damages. Justice Story reasoned that the seizure violated the law of
nations.
But, even supposing, for a moment, that our laws had required an entry
of the Apollon, in her transit, does it follow that the power to arrest her
was meant to be given, after she had passed into the exclusive territory
of a foreign nation? We think not. It cannot be presumed that
Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of
nations.
Id. at 370-71. But see The Merino, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391 (1824); The Richmond, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815) (holding that American-registered vessels seized in foreign
waters by the U.S. Navy are subject to United States jurisdiction). The Supreme Court
in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), distinguished The Merino and The
Richmond on the ground that the vessels seized in those cases were American-
registered and that "the seizures did not violate any treaty, but were merely violations
of the law of nations because made within the territory of another sovereign." Id. at
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the USSR attempted to ldnap a Soviet citizen from its Wash-
ington embassy, the State Department declared that "the Gov-
ernment of the United States cannot permit the exercise within
the United States of the police power of any foreign government"
and, for this misconduct, expelled a Soviet diplomat.419 These
examples show that the United States regards law enforcement
functions within a country's borders as "exclusively reserved" to
that country42
The Convention's drafting history supports the plain meaning
interpretation that Article 2 and Article 6.5 bar state-sponsored
lkdnapping of a country's nationals. The United States played an
active role on the losing side of both of these articles.42' In a real
sense, Article 2 was aimed at the United States. The Mexican
delegate said that he was able to persuade delegation after delega-
tion to support the proposed article because they feared that
United States law enforcement, and the DEA in particular, would
routinely overstep their authority422 and encroach upon other
countries' territory and nationals.4
The parties' overwhelming rejection of the United States'
proposed amendment to Article 6.5 and their refusal to include
even a hortatory provision concerning extradition of nationals
suggests, among other things, an intent to protect a state's
nationals from extradition.4 " Given this history and the article's
122.
419. See U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges Concerning Refusal of Two Russian Teachers
To Return to Soviet Union, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 29, 1948, at 251, 253.
420. See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432(2) (1987) (noting that international law bars one
state's exercise of law enforcement functions m another state absent that state's
consent). "A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions m the territory
of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized
officials of that state." Id. (emphasis added). The language of the Restatement
resembles that of Article 2.3. See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art.
2.3.
421. See supra notes 318, 324 and accompanying text.
422. A DEA-sponsored kidnapping in a foreign state party's territory would be
considered a direct affront to that country's sovereignty, repudiating typical
arrangements made between other governments and the DEA and thereby violating
Article 2. See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 2; infra notes 454,
457.
423. Telephone Interview with Alberto Szekely, the Head of the Mexican Delegation
to the Convention (July 24, 1994) [hereinafter Szekely Interview].
424. Many delegates to the Convention proposed the deletion of the original draft
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text, one can infer that, at the very least, the parties implicitly
intended to protect nationals against state-sponsored kidnapping,
a much more egregious violation of both the rights of the national
and her state.4' The Supreme Court in Alvarez-Macham,
however, rejected such an argument.42 The Court refused to
follow the Ninth Circuit's reasomng427 that the United States'
of Article 6.5, arguing that the original conflicted with their "constitution, national
legislation, and customary legal practice." See 1 Official Records, supra note 318, at
36, para. 64. A few delegates argued that the proposed Article 6 infringed on the
sovereignty of states and their right to refuse extradition. Id. at 36, para. 63. Those
opposing the draft prevailed, and the amended proposal not only deleted the
requirement of extraditing nationals, but also made extradition expressly subject to the
requested state's domestic law and applicable treaties "including the grounds upon
winch the requested Party may refuse extradition." U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention,
supra note 6, art. 6.5.
Tis history indicates that the majority intended to protect their nationals, given
that their laws, treaties, and in some cases constitutions so protected them. The
proposed draft would have been "contrary" to those laws. Id., see 2 id. at 105-06,
paras. 7-10 (statement of the Norwegian delegate on behalf of the Scandinavian
countries) (expressing their intent to "protect[] the rights of the person," their
national, from extradition). Even those delegates who based their opposition on the
notion that the original draft infringed on sovereign discretion to refuse extradition
implicitly intended to protect nationals as well. Treaties, like administrative regula-
tions, may serve more than one purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407 (1886) (finding that an extradition treaty served to surrender fugitives to a
requesting state but also protected individual fugitives from being tried for
nonextraditable offenses); see Vdzquez, supra note 63, at 1082-83. Administrative
regulations may advance the general good and, at the same time, they may be invoked
by one directly injured as a result of the government's violation of their rights. See,
e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Recogmzing a state's right to refuse extradition of its nationals, the amended article
thus implicitly protects this class of individuals.
425. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, at art. 6.5.
426. United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
427. United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd and
remanded, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty between the United
States and Mexico provides as follows:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own
nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not
prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up
if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the
requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the
offense.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 663 (citation omitted) (quoting Extradition Treaty, May
4, 1978, [1979] U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065).
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abduction of a national would defeat the purpose of a provision
prohibiting the extradition of nationals.428 The Court reasoned
that Mexico had long known of the Ker-Fnsbze doctrine429 and
had never sought to negotiate an article prohibiting abduc-
tions.430
Unlike the bilateral extradition treaty in Alvarez-Machan, over
100 countries have signed the U.N. Drug Trafficking Conven-
tion.41 Although a neighbor with whom we share a continent-
428. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. at 667-68; see also United States v. Matta-
Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Alvarez-Machan
compelled the rejection of a Honduran national's argument that his kidnapping from
Honduras by United States Marshals divested the trial court of personal jurisdiction,
given that the extradition treaty did not specifically prohibit forcible abduction of
foreign nationals). Commentators have widely condemned the Court's interpretation of
the extradition treaty. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Is the President Above Customary
International Law?, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 757 (1992); Hernan de J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous
Decision: Kidnapping Is Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (1993); Andrew L.
Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered. The Jurisdictional Nihilism of the Supreme
Court's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Macham, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994); Hector
H. Cdrdenas, Jr., Casenote, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Result Oriented
Jurisprudence, 16 HOUS. J. INTL L. 101 (1993); Bngette B. Homig, Comment,
Abduction As an Alternative to Extradition-A Dangerous Method To Obtain Juris-
diction over Criminal Defendants, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1993); Analisa W
Seringer, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Macham. Forcible Abduction As an
Acceptable Alternative Means of Gaining Jurisdiction, 7 TEMP. INTL L. & COMP. L.J.
369 (1993); Stephanie A. R6, Recent Development, "The Treaty Doesn't Say We Can't
Kidnap Anyone"-Government Sponsored Kidnapping As a Means of Circumventing
Extradition Treaties, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 265 (1993). But see
Halberstam, supra note 94 (defending the decision on political question grounds, an
issue discussed supra note 94); Semmelman, supra note 227, at 517 n.23; Symposium,
Kidnapping Foreign Criminal Suspects, 15 WHIrIR L. REV. 419 (1994) (containing the
panel discussion comments of Manuel A. Medrano, federal prosecutor in Alvarez-
Macham); Matonn, supra note 280, at 907; Edmund S. McAlister, Note, The Hydraulic
Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-Macham and the Case for a Justifiable
Abduction, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 449 (1994); Jacqueline A. Weisman, Comment,
Extraordinary Rendition: A One-Way Ticket to the U.S. or Is It?, 41 CATH. U. L.
REv. 149 (1991).
429. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
430. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. at 667-68. Ker, however, is distinguishable. Unlike
the paid agents in Alvarez-Machan, the Pinkerton detective who kidnapped Ker was
not ordered to do so by the United States government. See supra notes 192-227 and
accompanying text. Note, however, that, on remand, the district court disnssed the
case against defendant Alvarez-Machan on the ground of insufficient evidence. HENKIN
ET AL., supra note 161 (citing Seth Mydons, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20).
431. See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6.
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wide border and who is one of our chief trading partners may be
deemed to know our law regarding the Ker-Fnsbze doctrine,
imputing such knowledge to all the parties to the Drug Trafficking
Convention is much more difficult. Furthermore, the extradition
treaty at issue in Alvarez-Machain did not contain an article
equivalent to Article 2.4"2 Like statutes, provisions in the same
treaty should be read together to establish the drafters' intent and
purpose. 3' From the review session in which Article 2 was
proposed to its final adoption by consensus, the drafting history
materials indicate that the purpose of the article was to prevent
432. See Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. at 663 (quoting the treaty at issue).
433. As one commentator explained:
The Sutherland treatise identifies [four] approaches that have been used:
[(i)] interpretation of each section in isolation from the others; [(ii)] inter-
pretation of all the sections of each part of a statute together; [(iii)]
resolution of ambiguities based upon the purposes and goals set forth m
the preamble to the statute; and [(iv)] interpretation of each section in the
context of the whole enactment. The treatise endorses the "whole act rule"
as "the most realistic in view of the fact that a legislature passes judgment
upon the act as an entity, not giving one portion of the act any greater
authority than another. Thus any attempt to segregate any portion or
exclude any other portion from consideration is almost certain to distort
the legislative intent."
The U.S. Supreme Court agrees. "When 'interpreting a statute, the
court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole stat-
ute and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its
various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into
execution the will of the legislature."' The key to the whole act ap-
proach is, therefore, that all provisions and other features of the enact-
ment must be given force, and provisions must be interpreted so as not
to derogate from the force of other provisions and features of the whole
statute."
WILLmI N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 643-44 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting
2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.02 (Norman Singer ed.,
5th ed. 1992); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974)) (citations omitted). The
government could argue that the whole act doctrine includes considering the preambles.
The preamble to the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention states that the parties
'[r]ecogmzef that illicit traffic is an international criminal activity, the suppression of
which demands urgent attention and the highest priority." See U.N. Drug Trafficking
Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. Preambles yield to the provisions of the treaty or
statute itself. Although Articles 2 and 6 counter the generally stated purpose given in
the preamble, one may, in fact, construe those articles as consistent therewith, given
the damage to international law enforcement efforts that a state-sponsored ldnapping
may cause in the long run. See infra notes 454, 457.
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foreign law enforcement agents from penetrating a state party's
borders and carrying out law enforcement functions. 4' The
Court in Alvarez-Machan complained that, by basing the case on
the bar against the extradition of nationals, Alvarez-Macham was
asling the Court to make "a much larger inferential leap"43
than did the Court in Rauscher when implying a treaty right.411
Coupling Article 2 with Article 6 of the U.N. Drug Trafficlng
Convention shortens that leap to a mere step.
The Convention parties evidenced their intent to protect
nationals from state-sponsored ldnapping far more strongly than
the parties to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty did to protect
extradited fugitives from being charged with non-extraditable
434. For the proposition that the prohibited law enforcement functions include state-
sponsored kidnapping, see supra note 414 (noting that state-sponsored kidnapping
violates U.N. and OAS charters); see also supra notes 322-50 and accompanying text
(describing the drafting history of the Convention).
435. Alvarez-Machazn, 504 U.S. at 669. Given the generality of the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty at issue in Rauscher as compared to the more specific language of
the Mexmcan-United States extradition treaty, the Court's complaint in Alvarez-Macham
appears groundless. In regard to the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, the
government could argue that Article 6 only applies to states whose domestic law or
treaties prohibit them from extraditing their nationals. Nationals of countries like the
United States, which generally extradite their own nationals, would not be protected
from such abductions. Such an argument, however, should fail, because of lack of
mutuality. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 (one vol. ed. 1952)
(discussing mutuality of obligation); 1 Official Records, supra note 318, at 66, para. 102
(recording when a delegate from a country permitting extradition of nationals
supported the deletion of the requirement: "[Slince most of [the] other countries had
legal obstacles to the extradition of nationals, the paragraph would in practice have
no application because of lack of reciprocity."). Note, however, that the United States
reservation expressly protects our nationals from extradition to countries with whom
we do not have an extradition treaty and refuses to make the Convention operate as
an extradition treaty with such countries. See supra note 317.
Civil-law countries generally prohibit the extradition of their nationals. Among
those countries that prohibit extradition of their nationals are: Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador, Guatemala, The Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Uruguay. See SATYA D. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN LAW AND
PRACTICE 94 nn.52-54 (1968). Some other countries generally do not extradite their
own nationals but provide limited exceptions when, under an international treaty or
in other exceptional circumstances, they may grant extradition. Examples include:
Hungary, Italy, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Mexico. Id. at 95 nn.55-57. Common-law
countries generally permit the extradition of their nationals. These countries include
Australia, Canada, India, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at
97.
436. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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offenses.417 In Rauscher, the treaty mentioned nothing more than
the offenses that would form the basis of extradition.3 8 The
Court, however, implied that the absence of other authorized
offenses prohibited charging the defendant-fugitive for any other
crnnes.439 Likewise, in Data Processing"' and Clarke," ' no
evidence suggested that, by limiting the types of operations in
which banks could engage, Congress intended to benefit either
data processors or stockbrokers, respectively In both cases,
however, the Court concluded that these plaintiffs would suffer
injury in fact and that they were direct, although umntended,
beneficiaries of congressional enactments regulating the banking
industry 2 The data processors and stockbrokers thus were
within the zone of interest arguably protected or regulated by the
statute. 3
If the DEA were to abduct a foreign drug suspect from her
country, such a suspect would be able to show not only that she
was a direct beneficiary of Articles 2 and 6, but also that the
parties to the Convention implicitly intended to protect nationals
like herself from state-sponsored kidnapping. She would satisfy
not only the zone-of-interest test but also the higher, more
difficult legally-protected-interest test.' Because Articles 2.3
and 6.5 do not pose any separation-of-powers conflicts, because the
Convention itself renders neither Article 2.3 nor Article 6.5 non-
self-executing, and because foreigners kidnapped by United States
agents from abroad have suffered injury in fact and are within the
zone of interests protected by the Convention, they are entitled to
invoke the Convention to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
437. See rd.
438. See supra notes 168-91 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 168-91 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 251-73 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 251-73 and accompanying text.
444. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text (discussing the
evolution of the legally-protected-interest test).
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D. Effectuating the Conventin's Purpose and Promoting World
Order and the Rule of Law
Construing the Convention to allow such abducted defendants
to challenge jurisdiction likewise advances the Convention's
general purpose to "promote co-operation" among nation-states m
fighting the illicit drug trade."5 Taking Article 2.1 together with
Articles 2.2 and 2.3 provides one of the Convention's fundaments.
Nations must work together to stop the international drug
trade.446 To accomplish that result, nations must respect one
another and, in particular, refrain from sending law enforcement
agents onto the territory of another state that is a party to the
Convention, at least not without that party's consent. Stenmmng
the drug trade requires, among other things, detailed and
accurate intelligence. 7 United States drug enforcement agents
cannot obtain this information on their own. They need the
cooperation of law enforcement in source countries, in countries
serving as transshipment points, and in countries where the drug
money is laundered.448 Furthermore, law enforcement officials in
the host countries and in the United States depend on civilians for
a great deal of the necessary information. 449
Encroaching on another country's soil and abducting a national
from that country insults the host country's government and its
445. The Convention's purpose is to "promote co-operation" among states in order:
(1) to enact a full panoply of laws targeting every actor in the illicit drug trade,
including the grower, manufacturer, exporter, importer, distributor, street seller, and
street user; (2) to extradite drug offenders; and (3) to help each other to gather
evidence against drug offenders (for example, deposing witnesses and turning over
suspects' bank accounts). See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.1;
supra notes 300-17 and accompanying text; infra note 525 (quoting Article 2.1 in full).
446. Some commentators note that unilateral interdiction can, in some cases,
increase the profits of drug dealers by raising prices. See, e.g., Raphael F Perl, The
United States, in SCoI' B. MACDONALD & BRUCE ZAGARIS, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK
ON DRUG CONTROL 67, 78 (1992) ("Interdiction as part of a coordinated plan [with
other countries], however, can have a strong disrupting and destabilizing effect on
trafficker operations.").
447. See Bruce Zagaris & Scott B. MacDonald, Mexico, in MACDONALD & ZAGARIS,
supra note 446, at 187-88.
448. See id.
449. See CHARLES R. SWANSON ET AL., POLICE ADMINISTRATION 18-19 (3d ed. 1993)
(discussing "community policing" in the United States).
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people.450 Such a trespass tends to discourage that country's
officials and civilians from cooperating with the United States.45'
Reacting to such a transgression, they may decide to withhold
vital information from United States law enforcement.
By holding that the treaty bars state-sponsored kidnapping of
nationals, the Court would thus effectuate one of the purposes of
the treaty-that of fostering international cooperation in combat-
ting the illegal drug trade. Such a holding is consistent with the
plain meaning interpretation of Articles 2 and 6, as well as with
the drafting history of those two articles.45 2 In addition, such a
holding would also carry out one of the purposes of the Supremacy
Clause-that of reducing conflict with other countries.453
If, in attempting to stop the illicit drug trade, the United States
runs roughshod over international law by kidnapping individuals
from foreign states in violation of treaty and international custom,
our reputation as a law-abiding nation suffers. We justifiably
condemn states that engage in international lawlessness, includ-
ing state-sponsored abductions, assassinations, and other acts of
terrorism. By violating a treaty-particularly one that we
sponsored-the United States would be creating a double
standard.41 It is then hypocritical to protest other states who
450. Witness Mexico's reaction to the Supreme Court's ruling m United States v.
Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). See infra notes 454, 457 and accompanying text.
451. See tnfra notes 454, 457 and accompanying text.
452. See U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6; supra part IV.B.
453. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
454. The Supreme Court's decision m Alvarez-Macham outraged most Mexicans.
They viewed the decision as condoning trespass by United States law enforcement, a
kind of trespass that they felt would have brought certain and swift retribution had
Mexico kidnapped an American citizen and brought her to Mexico for trial. Mexicans
were particularly incensed, given their fairly vigorous prosecution of drug offenders
involved in the Camarena torture and killing. Nine of the perpetrators were given jail
sentences, at least one of the perpetrators being sentenced to a term of 40 years, see
United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 671 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
the maximum term available under Mexican law, cf. Mexicans Given 40 Years for
Killing Agent, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1989, at A32 (emphasizing the lack of opportunity
for parole).
For days following the case, Mexican newspapers headlined the Supreme Court's
decision. A columnist from El Excelszor, a major daily newspaper of Mexico City, began
his June 30, 1992, column as follows: "[The more than 100 countries which have
extradition treaties with the United States can throw them in the garbage]." Martin
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violate treaties of vital interest to us. 455 Given our initial posi-
L. Guzman Ferrer, Matanga DUo la Changa, EL EXCELSIOR, June 30, 1992, at 7-A, 7-A
(translation by Author). He noted that the Supreme Court's decision "[affronts the
entire world community, not just Mexico. But there's no doubt that the kidnapped
victims are Mexicans, not Chinese. Furthermore, let's see if the Drug Enforcement
Agency will dedicate itself to kidnapping Swiss, Swedish or Saudi citizens]." Id.
(translation by Author); see also Divid Aponte, Diflcil Momento Vive la Relacwn
Mixico-EU: Solana, EL UNIVERSAL, June 28, 1992, at 1 (quoting Memco's Secretary of
State as having said that the Alvarez-Machain case had provoked one of the gravest
crises between the two countries and that "[it is essential to reach a solution that
assures unrestricted respect for Mexican territorial jurisdiction to emphasize the
international concern that the 'law of the jungle' is encroaching upon law and order]")
(translation by Author); Eduardo Chimely, Pide la Corte Suspender Plagws, EL
EXCELSIOR, June 28, 1992, at 1, 10 (discussing Mexican religious leaders who
condemned the decision as violative of sovereignty and human rights); Deshonro a EU
su Pretens16n de Junsdiccmon Extraterritorial, PUNTO, June 29, 1992, at 1, 13
(containing a lead headline in 36-point type on page one that stated: "Deshonr6 a EU
su pretension de junsdiccion extraterritorial [U.S. dishonors itself with its pretension
of extraterritorial jurisdiction]") (translation by Author); Carlos Fazio, Barr, el
Justictero, EL FINANCIERo, June 30, 1992, at 47 (condemning the Alvarez-Machain
decision as imperialistic and contemptuous of international law and concluding that
"[the logic of Attorney General Barr [who in an advisory opinion asserted the legality
of state-sponsored abductions]-the end justifies the means-is comparable to that of
Libyan kidnappers and other terrorists roundly condemned by the United States]")
(translation by Author); Tratado sin Honor, PUNTO, June 29, 1992, at 2 (containing an
editorial denouncing the opinion as violating the extradition treaty and questioned the
United States' willingness to meet treaty obligations).
Canada, Colombia, and numerous other countries also denounced the decision.
Alan J. Kreczko, The Alvarez-Machamn Decision, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 614, 615
(1992). The presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay all
requested that the case be referred to the OAS. Id., El Fallo de la Suprema Corte de
EU Sobre los Secuestros, Tema de la Cumbre del Cone Sur, EL EXCELSIOR, June 28,
1992, at 10-A.
455. United States companies lose a conservatively estimated one billion dollars
annually from Chinese concerns' manufacturing pirated software, compact discs, and
video cassettes in violation of the international copyright conventions and the
Memorandum of Understanding Between China and the United States signed in
January 1992. Seth Faison, Copyright Pirates Prosper in China Despite Promises, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1996, at Al (noting that China's copyright enforcement efforts have
been weak); Margaret McKeown & H. Ping Kiang, IP Protections in China-Reality or
Virtual Unreality, LEGAL TIMES, May 15, 1995, at 8; Wanda Szeto, Undercover Bid To
Find China's Disc Pirates, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 14, 1995, at 3, available in
LEXIS, News Library, SChina File (relating how Windows 95 "turned up" m local
Chinese computer stores "two weeks before its official launch"); see also Julia Preston,
As Piracy Grows in Mexico, U.S. Companies Shout Foul, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996,
at 1 (estimating that United States companies lose $485 million each year because of
pirated compact discs, video cassettes, and computer software copied in Mexico).
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tions on the proposed Articles 2 and 6,456 refusing to honor them
suggests that we do not take our obligations under the Convention
seriously If we can disregard those provisions that we dislike,
other parties to the Convention may do likewise, thereby weaken-
ing the Convention and international law generally 
45
Failing to permit individuals to invoke Articles 2 and 6 would
increase the likelihood that such international law violations will
go unaddressed.458 Public clamor about the insidious effects of
456. See supra part IV.B.
457. One prominent Mexican scholar responded to the Alvarez-Machain decision as
follows: "We are offended by this imperialistic judgment. We understand your
anger, but not your methods. There is no difference ethically between what
terrorists do and what the U.S. has done." Interview with Dr. Victor C. Garcia-Moreno,
Professor of International Law at Umversity Autonoma of Mexico, Mexico City, Mex.
(July 22, 1992) (noting that Mexico is worried about whether the United States "Will
keep its word" and stating that-assuming that the- evidence was sufficient-Mexico
would have prosecuted Alvarez-Macham).
In response to Mexican complaints regarding the Alvarez-Macham kidnapping and
the Supreme Court decision, the United States negotiated and signed a treaty with
Mexico outlawing such abductions. See Marcus Stern, Zedillo Concerned That Prop. 187
Could Become National Policy, SAN DIEGO UNION, Nov. 24, 1994, at A-18. President
Clinton, however, has not submitted the treaty (called "The Abduction Treaty") to the
Senate for ratification because of a dispute with Mexico concerning Mexico's apparent
reneging on a promise to extradite one of its nationals suspected in the United States
of raping a minor. Tim Golden, Dispute Holds Up U.S. Extradition Treaty with Mexico,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1994, § 1, at 6; Doyle McManus, Reno To Protest Mexico's Plan
To Withhold Suspect in Rape, LA TIMES, May 9, 1994, at A-4. If and when
submitted, the treaty faces an uncertain fate in the Senate. See EXTRADITION.
Congress Is Right To Turn Up the Heat on Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 12,
1995, at 2J (noting the initial opposition of Jesse Helms, Chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, because of Mexico's refusal to extradite one of its nationals who
allegedly raped a California girl).
458. The plain meaning and drafting history of the Supremacy Clause implicitly
view individuals and the judiciary as helping to enforce treaty obligations. See supra
part II.A.2.a. The Haitian refugee case illustrates this principle. See Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); supra note 154 (discussing Sale). Neither
President Bush nor President Clinton was willing to carry out the United States'
obligations under the Protocol protecting refugees, see Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, supra note 98, presumably because of the broad public opposition to the
imigration of Haitian refugees, see Steven A. Holmes, Pressure Builds over Return
of Boat People to Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, § 1, at A17; The Truth Rebuked
on Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, § 1, at A38. In one of its most strained inter-
pretations of a treaty in recent memory, the Supreme Court upheld the
Administration's interdiction of the Haitians on the high seas and their forced return
to Haiti without even a cursory check to determine whether any of the refugees
qualified for political asylum. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2567. Had the Supreme Court
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illicit drugs has, unfortunately, often drowned out those who call
for respecting international law and protecting basic human and
constitutional rights. Sensing the majority will, low-level law
enforcement officials may be tempted to engage in foreign
adventuring at the cost of future law enforcement benefits,
thereby eroding respect for the rule of law 4" Given the unap-
pealing character of abducted drug defendants, the executive
branch may be unwilling to enforce our international obligations
vigorously
Those who argue that state-sponsored kidnappmg prevents drug
dealers from seeking havens in sympathetic states460 put short-
term results ahead of long-term solutions.46' Kidnapping weak-
ens the Convention because it leads to distrust and disrespect,
thereby erecting barriers to commumcation, cooperation, and
exchange of information. If the United States abducts drug
suspects in violation of the Convention, countries like the
followed the clear language of the treaty, language that was consistent with the
treaty's purpose, the Court would have helped the United States to comply with its
treaty obligations. The Court in Sale, however, abdicated its responsibilities as an
impartial arbiter of the law.
459. Alvarez-Macham made this argument in his brief in the United States Supreme
Court. Respondent's Brief at 13, United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)
(No. 91-712).
460. See Semmelman, supra note 227, at 563; Symposium, supra note 428, at 427-
28 (recounting the assertions of Alvarez-Macham's prosecutor that the brutal nature
of Enrique Camarena's killing, official Mexican corruption, and the ability to deter
traffickers from similarly torturing and murdering our agents in other cases justified
Alvarez-Macham's abduction); Matorm, supra note 280, at 931-32; Weisman, supra note
428, at 173. Admittedly, the safe havens argument is not a frivolous one. Certain
countries do play this role, and some government officials are subject to corruption.
Resorting to the expedient of a state-sponsored kidnapping rather than to lawful
bilateral and multilateral remedies, however, generally undermines over the long term,
effective international law enforcement efforts. See infra notes 461-67 and accompany-
ing text.
461. Countries that establish havens for maUor drug traffickers may be subject to
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 41;
cf. G.A. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc S/Res/47th
(1992) (imposing economic sanctions on Libya for its refusal to surrender two fugitives
charged with complicity in the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103, the Lockerbie case).
Providing havens for such operators may constitute a sufficient "threat to peace" to
trigger U.N. sanctions. Cf. G.A.Res. 48, supra (citing such a threat as the basis for the
Security Council's sanctions). The United States also can unilaterally impose trade
sanctions on such haven countries and attempt to get its allies to do likewise. See
U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
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Bahamas can equally justify refusing to provide access to banking
records. Ending bank secrecy and thereby maung money
laundering far more difficult was one of the Convention's major
achievements and a long-sought goal of United States law
enforcement.462 State-sponsored tidnappings over time, there-
fore, act as a drag on effective international law enforcement463
462. Cf. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6 (making crinnal the
conversion or concealment of property obtained from drug trafficking activities).
463. State-sponsored kidnappings may thwart effective multilateral law enforcement
efforts. For example, the United States focuses much of its drug interdiction effort on
the Amencas-Mexico, Central America, and South America. See Zagars & MacDonald,
supra note 447, at 188. Some Latin American countries, however, have been less than
stalwart allies in the United States' war against drugs. See id. Because most of these
countries do not have a major domestic drug problem comparable to that of the United
States, they have viewed the drug crisis as our problem: if the demand went down,
the drug problem would disappear. Id. at 190; GILBERT, supra note 414, at 366
("[Many South American countries have not viewed the narcotics problem as having
the same urgency as in the United States."). Increasingly, Mexico has treated the
production and distribution of drugs seriously. Id. Jim Kolbe, the Republican Congress
member who sponsored a bill to stop such kidnappings in the future, noted that
Mexico has become a key fighter in the war against drugs. Mary Benanti, Kolbe Calls
for Clarification of Mexico Extradition Treaty, Ganent News Serv., June 19, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Gns File; Sam Dillon, Mexico Arrests a Top Suspect
in Drug Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at Al (relating how Mexico arrested and
handed over to United States authorities Juan Garcia Abrego, who was on the FBI's
"10 most-wanted List" and who was accused of being "one of the hemisphere's most
powerful and murderous drug lords"); Ann Devroy & Pierre Thomas, Clinton Advised
To Certify Mexico As Cooperative in Drug War, WASH. POST Mar. 1, 1996, at A19
(relating how Clinton Administration officials have determined that, despite having an
important role as a conduit of illicit drugs to the United States, Mexico has "made
strides in its anti-narcotics efforts"); Habrd Nueva Audiencta del Congreso para
Angalizar el Caso Alvarez Mdchain, EL NACIONAL, June 30, 1992, at 13; Jorge Pinto,
Credit Mexico for Drug War Successes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, § 1, at A12 (noting
that, in 1994, Mexican authorities confiscated drugs with a street value of nearly $100
billion). But see Symposium, supra note 428, at 428-29 (alleging official corruption in
Mexican drug enforcement efforts); Sam Dillon, Mexicans Tire of Police Graft As Drug
Lords Raise Stakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at A3 (alleging institutional corruption
in Mexico's police forces); Tim Golden, To Help Keep Mexico Stable, U.S. Soft-Pedaled
Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1995, at 1; David Johnston, Clinton Urged To Cite
Mexico for Drug Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996, at 1, 12 (noting that some unnamed
United States narcotics officials are concerned about the growth of Mexican drug
cartels). Mexico can serve as an honest broker between the United States and other
Latin American source and transshipment countries. By taking strong steps against
drug trafficking and production, Mexico, an admitted leader in Latin America, is well
positioned to encourage other Latin American countries to do likewise. Zagars &
McDonald, supra note 447, at 190. The diplomacy of the United States may not be as
effective in these countries as Mexico's example and effort. A series of state-sponsored
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in much the same way that a hostile police force entering a
minority community often provokes resentment, causing the
community to refuse to cooperate with the police,M resulting in
fewer arrests and convictions. As Alvarez-Machan illustrates,
45
such a policy may not be limited to states who are sympathetic to
the illicit drug trade but may embrace allies committed to the
fight against illicit drugs and psychotropic substances.
Justice Brandeis, though in a domestic context, conveyed the
consequences of government agents' violation of the law in the
name of enforcing the law-
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously Our
Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy To declare that in the adminstra-
tion of the crimnal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribu-
tion. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should
resolutely set its face."
The United States has a long tradition of using law to resolve
disputes at home.467 Justice Brandeis's words apply equally to
how we conduct ourselves toward other countries and their
citizens in the increasingly small and interdependent global
community
kidnappings, however, might dissuade Mexico from zealously cooperating with the
United States on international drug enforcement. Senate ratification of the Abduction
Treaty, see supra note 457, may end the controversy concerning the abduction of Mexi-
cans from their country, but whether the President will submit the treaty to the
Senate or whether the Senate will ratify it is by no means certain.
464. See, e.g., Dwight L. Greene, Foreword: Drug Decriminalization: A Chorus in
Need of Masterrap's Voice, 18 HOFSTRA L. Rsv. 457, 491 (1990). If the United States
wished to arrest a major trafficker who fled to Mexico, some Mexicans, resentful of the
U.S. kidnapping of Alvarez-Macham, might refuse to come forward with information
about the major trafficker.
465. See United States v. Alvarez-Macham, 504 U.S. 655, 668-70 (1992); Zagars &
MacDonald, supra note 447, at 188.
466. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).




By violating the Treaty of Peace of 1783 with Great Britain, the
individual confederated United States provoked British retaliation
and risked the fruits of the hard-won independence.4" During
the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and the states' ratification
process, which lasted until 1788, the Framers were keenly aware
of the dangerous consequences of violating treaties.469 As a
result, they made treaties the supreme law of the land,47
enforceable by individuals in state and federal courts.47' Because
the states had violated the Tones' treaty rights, the Framers
particularly wanted to ensure that Tories and other foreigners
would have access to our courts.472 Empowered to invoke trea-
ties, the Framers believed that these foreigners would be less
likely to complain to their home countries about maltreatment at
the hands of the United States.473 If our government infringes
upon foreigners' rights, the potential for international conflict is
greater than if private parties do so.' Consequently, when a
foreigner invokes a treaty to defend against a governmental
proceeding, the court should presume that the treaty or relevant
treaty provision is self-executing. The government may rebut the
presumption of self-execution only upon showing that (1) the trea-
ty or relevant treaty provision manifestly makes itself non-self-
executing by its own terms, (2) enforcing the treaty would violate
the Constitution's separation of powers, or (3) the individual
defensively asserting the treaty provision is not arguably within
the zone of interests protected by the treaty or treaty provision in
question.475
The history of Articles 2 and 6 of the U.N. Convention Against
468. See supra notes 26-53 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
473. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
474. Cf supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing Alexander Hamilton's
concern over foreigners' complaints to their home countries regarding unjust treatment
at the hands of the American government).
475. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
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Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances476
demonstrates that the articles neither pose a separation-of-powers
conflict nor make themselves non-self-executing by their own
terms.4" Furthermore, reading Articles 2 and 6 together shows
that the parties implicitly intended to protect their nationals from
state-sponsored abductions. 4" Articles 2 and 6 are thus self-
executing. Co-sponsored by our neighbors, Canada and Mexico,
Article 2 underscored fears that United States agents would
disregard boundaries and trample upon sovereign rights of other
countries and their nationals.47 s Article 2 was a quid pro quo to
the parties' acceptance of their other obligations under the
Convention, the most sweeping criminal-law convention ever
agreed upon. Coincidentally, not only did the United States
strenuously oppose the proposed Article 2,40 but we also vigor-
ously supported a much stricter draft of Article 6, requiring states
to extradite their nationals. 481' Defeated on both counts, the
United States would appear to be mocking the Convention and the
rule of law if our agents kidnap foreign nationals from their
countries in an apparent attempt to overcome our losses at the
conference table.
Given the Framers' intent to avoid conflict with foreign govern-
ments, courts should allow foreign nationals who are the direct
objects of our government's treaty violations to invoke the treaty
to challenge a court's jurisdiction over them and to obtain a
dismissal and an order returmng them to the asylum country
Such a result helps fulfill the United States' treaty obligations,
avoids friction with other countries, and aids in effectuating the
Convention by promoting cooperation among the parties in the
fight against the illicit drug trade. Lastly, such a result advances
respect for the rule of law, particularly given the United States'
stance towards Articles 2 and 6 when proposed. As Judge Oakes
of the Second Circuit stated concerning a state-sponsored
abduction in another context:
476. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2,6.
477. See supra part W.B.
478. See supra part IV.B.
479. See supra notes 329-50 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 324, 328 and accompanying text.
481. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
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That respect for the sovereign integrity of other nations is, in
addition to conforming to high moral principles, a self-serving
pragmatic viewpoint for the United States to take; we can
better demand in the international court of public opinion
silar respect for our sovereign integrity if we extend such
respect to others.4
482. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert.
denzed, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
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APPENDIX
Drafting History of Article 2 of the U.N Drug Trafficking
Convention
The full text of Mexico's original proposal is as follows:
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
In full compliance with the principles of international law
regarding legal equality and sovereign equality of States, as
well as the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs
which are essentially within the exclusive competence of
States, the Parties agree that:
1. This Convention constitutes an instrument of international
co-operation, aimed at ensuring maximum effectiveness in the
struggle of the States Parties against the illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, m all aspects of
the problem as a whole, in all cases within [sic] the most strict
respect for, and m full compliance with, the limits set by the
provisions of the respective internal legal system of each State
Party, and in the framework of applicable treaties in force on
the matter.
2. Nothing in this Convention empowers, in any way whatsoev-
er, the authorities of one of the States Parties to undertake, to
attempt to undertake or to exercise pressure in order to be al-
lowed, in the territorial jurisdiction of any of the other States
Parties, the exercise and performance of functions whose
jurisdiction or competence are exclusively reserved to the
authorities of each of those other States Parties by their
respective national laws and regulations.
3. This Convention in no case implies and cannot be interpret-
ed in the sense that, in order to comply with it, a State Party
has undertaken, by virtue of its provisions, to take measures
itself or to authorize measures in its territorial jurisdiction
which in any way exceed its legal jurisdiction or competence,
or which in any other manner are not expressly permitted by
its legal provisions in force, or which may, in the judgment of




4. In conformity with the above paragraphs, none of the
provisions of tins Convention shall be invoked or utilized as a
pretext to attempt to go beyond the precise limits of its scope,
m contravention of the provisions of this article 4
The Canadian-Mexican amendment changed the original as
follows:
1. This Convention constitutes an instrument of international
co-operation, aimed at ensuring maximum effectiveness in the
struggle of the States Parties against the illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,"" in .. a "
of the problem as a whole, m all eascs within [siel the most
stret respeet foAr -adm in ull ompance with the Rixuit sct by
the provisinea of the rcopctive "-tcrnal system of each State
Party, and in the franacwor4 of applicablo treatie mn forec onR
the matter.4' Its provisions are directed at all aspects of the
problem with strict respect for the provisions of the internal
system of each State Party.4
The Canadian-Mexican amendment collapsed paragraphs 3 and
4 of the original into the second paragraph:
3. Thi convention in no ease uplieo and cannot be interpreted
in the euce that, n order to comply with it, a State Party ha
undertaken, by virtue of ito provwieno to tAe ineacurcos itoe
or to authorize measurco mn its territorial juno dic-t-in winh in;
any way eeed it legal ju ditin onar cmpetence, or which
in any other manner are not expressly permitted by its legal.
pro8in0 in feore, or wneh may, i the judgment of that t
Paft, preqjudice its eecurity, public order or any ether eccential
4t84.Itd. 87
4. In coormity with the above paragrphs, none of the
proaiono of ti Conventien shall be nvoked or utilied as a
pretet to attempt to go beyond the preo3,e limits of its cpe.
483. 1 Official Records, supra note 318, at 76.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328.
487. 1 Official Records, supra note 318, at 76.
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m; contr~__~aUtin of the provqiens of thic artile.'
2. Nothing in tbis Convention derogates from the principles of
the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States or that
of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States 89
The Canadian-Mexican amendment moved the second para-
graph to the third paragraph:
2. 3. Nothing in this Convention empowers, 490 -i-any-v-ay
whatsoeve"491 the authorities of one of the States Parties to
undertake'. t tmp.t undertake or to c.. r.i.. prcsure
m order to be allowcd, 93 m the territorial jurisdiction of any
of the other States Parties, the exercise and performance of
functions whose jurisdiction or competence are exclusively
reserved to the authorities' of eaeh A "' those other States
Parties by their respective national laws and regulations.4
The first paragraph of the Canadian-Mexican proposal was
modified slightly by Canada and Mexico shortly after it was
proposed. As amended, the proposed article read:
1. This Convention constitutes an instrument of mternational
co-operation, aimed at ensuring maximum effectiveness in the
struggle of the States Parties against the illicit traffic in
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 41 I ts pre sieais
aRrce directed at all aspects of the problem with etrict respectfr
the proisions of the internal system of ca h State Par, 4 98
Its provisions, which are directed at all aspects of the problem,
establish obligations which are to be implemented and
executed with strict respect for the provisions of the internal
system of each State Party.
41
488. Id.
489. Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328.






496. Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328.
497. 1 Official Records, supra note 318, at 76.
498. Id.
499. Amendment Submitted by Canada and Mexico, United Nations Conference for
the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic m Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
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A few days later, forty-two countries, including Canada and
Mexico, again amended the first paragraph, also modifying the
second sentence of that paragraph. In this. amendment, that
sentence read as follows: "Its provisions, which are directed at all
aspects of the problem, establish obligations which are to be
implemented and executed with strict respect for the fundamental
provisions of the internal legal system of each State Party 00
The United States continued to oppose the proposed article. The
United States delegate stated:
95. Mr. Newlin (United States of America) said that his
delegation was opposed to the article 1 bis set forth in docu-
ment EJCONF.821C.1/L.1/Rev.2. [The United States delegation]
believed that the convention did not need an article on its
scope. Moreover, several parts of the proposed article were
already covered by existing provisions. For example, the first
sentence of paragraph 1 and the whole of paragraph 2 were
more suitable for the preamble to the convention. As to the
second sentence of paragraph 1, it could be interpreted as a
saving clause which would call into question the obligations of
the Parties under the convention to change their national
legislation in order to bring it into conformity with the
convention. That result might not have been the one intended
by the original sponsors of article I bis but it was unfortunate-
ly a possible interpretation of the sentence in question. It was
also highly questionable whether a safeguard clause of a gen-
eral character in article 1 was needed when there were already
safeguard clauses in a number of articles of the convention,
such as articles 2, 3, 4 and 5.
96. Paragraph 3 of the proposed article I bis dealt with a very
minor issue which was already covered by article 6, paragraph
1(a).
97 In conclusion, all the elements in the proposed article 1 bzs
Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.821C.1/L.1/Rev.1 (1988) (amended language shaded,
original language struck).
500. Amendment Submitted by Afghanistan et al., United Nations Conference for the
Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.821C.1/L.1/Rev.2 (1988) (amended language emphasized).
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were either unnecessary because they were to be found
elsewhere m the draft or undesirable because they were likely
to have harmful consequences on the convention if adopted. He
accordingly urged the Committee to reject the proposal." 1
The United Kingdom submitted an amendment to modify the
second sentence of the first paragraph. Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and
Sweden also sponsored the United Kingdom's amendment. The
U.K.'s amendment substituted the following language for the
second sentence of the first paragraph: "In implementing and
executing their obligations under the Convention, States Parties
shall take any necessary measures, including legislative and
administrative measures, in conformity with the fundamental
provisions of their internal legal systems."0 2
The U.K.'s amendment appeared to attempt to strike a balance
between requiring state parties to fulfill their obligations under
the Convention and recognizing the constitutional limitations of
the individual states. Three days later, the United States
introduced its own proposal. In offering the proposal, the United
States delegate explained that the United States wanted to
change the tone of the proposal from the negative to the positive:
5. Mr. MEYER (United States of America) said that his
delegation did not believe that an article on the scope of the
convention was necessary m an instrument of the present
type, although he saw merit in the amended text referred to
by the previous speaker [the U.K. delegate]. The mare
difficulty which his delegation found with that text was the
prevailingly negative tone of the wording. It had accordingly
redrafted the text with the aim of giving it a more positive
mode of expression." a
Retaining the United Kingdom's language in the second
sentence of paragraph 1, the United States proposal changed the
language of the first sentence of paragraph 1.
501. 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 156.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 171.
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1. This Convcntion consgtetc an inotumcnt ofmtcrnation-al
ec opcr.ation, .. nd at .n.ur..g max.mum cffc.tiven.. m thc
otruggic of the Statz Partics agast the ii it traffic m
narcoatie drugs and -psychotropic oubot;Ancz.F 04 The purpose
of the present Convention is to assist States Parties to address
more effectively the various aspects of the drug abuse problem
having an international dimension.. In implementing and
executing their obligations under the Convention States Par-
ties shall take any necessary measures, including legislative
and administrative measures, in conformity with the funda-
mental provisions of their internal legal systems."°
The United States' proposed second paragraph phrased the
state parties' obligations affirmatively rather than negatively-
2. Nothing m thAc;F Cefivcnion dcroegatco from the prrciplco oa
the sovcrceign equahity and tcrritorial mtegrity of States or that
of non mtcrvcntion m thc domcstic affairs of Statc7. States
Parties shall carry out their obligations under the present
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that
of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States& 8
As to the last paragraph, the United States proposal tightened
up the language, omitting some verbose phrasing, without altering
the substance of the original:
3. Nothing in t1us C-Genvcntn cmpowcrs thc authoritics of onc
of the States -RR-Poic to;;-; ucrtokc, in the tcrritorial juridiction
of any of the othcrf States Partics, the excreise and pcrfor
manec of finctions whooc jurisdicition [sid or compctcnecor
cxclucivcly rcocrFvd for thc authoritico of thooz other Statcs
Porztico by thcir national laws -anRd rcgulationo.5 " A State Part
to the present Convention shall not undertake in the territory
of another State Party the independent exercise and pe;for-
504. 1 id. at 76.
505. 2 id at 171.
506. Id. at 156.
507. Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328.
508. 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 171.
509. Canadian & Mexican Amendment, supra note 328.
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mance of functions which are reserved for the authorities of that
other State Party by its national law and regulations.51°
Note that the word "independent" was added to paragraph 3 to
include the possibility of joint operations. Delegate Meyer ex-
plained the change as follows:
9. One slightly new element had been introduced into para-
graph 2, namely the word "independent", which was intended
to ensure that there was no possible conflict between article 1
bis and article 6, which dealt with joint operations. Apart from
that, no element previously present in the 42-nation proposal
had been omitted or modified.511
After subsequent consultation with some of the delegates,
apparently including Mexico and Canada,512 the United States
modified its proposed scope article, dropping, among other things,
the word "independent."51 Mr. Meyer explained the modifica-
tions as follows:
2. Mr. MEYER (United States of America) said that, as a
result of consultations with other delegations on the text of his
proposals, he had introduced some changes which he hoped
would make a consensus on article 1 bis more likely The
revised text was before the Committee in document
E/CONF.82/C.1/L.38. The Committee would note that, in the
first sentence of paragraph 1, the words "to assist States
Parties to address more effectively" now read "to promote co-
operation among States Parties so that they may address more
effectively" In paragraph 3, the words "the independent
exercise and performance of functions which are reserved for
the authorities" had been amended to read "the exercise of
jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively
reserved for the authorities." 14
As amended, the United States proposal read as follows:
510. 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 171.
511. Id.





1. The purpose of the present convention is.. to assist the
Statcs Paitirs add.. .. more cctrl" 5 15 to promote co-
operation among States Parties so that they may address more
effectively"l7 the various aspects of the drug abuse problem
having an international dimension." 8 In implementing and
executing their obligations under the Convention States
Parties shall take any necessary measures, including legisla-
tive and administrative measures, in conformity with the
fundamental provisions of their internal legal systems." 9
2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under the
present Convention in a manner consistent with the principles
of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and
that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other
States.520
3. A State Party to the present Convention shall not undertake
in the territory of another State Party521 th -d.. -
eyxereise and performanee o-f functeioens -Avch ar r czrd for
thc a-thoeriicos the exercise of jurisdiction and performance
of functions Which are exclusively reserved for the author-
ities5 of that other State Party by its national law and
regulations.5
The amended language shaded above does not appear to make
any substantive changes, other than to state expressly the
purpose of the Convention, when the earlier draft had implied it.
The amended U.S. proposal underwent slight, subsequent
amendments and then became Article 2 of the Convention:
515. Id. at 171.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 176.
518. Id. at 171.
519. Id. at 156.
520. Id. at 171.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 176.
524. Id. at 171 (amended language shaded, original language struck).
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Article 2 - SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
1. The purpose of this Convention is to promote co-operation
among the Parties so that they may address more effectively
the various aspects of' the drug ab pr.. bl mP526 illicit
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances5" hav-
ing an international dimension. In carrying out their obliga-
tions under the Convention, the Parties shall take necessary
measures, including legislative and adminstrative measures,
in conformity with the fundamental provisions of their re-
spective domestic legislative systems.5"
2. The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that
of non-mtervention in the domestic affairs of other States.52
3. A Party shall not undertake in the territory of another Party
the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which
are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Party
by its 530 national lawD,, and regulAion 53 1 domestic law...
525. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6.
526. 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 171.




531. 2 Official Records, supra note 318, at 171.
532. U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention, supra note 6 (amended language shaded,
previous drafts language struck).
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